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Steven Velychenko

BOHDAN KHMELNYTSKY AND THE RAKOCZIS
OF TRANSYLVANIA DURING THE POLISH
ELECTION OF 1648

... Iakie i Rakoczy
Osobney w-tym odniego żadaiąc pomocy
Iakoby mogł Elektem Polskieu bydz Korony
Czego dopiąć rozumie kiedy on z swej strony
Pod Krakow sam wymierzy, a z-drugiey Kozacy
Ku Warszawie postąpią...
... i Rakocemu pierwey rady doda
Ieżli wzaiem, kiedy on dopnie sam Korony
Zostawie go przy ziemi Ruskiej udzielony
I Kiiow za — xiążecą bedzie miał Stolice.

Samuel Twardowski, *Wojna Domowa*.

During his lifetime, the Polish king Władysław IV made a number of unsuccessful attempts at increasing royal authority in the Rzeczpospolita. The gentry, zealous in their defense of the "golden liberties," which included the right to elect a king, was understandably wary of him. Indeed, as early as 1627 Rafał Leszczyński, the voievode of Bielsk, had expressed his reservations about the possibility of Władysław becoming king because of his "inclination toward tyranny."¹ But the king persisted in his attempts despite repeated failures, and during the last years of his life he began

¹ Archiwum Radziwillow, Archiwum główne akt dawnych (Warsaw), sec. 5, vol. 173, no. 8080, pp. 236-38.

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planning a crusade against the Turks, which he hoped would bring him the power he sought. The Ukrainian cossacks were to have played an important role in this scheme as a military vanguard, and their leaders, including Bohdan Khmelnytsky, met with Władysław in May 1647. There is no record of what transpired at the meeting, though most likely the king informed them of his immediate intentions. These included a march with the royal guard to Kiev, where, by virtue of his presence, Władysław hoped to be able to raise the troops he needed for the crusade and thereby make himself independent of the gentry and the Seym.² Soon after this meeting Władysław left for Warsaw, and one year later he died.

Bohdan Khmelnytsky, meanwhile, suffered a personal disaster that altered his life. While he was absent from his estate, a local Polish nobleman, Czaplinski, pillaged and destroyed it, ran off with his mistress, and savagely beat one of his sons within an inch of his life. Marked as one of the “king’s men,” Khmelnytsky was unable to obtain satisfaction from the courts and, instead, was himself arrested. Escaping from prison with the help of friends, he fled to the Zaporozhian Sich convinced that not only his own injustice, but the grievances of the entire cossack estate, whose rights had been so drastically circumscribed after 1638, could only be redressed by force of arms. Accordingly, his original purpose was to obtain a reconfirmation of the cossack rights the Poles had come to ignore. Arriving at the Sich in February 1648, Khmelnytsky was elected hetman shortly thereafter. He proceeded to conclude an alliance with the Crimean Tatars, and in the spring he began military operations against the Polish army. After leading his forces to two major victories, the hetman stopped at the town of Bila Tserkva in June and entered into negotiations with Warsaw.

The cossack summer campaign of 1648 had been well planned. If, for example, the dates of the first battles are compared with the distances between the battlefields, it emerges that Khmelnytsky’s headquarters moved at an average of thirty to thirty-five kilometers daily. This was fast, especially when compared with the twelve kilometers averaged by the Polish army during its march from Lviv to Pyliavtsi that same summer.³ The speed of the march strongly suggests that Khmelnytsky and his officers intended to

² W. Czermak, *Plany wojny tureckiej Władysława IV* (Cracow, 1895), pp. 271, 322.

³ I. Krypiakevych, ed., *Dokumenty Bohdana Khmelnytskoho* (Kiev, 1961), p. 664.

do more than merely defeat the Polish field army. Given the hetman's last meeting with the king, it seems that their objective could have been a rendezvous with the monarch, at which time they would have put themselves and their army at his disposal. With over 12,000 professional soldiers under his personal command, Władysław would then have been free do as he willed, for he could have been challenged only by one or two of the most powerful magnates. From the cossacks' point of view such a rendezvous would have had an important legitimizing function. A declaration of loyalty to the king would have sanctioned the officers' military initiative, thereby absolving them from the stigma of rebellion that had hung over them after their victories over the Polish forces.

If these had actually been Khmelnytsky's plans, they were abruptly nullified by Władysław's death in May 1648, and the shock the news of his death must have had upon the hetman must therefore not be underestimated. Indeed, Khmelnytsky actually believed the king had been poisoned by those who feared his absolutist intentions.⁴ But this was not the only shock in store for the cossack leader in the early days of June 1648, for at about the same time that he heard about the king's death, he also received news that a large Muscovite army had been mobilized and was threatening his rear.

Faced with these two developments, the hetman suspended military operations and turned to diplomacy. First, he began searching for a powerful patron-protector who could represent the cossacks at the coming royal election.⁵ Second, he wrote to Moscow and informed Tsar Aleksei that he wanted him as king of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth.⁶ But Khmelnytsky had unleashed a revolution that did not permit him to remain militarily inactive for long. A radical faction, represented by Maksym Kryvonos and Matvii Hladky, opposed negotiating with the Poles and pressed for confrontation. The Poles, for their part, were prepared to recognize Khmelnytsky as hetman, but were reluctant to agree to concrete issues. Consequently, the hetman resumed the campaign in July. But the pace was slower now. On the one hand, Khmelnytsky wanted to come to an agreement with the Poles,

⁴ *Vossoedinenie Ukrayiny s Rossiei*, 3 vols (Moscow, 1954), 2: doc. no. 41, 50. *Akty moskovskogo gosudarstva* (St. Petersburg, 1890), 2: doc. no. 342, 357.

⁵ Letters were sent to Adam Kysil, Adam Kazanowski, and Dominik Zaslawski. I. Krypiakevych, op. cit., pp. 39-47, 59-63.

⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 48-49.

for it had not been his intention to spark off a mass rebellion; he felt he was losing control of the situation and plunging the entire society into anarchy. On the other hand, he did not know whether the tsar would react favorably to his letter and not attack his rear.⁷ After defeating a large Polish army at Pyliavtsi, on 16 November the cossack army reached the town of Zamość (Zamostia), 250 kilometers away from Warsaw. According to contemporary accounts, Khmelnytsky continued military preparations there and expressed his intention of marching as far as the Vistula River.⁸ On 20 November, however, the Ukrainian army had begun marching back to central Ukraine.

Historians have argued that in the autumn of 1648 the hetman's objectives were limited, as they had been in the summer, to obtaining an increase in the number of registered cossacks and greater rights for them. Such an interpretation, however, ignores the administrative-political implications of Ukrainian demands. By calling for a register of 12,000 cossacks to be placed under the direct command of the king, Khmelnytsky was in reality making a demand that would result in the establishment of absolutism and the abrogation of the gentry's "golden liberties." If the Seym had agreed to such a demand, the king would have in effect been provided with a large standing army that he could then use at any time to force the gentry estate to agree to increasing royal prerogative. Chancellor Jerzy Ossoliński realized this as early as July 1648, at which time he wrote that meeting cossack demands would signal the end of the gentry-republican order.⁹ Ostensibly, Khmelnytsky was making limited demands in order to facilitate compromise between himself and the gentry and thus terminate the war. In actual fact, his demands could only result in extended

⁷ It was rumored that the tsar had offered Khmelnytsky an alliance in return for Ukrainian lands east of the Dnieper River. If this is true, Khmelnytsky had obviously refused. Cf. A. Z. Helcel, ed., *Jakuba Michałowskiego... księga pamiętnicza* (Cracow, 1864), pp. 236-38; E. Raczyński, ed., *Pamiętniki Albrechta Radziwiłła* (Poznań, 1839), 2: 298, 307, 312. For what is perhaps the best discussion of Ukrainian-Russian relations in 1648-49, see J. Seredyka, "Stosunki ukraińsko-rosyjskie w 1648," *Zeszyty naukowe Uniw. Wrocławskiego*, ser. A: *Nauki społeczne* 23 (1960): 57-189, and his "Stosunki ukraińsko-rosyjskie w pierwszej połowie 1649 roku," *Zeszyty naukowe Wyszej szkoły pedagogicznej w Opolu*, *Historia* 2 (1961): 171-94.

⁸ M. Hrushevsky, *Istoriia Ukrainy-Rusy*, 2d ed. (New York, 1956), 8, pt 3: 100; I. Krypiakevych, op. cit., p. 76.

⁹ L. Kubala, *Jerzy Ossoliński* (Lviv, 1922), pp. 279-80.

negotiations—thus delaying the choice of a successor to Władysław IV.

Between June and December the royal election took place in Warsaw. Of the three major candidates—Jan Kazimierz, his brother Karl Ferdinand, and Prince George II Rákóczi of Transylvania (a small but powerful country that in the middle of the seventeenth century was a major European power)—it seemed initially that Karl Ferdinand would win. Ossoliński, a man disliked by the gentry, backed Jan Kazimierz, who stood for compromise with the cossacks. The militant majority, however, supported Karl, the bishop of Wrocław and favorite of the papal curia, who stood for confrontation. But as the election and the war with the cossacks dragged on, Karl's support slowly dwindled. When news of Khmelnytsky's expression of support for Jan Kazimierz, first made on 6 November, reached Warsaw five or six days later, Karl Ferdinand was persuaded to withdraw, in the interests of national unity, in favor of his brother, who was proclaimed king on 20 November. Tsar Aleksei, who had been one of the minor candidates during the election, recognized Jan Kazimierz as soon as he was informed.

The Rákóczis, however, were loath to give up a chance to take the Polish throne. But their candidacy had little gentry support and was opposed by Brandenburg, Austria, and Sweden, which were decidedly against the prospect of a strong Transylvania in dynastic union with the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. George II Rákóczi, like his father George I, who had died on 11 October 1648, could therefore count only on the support of the dissident Calvinist-Orthodox faction led by Prince Janusz Radziwiłł and on the cossacks. On 19 November, however, Radziwiłł formally accepted Jan Kazimierz's election. The Rákóczis were thus left with only one major potential ally in their bid for the Polish crown: Khmelnytsky and the cossack army, which was slowly getting closer and closer to the capital.

Khmelnytsky, of course, turned back at Zamość, and it is the accepted interpretation that he did so because Jan Kazimierz, purportedly his candidate for the throne, had been elected. In light of the hetman's relations with the Rákóczis, however, it is possible to doubt seriously the sincerity of the Ukrainian leader's declaration of support for the Polish prince. His declaration can be seen as a ruse intended to prolong the election Seym and delay its outcome by keeping the gentry divided for as long as possible. Being well informed of the balance of forces, Khmelnytsky knew the gentry favored confrontation and that their candidate was Karl Ferdinand. In a letter to Jan Kazimierz dated 16 November, he frankly stated his belief that “the commonwealth does not want

your highness as its king.”¹⁰ From his point of view there was no reason why his declaration of support for Jan Kazimierz should automatically tear the gentry away from Karl. Furthermore, the hetman’s political beliefs made it quite unlikely that he would have supported any gentry-elected candidate for the Polish throne: he and his officers knew quite well how Polish kings were limited by and beholden to their electors. What Khmelnytsky wanted was a strong monarch on the throne, “an autocratic sovereign.”¹¹ In June, after he heard of the death of Władysław, he expressed his support for the candidacy of the Muscovite tsar in precisely these words. But by November his choice had changed. It was no longer the tsar nor Jan Kazimierz, but George II Rákóczi, a ruler who would not be beholden to the gentry if he succeeded in taking the throne with the help of the cossack army.

Khmelnytsky’s choice did not reflect a radical departure from the pattern of Polish-Ukrainian politics at the time. The Transylvanian princes had been popular among the Ukrainian Orthodox since the last decades of the sixteenth century. Under the rule of Stefan Batory (who was king of Poland between 1576 and 1586) the Orthodox church suffered no persecution, and the cossacks benefitted from his military reforms (especially the establishment of the register in 1576) to such an extent that well after his death their officers referred to his reign as an idyllic period. In later petitions to the Seym or the king, they requested that relations between themselves and the Rzeczpospolita be “as they were” under his rule.¹² In 1623 an anonymous Orthodox prelate expressed the following sentiment concerning Batory:

Let agreement and harmony exist among the Polish, Lithuanian, and Ruthenian nations . . . as it did under King Stefan. He concerned himself only with the good of the Commonwealth . . . and realized nothing would lead to its decline faster than religious persecution.¹³

¹⁰ I. Krypiakevych, op. cit., p. 80. Khmelnytsky later told the Russians he had not recognized Jan Kazimierz at the time he was elected because “[in Poland] there is not a single king and one council, [instead] everyone rules the cossacks.” *Vossoedienenie*, 2: docs. 152, 167.

¹¹ I. Krypiakevych, op. cit., pp. 33-34, 48-49; A. Z. Helcel, op. cit., pp. 236-38; I. Krypiakevych, “Sotsialno-politychni pohliady Bohdana Khmelnytskoho,” *Ukrainskyi istorychnyi zhurnal*, 1957, no. 1, pp. 94-105.

¹² Samiilo Kishka to Sigismund III in 1600. *Zherela do istorii Ukrayn-Rusy* (Lviv, 1895-1924), 8: doc. no. 72. See also W. Jarosz, “Legenda Batoryanska,” *Kwartalnik historyczny* 17 (1903): 596-616.

¹³ M. Koialovich, ed., *Dokumenty obiasniaiushchiia istoriiu zapadnorusskago kraia* (St. Petersburg, 1865), pp. 300-303.

Khmelnitsky shared this view of Batory: in a letter to Rákóczi in November 1648, he mentioned that he held this monarch's name "in esteem."¹⁴

The Rzeczpospolita and Transylvania were close politically at the end of the sixteenth and the beginning of the seventeenth century; indeed, they were in dynastic union between 1576 and 1598. This relationship provided a precedent for the opponents of Sigismund III under the leadership of Michal Zebrzydowski. In 1606-1607 they chose Transylvanian princes as rival candidates for the Polish throne. Stefan Bocskay (1604-1606) and then Gabriel Batory (1608-1613) willingly accepted their offer. In June 1607 Zebrzydowski had actually declared Sigismund dethroned and, according to English reports, Batory had been prepared to march into Poland that same month.¹⁵ In light of these facts it would not be farfetched to conclude that had Zebrzydowski not been defeated, the reestablishment of a Polish-Transylvanian union would have been quite possible. It is significant to note that the Orthodox initially supported the Zebrzydowski confederation and that Kostiantyn Ostrozky backed the candidature of Bocskay.¹⁶

The precedent of political cooperation between the Transylvanians and various groups in the Rzeczpospolita also seems to have included the possibility of autonomy for an area in central Ukraine. In 1644, for example, as part of an agreement reached with the Turks by George I Rákóczi, his younger son, Sigismund, was to have been made prince of "cossack land" once his brother, George II, became king of Poland.¹⁷ It should be remarked, however, that the majority of the commonwealth's gentry regarded Stefan Batory as a tyrant, and that later the prospect of having either Bocskay or Gabriel Batory as king was condemned as an attempt to establish absolutism by those of Zebrzydowski's op-

¹⁴ I. Krypiakevych, ed., *Dokumenty*, pp. 84-85.

¹⁵ *Elementa ad Fontium Editiones* (Rome, 1960—) 5: 134; 6: 13-17, 45; L. Bazylow, *Siedmiogorod a Polska, 1576-1613* (Warsaw, 1967), pp. 184-96.

¹⁶ Magyar Tudomanyos Akademia (Budapest), ms. no. 4982, fol. Ih, p. 15.

¹⁷ The only reference to this is in the chronicle of George Kraus in *Fontes Rerum Austriacarum* (Vienna, 1855-1904), scriptores III, 1: 189. For a background to Transylvanian contacts with the cossacks, see I. Krypiakevych, *Ukrainski kozaky v evropeiskyykh politychnykh plianakh* (Lviv, 1914).

ponents who knew of his intentions.¹⁸ When, therefore, Khmelnytsky and the Rákóczi were slowly drawn together in 1648, their potential cooperation represented a serious and recurring threat to Poland.

George I Rákóczi first attempted to contact Khmelnytsky sometime between June and September 1648 through Iurii Nemyrych, a leading Arian noble, and Adam Kysil, the leading Orthodox spokesman at the time. There is no record of whether or not this first attempt was successful. Then in the autumn of that year, around 30 October, a Transylvanian delegation reached the cossack camp, located somewhere between Lviv and Zamość, where it stayed until about 17 or 18 November.¹⁹ Since Jan Kazimierz's envoys did not arrive at the hetman's headquarters until 15 November, it is obvious that Khmelnytsky had his first extended discussions on the subject of who was to succeed Władysław with the Transylvanians, and not the Poles.

The details of these deliberations have unfortunately been lost, if they had at all been recorded. The direction of Khmelnytsky's politics, however, may be traced using his letters. On 15 November he sent off two to Poland. In one, addressed to the Senate, he wrote that if he was attacked he would conclude the Rzeczpospolita no longer wanted the services of the cossacks. In the second, addressed to Jan Kazimierz, the hetman reiterated his desire to see a strong monarch on the throne.²⁰ On 17 November he dispatched a third letter, this time to Transylvania, with a delegation headed by his secretary, Ivan Vykhovsky, and accompanied by a guard of 1,000 men. Addressed to Rákóczi, it contained a reference to military action, which is not found in the other two:

We know that you are our future lord and protector. From the depths of our hearts and souls we want you as king of Poland, our fatherland Therefore, most gracious sovereign, advance on Poland as quickly as possible, and we will join you with our army.²¹

¹⁸ J. Tazbir, *Ariane i katolicy* (Warsaw, 1971), pp. 251-52; Biblioteka Czartoryska (Cracow), ms. 1577, pp. 251-52; *Dokumenty ob osvoboditelnoi voine ukrainskogo naroda 1648-1654 gg.* (Kiev, 1965), p. 51.

¹⁹ S. Székely, ed., *Székely Okleveletar* (Koloszvar, 1896), 6: 182-83; *Monumenta Hungaricae Historica* (Budapest, 1857-1919), leges 10, pt. 2, pp. 49-50; M. Korduba, "Borotba za polskyi prestol po smerty Volodyslava," *Zherela do istorii Ukrainy-Rusy*, 12.

²⁰ I. Krypiakevych, *Dokumenty*, pp. 80-84.

²¹ Ibid., pp. 84-85.

In June Khmelnytsky had offered to support the tsar if he attempted to take the Polish throne. Aleksei did not take up the offer, however, and by October, not having heard anything from Moscow, the hetman probably concluded the Russians would remain neutral. The object of Khmelnytsky's policies then changed to giving the Polish throne to the Transylvanian dynasty.

As far as can be established, the Ukrainian-Transylvanian agreement, concluded in the first weeks of November, required Khmelnytsky to somehow draw out the elections and then lay seige to Cracow, where the Polish regalia were kept. In the event that Jan Kazimierz was elected, Rákóczi and the hetman would contest the validity of the election because it had been done in time of war.²² Therefore, given the existence of this plan it is possible to argue that Jan Kazimierz's election had little to do with Khmelnytsky's decision to withdraw from Zamość. Having failed in his attempt to stall the election and then hearing of the death of George I Rákóczi, it was more likely that the hetman decided to stop all activity until he heard how the Transylvanians would react to the radically altered situation.

Khmelnytsky marched to Kiev and in February 1649 informed George II that he intended to follow through with the plans established the previous November. He asked the Transylvanian prince to have five thousand men ready to march as soon as the cossacks began their spring offensive.²³ The Transylvanians, however, could not decide whether or not to continue to challenge Jan Kazimierz's election. Henri Bisterfeld, one of the Rákóczis' major counsellors, and George's brother Sigismund were prepared to implement the original plan, but George II hesitated. Thus, on the one hand, the royal council met and approved in principle the alliance with the cossacks, while, on the other, George II sent a letter to Jan Kazimierz ensuring him of his good intentions.²⁴ Fearful of Austrian and Turkish reactions against him if he moved against Poland, and also perhaps afraid of the implications of allying with a commoner to overthrow a consecrated monarch, George II vacillated.²⁵ He continued, however, to send Khmelnytsky favorable declara-

²² *Monumenta Hungaricae Historica*, diplomataria, 23: 3-4.

²³ I. Krypiakevych, op. cit., pp. 99-100, 120-21.

²⁴ M. Korduba, "Mizh Zamostom ta Zborovom," *Zapysky Naukovoho tovarystva im. Tarasa Shevchenka* 133 (1922): 55; A. Z. Helcel, op. cit., p. 389.

²⁵ George II was profoundly shocked by news of the execution of Charles I in England. See L. Makkai, "The Hungarian Puritans and the English Revolution," *Acta Historica* 5 (1958): 29.

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tions of intent throughout 1649, 1650, and 1651. These kept up the hetman's expectations and aroused in him false hopes, which, it can be argued, led him to plan his strategy, until at least 1652, around placing a Rákóczi on the Polish throne. In 1656 George II finally decided he could attack Poland, but the joint Transylvanian-cossack campaign of 1657 ended in fiasco. With it the ambitious Treaty of Radnot, which provided for the partition of the Rzeczpospolita among Transylvania, Sweden, and Cossack Ukraine, was relegated to the archives as one of history's many unrealized grand designs.

Michael Palij

EARLY UKRAINIAN IMMIGRATION TO THE UNITED STATES AND THE CONVERSION OF THE UKRAINIAN CATHOLIC PARISH IN MINNEAPOLIS TO RUSSIAN ORTHODOXY

My people do not live in America
They live underneath America.
America goes on over their head.

Rev. Paul Tymkevych of Yonkers

The mass immigration of Slavs to America began at a much later date than the immigration of Western Europeans. Between 1820 and 1870, for example, about 50 percent of immigrants to the United States were from the United Kingdom, while the countries of southern and eastern Europe—Italy, Austria, and Russia—furnished scarcely 0.5 percent. This latter immigration had increased to 32 percent of the total by 1890, and to 40 percent by 1892. The year 1881 marks the climax of the older West European immigration and the beginning of the new Mediterranean and Slavic immigration.¹

Before the 1850s, Slavs came to the United States as individuals; their incentives were basically political. The pattern changed markedly as a result of the revolutions of 1848 and 1849 in Germany and Austria. Their failure led a large number of Germans, as well as some Italians, Hungarians, Czechs, Poles, Jews,

¹ Allan MacLaughlin, "The Slavic Immigrant," *The Popular Science Monthly* (New York) 63 (1903): 25.

and others who had been involved, to leave their countries and to seek refuge in America. There they found both freedom and economic opportunity. News of their success spread to their homelands and encouraged others to emigrate.

The Czechs were the first Slavic people to immigrate in large numbers to America. The Poles from Austria and Germany were next, followed by a stream of refugees from Russian-ruled Poland after the failure of the Polish uprising of 1863-64. Thus the mass immigration of Slavs began. The news of the Czech immigration spread, mainly via the Slovaks, to the Ukrainians in Transcarpathia, while the news of the Polish immigration came to the Ukrainians in Galicia and Bukovyna.²

Causes of Emigration

The incentives for emigration were numerous, but living conditions under a foreign regime, including political and national oppression and religious persecution, constituted the main reason for departure from the native land. Economic ruin, especially as it related to the land problem, was of primary importance. With the abolition of serfdom in Austria in 1848, the greater and better part of the cultivated land, the pasture lands, nearly all the timber lands, and water-power rights remained in the hands of a few thousand landlords.³ In Galicia, in 1893, 4,493 landlords owned 7,637,945 acres of farm land, while 1,623,837 peasant families lived on 10,017,274 acres. Of the 4,493 landlords, 161 among them possessed 3,782,206 acres.⁴ The territory of eastern Galicia (except for the city of Lviv) covered 5,520,335 hectares (13,640,747 acres). Of this total, the landlords owned 2,089,853 hectares, or almost two-fifths of the territory of eastern Galicia. The rest of the land (3,440,479 hectares) was divided among 649,913 owners: peasants, parishes, schools, and village and city authorities. Of these small

² Emily Greene Balch, *Our Slavic Fellow Citizens* (New York, 1910), pp. 131-32; Richard Wonser Tims, *Germanizing Prussian Poland* (New York, 1941), p. 109; Luka Myshuha, ed., *Propamiatna knyha UNS* (Jersey City, 1936), p. 255; E. N. Matrosov, "Zaokeanskaia Rus," *Istoricheskii vestnik* (St. Petersburg), 67 (1897), no. 2, p. 484.

³ Ivan Ardan, "The Ruthenians in America," *Charities* (New York) 13 (1904), no. 10, p. 240; B. Balk, "Ruthenians versus Poles in Galicia," *The New York Times Current History* 9 (1919): 328.

⁴ Yaroslav J. Chyz, *The Ukrainian Immigrants in the United States* (Scranton, 1939), p. 5; Robert De C. Ward, "The Immigration Problem," *Charities* (New York) 12 (1904), no. 6, p. 140.

parcels of land, 421,646 (64.9 percent) were homesteads that were not self-supporting. Moreover, there were about eighty thousand families without land, the agricultural proletarians.⁵ With the increase in population this land problem became more complicated. The small peasant farms were constantly divided and subdivided among the children. The peasants could neither buy nor rent land from the nobility. In some cases, however, they were able to rent sections of church land from the village priest.⁶

There were no important industries in Western Ukraine and hence no opportunities for industrial employment. Consequently, poor peasants were forced to work for landlords for low wages. For example, in Galicia in 1901 the average wage paid to male farmhands for a thirteen-to-sixteen hour day was 0.60 crowns; to female farmhands, 0.36 crowns; and to young boys and girls, only 0.12 crowns.⁷

Educational opportunities were also limited. There were only a few vocational schools where Ukrainian children could obtain professional training, and those who did had few job opportunities. Neither were there many high schools or universities in Galicia, nor could the poorer segments of society afford to pay for their children's education. Moreover, Ukrainians were discriminated against by the administration because of their nationality and their religion. Thus, educational institutions, both as potential employers and centers for career training, largely excluded Ukrainians.

Commerce offered limited opportunities for Ukrainians because it was largely controlled by the Jewish population. The establishment of new businesses was made almost impossible by the competition of this well-established monopoly, which also closed employment avenues to non-Jews.

Such conditions were sufficient to drive even the most conservative Ukrainians from their fatherland. Even before immigration to the New World began, every summer a large number of so-called *Sachsenganger* went to Germany to work on farms; in 1900 there were an estimated seventy thousand from Galicia alone.⁸ Most of the immigrants were girls and young men. The Ukrainian immigration was neither planned nor protected by the state, the church, or other institutions.

⁵ *Krivava knyha* (Vienna, 1921), 2: 81-82.

⁶ Balch, *Our Slavic Fellow Citizens*, pp. 135, 137.

⁷ Ardan, "The Ruthenians in America," p. 247; Wasyl Halich, *Ukrainians in the United States* (Chicago, 1937), p. 13.

⁸ Balch, *Our Slavic Fellow Citizens*, p. 139.

Periods of Immigration

Immigration of Ukrainians to America can be divided into five periods. The first period began in colonial times and continued until about 1870. Immigration during this period was essentially casual and sporadic and involved only a small number of people. The second period spanned the years 1870 to 1899. It represented the beginning of a mass migration. In the third period, which began after 1899 and continued to 1914, the immigration of Ukrainians reached its height.⁹ The fourth period, which spanned the inter-war years, was marked by a great decline in immigration, especially after the American immigration act of 1924 introduced new quotas, which restricted the number of immigrants admitted each year to 2 percent of the foreign-born population of each nationality in the United States in 1890. On 1 July 1929, this national-origins quota formula became fully operative and was applied until 1946. Nativist opposition to immigration was aroused not so much by the number of immigrants, but by the fact that an increasing proportion was coming from southern and eastern Europe. The quota formula was deliberately designed to check a "new" immigration. This law particularly penalized the Ukrainians; because their immigration had been recent, their quota was reduced almost to the vanishing point.¹⁰

First News

Although news about opportunities in the United States spread by word of mouth among the Ukrainians via the Czechs, Slovaks, Poles, and Jews, solicitation by steamship agents from the Pennsylvania mining districts, who came to the Lemko region on both slopes of the Carpathians in the 1870s, was the main stimulus of immigration. At this particular time American miners were on strike, and Ukrainian immigrants came to America not

⁹ Halich, *Ukrainians in the United States*, pp. 11-12. Mass emigration became possible only after the abolition of serfdom in Austria in 1848 and the passage of the fundamental law of December 1867, which granted to the emancipated peasants the right to emigrate at will. (Celina Bobińska and Andrzej Pilch, *Employment-Seeking Emigrations of the Poles of World-Wide XIX and XX c.* [Cracow, 1975], pp. 84-85).

¹⁰ Edward P. Hutchison, "Immigration Policy since World War I," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 262 (1949): 16-18; Michael Palij, "The Ukrainians in the United States," *Ukrainian Weekly*, 24 December 1954.

knowing that they were to be employed as strikebreakers. As a result of the circumstances of their arrival, they often suffered insults and were beaten up. However, high wages, from ten to fifteen times higher than those earned at home, not only kept them at their jobs, but also induced them to write letters to relatives and friends about the greater opportunities and freedoms in the New World. These letters stimulated a new wave of immigrants, and in the decade 1870-80 Transcarpathia and Galicia first began losing population.¹¹

As immigration to America increased, various hindrances that tended to check the movement appeared. Apart from transportation expenses and the tribulations of a long voyage, the most serious impediment to emigration was the opposition of the landlords and the government of Austria-Hungary. The landlords feared the loss of farm labor and the prospect of paying higher wages to the fewer laborers who remained. They judged that the poorer and more numerous the peasants were, the cheaper would be the labor force. The government needed healthy men for the army. A variety of steps were thus taken to discourage emigration. Letters were opened, and if they praised America, they were often held back. Proclamations warning that there was much suffering and hunger in America were distributed to intimidate people. The government sent orders to clergymen to preach against emigration. When these measures failed, the government issued in March 1877 a series of secret circulars ordering county offices and police headquarters to stem emigration. The police arrested would-be emigrants on trains, in railroad depots, and on the streets of towns, and took their tickets and money to prevent them from leaving. Guards were stationed at railroad towns along the German border to watch for emigrants and to arrest them. Often, however, steamship agents, who were representatives of the Hamburg-American and English Cunard lines, bribed officials and brought emigrants to their destinations. Unfortunately, however, some agents were less than scrupulous. One group of emigrants who were planning

¹¹ Nestor Dmytriv, "Pershi roky emigratsii ukrainitsiv v Zluchenykh Derzhavakh Piv. Ameryky," *Kaliendar Ruskoho Narodnoho Soiuza na 1914 rik* (Scranton), p. 161; Nicholas Ceglinsky, "Ukrainians in America," *The Interpreter* (New York) 3 (1924), no. 12, p. 6; Frank Julian Warne, *The Slav Invasion and the Mine Workers: A Study in Immigration* (Philadelphia, 1904), pp. 47-49; Damian Merena, "Pro pershykh lemiv v Amerytsi," *Svoboda* (Jersey City), 1956, no. 24; K. Andrukhovych, *Z zhyttia rusyniv v Amerytsi: Spomyn z rokiv 1889-1892* (Kolomyia, 1904), p. 5.

to go to Pennsylvania landed in Texas; another group was taken against their will clear to the Hawaiian Islands. Finally, in the decade preceding the First World War, most of the restrictions on emigration were removed.¹²

Most Ukrainian emigrants to America came from Austria-Hungary. As late as 1905, for example, over 97 percent of Ukrainians came from either Galicia (over 75 percent) or Transcarpathia (over 22 percent).¹³ Immigration from Russian-ruled eastern Ukraine remained relatively insignificant until the First World War. It was channeled from the late 1880s to Siberia and to the Far Eastern Amur and Ussuri river basins, because the tsarist regime wished to strengthen its political and military position in Asia and to get rid of unruly subjects. This eastward colonization movement reached its height after the peasant unrest of 1902 and the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905: during the period 1906-1910, an average of 202,000 Ukrainians left annually; in 1909, 290,000 left. A certain number—about 480,000 during the period 1890-1914—returned to Ukraine.¹⁴

Emigration from eastern Ukraine to America was thus late and small. It began basically in the 1890s, although some immigrants had come to California via Alaska in the 1860s.¹⁵ The eastern Ukrainians learned about opportunities in America from the Jews. The first group of Ukrainians, consisting of five stundist families from Kiev county, arrived in America in 1892 with Jewish immigrants and settled on farms in Virginia. The next group came from the same area in 1898 and settled on farms in North Dakota. The reasons for their emigration were not economic but religious:

¹² Iuliian Bachynsky, *Ukrainska emigratsiia v Z'iedynenykh Derzhatvakh Ameryky* (Lviv, 1914), 1: 4-15. After the annexation of Hawaii by the United States, a special law had to be passed by Congress in 1900 in order to free it from the state of practical slavery. Y. J. Chyz, *The Ukrainian Immigrants*, p. 6)

¹³ MacLaughlin, "The Slavic Immigrant," p. 30; "Ukrainians in America," *The Literary Digest* (New York) 63 (1919): 40. Immigration reports indicate that in the twelve fiscal years from 1899 to 1910, 98.2 percent of the Ukrainians admitted to the United States came from Austria-Hungary. (*U.S. Senate Reports of the Immigration Commission. Dictionary of Races or Peoples*. Doc. no. 662, 61st Congress, 3rd Session, 1911, vol. 9, p. 118).

¹⁴ Ivan Mirchuk, ed., *Ukraine and Its People: A Handbook* (Munich, 1949), pp. 107-109; Ceglinsky, "Ukrainians in America," p. 6.

¹⁵ Andrukhovych, *Z zhyttia rusyniv v Amerytsi*, p. 6.

persecution by the Russian Orthodox church and the tsarist regime.¹⁶

Early Immigrants

Ukrainian names are found in records from the colonial period of American history. The second governor of Virginia, John Smith, who escaped from Turkish captivity and passed through Ukraine, brought to Virginia a pitch maker, Molasco, one of the "Polonians" who "make pitch and tarr and soap ashes," who might have been Ukrainian.¹⁷ The founder of the Zabriskie family, who arrived in New York in 1662 under the name of Albert Saboriski, was probably a Ukrainian exile from Poland. His only known signature, found on an Indian contract of purchase dated 15 July 1679, appears as "Albridt Zaborovskij". All other transcriptions of his name always have an "i" instead of the second "o," a characteristic of the Ukrainian language. The Sadovsky family of Virginia and Kentucky, which played a prominent role in early American public life, was probably Ukrainian in origin. In Pennsylvania, among the immigrants who arrived between 1727 and 1776 are such Ukrainian-sounding names as Nicholas Orich [Orikh], Peter Looh [Luh], Daniel Zwier [Zvir], Andreas Kissel [Kysil], Peter Step, and others.¹⁸

The first well-known Ukrainian immigrant in America was an Orthodox priest and political exile from Kiev, Ahapii Honcharenko. In September 1857 the Holy Synod appointed Honcharenko archdeacon to the Russian consulate church in Athens, Greece. There he established contact with Alexander Herzen and Nikolai Ogarev in London and began publishing articles in Herzen's *Kolokol* describing the injustices he observed in Ukraine. His revolutionary activities were uncovered, and Honcharenko was arrested in February 1860. With the help of friends, he was freed in Constantinople while being transported back to Russia. He went to London, where he wrote for Herzen's publications and worked at the British Museum. In 1861 he moved back to Greece and was consecrated a priest at Mount Athos. For a few years he lived in the Near East—in Jerusalem, Cairo, and Alexandria. Stabbed in Cairo by a Russian agent, Honcharenko returned to Athens after his

¹⁶ Bachynsky, *Ukrainska emigratsiia*, pp. 15, 170-71, 175, 179; Jerome Davis, *The Russians and Ruthenians in America: Bolsheviks or Brothers?* (New York, 1922), pp. 29-30, 81.

¹⁷ Chyz, *The Ukrainian Immigrants*, p. 2.

¹⁸ Balch, *Our Slavic Fellow Citizens*, p. 206.

recovery. From there he went to America, arriving in Boston on 1 January 1865. He taught Greek in the Episcopal School in New York and in 1867 moved to San Francisco. After the United States purchased Alaska from Russia in 1867, Honcharenko became editor of the *Alaska Herald*, a Russian and English bimonthly published in San Francisco (1867-71), which helped in the Americanization of that territory. He also aided Ukrainians and Russians who had fled from tsarist exile in Siberia and formed a local Ukrainian organization, the Decembrist Club, in San Francisco.¹⁹ Honcharenko died on his small farm, Ukraina, near Hayward, California, in 1916.²⁰

Mass Immigration and the Distribution of Ukrainian Immigrants in the United States

Metropolitan-Cardinal Sylvester Sembratovych wrote in a letter to Ukrainian immigrants in Shenandoah, Pennsylvania on 24 October 1882 that while visiting places in the Lemko Carpathians, in the area of Horlytsi, Iaslo, Zhmyhorod, Duklia, and Nova Ves, he learned that "very many of our people have gone to America to earn a living."²¹ Among the earliest Ukrainian immigrants from Galicia were Ivan Makohon from Zalisia, Stanyslaviv county, who came to Texas in the early 1860s as an escapee from military service. Later he made a fortune as a prospector in Colorado and became owner of the "Occidental Hotel, I. MacOhon" in Denver. Other early immigrants were Iurii Kashytsky from Nova Ves, Nowy Sącz (Novyi Sanch) county, Mykhailo Zoliak from Hanchov, Gorlice (Horlytsi) county, and Ilko Pyvovarchuk from Uhryny, Nowy Sącz county. They arrived in 1872, 1873 or 1874, and 1874 or 1875 respectively.²² Rev. Nestor Dmytriv wrote that

¹⁹ Halich, *Ukrainians in the United States*, p. 21.

²⁰ A. Honcharenko, *Spomynky*, pp. 6 ff.; Theodore Luciw, *Father Agapius Honcharenko: First Ukrainian Priest in America* (New York, 1970), pp. 30-37; "Pershyi ukrainskyi imigrant v Zluchenykh Derzhavakh Pivnichnoi Ameryky," *Ukrainskyi zahalnyi kaliendar Krynytsia na 1937 rik* (Lviv, 1936), p. 92.

²¹ Andrukhowych, *Z zhyttia rusyniv v Amerytsi*, pp. 38-39.

²² Bachynsky, *Ukrainska emigratsiia*, pp. 86-87.

in 1895 he met a Ukrainian farmer near Troy, New York, who had been in America twenty-seven years, and "if one were to look at the Boston region, one would find [there] many of our people, especially from the Hungarian side [Transcarpathia], and these

people I would consider our first immigrants, who came to America before 1870.”²³ The mass immigration of Ukrainians, however, started during the decade 1870-80, following the recruitment by steamship agents of Lemko Ukrainians to the Pennsylvania mining region.

The largest number of Ukrainian immigrants settled in the eastern and midwestern regions of the United States, mainly in the coal and iron mining regions of Pennsylvania, Ohio, Illinois, Michigan, and West Virginia. Others settled in the industrial centers of New York and New Jersey. According to the 1910 census, Pennsylvania alone had over half of the Ukrainians living in America. Large numbers of Ukrainians settled in New England, where they combined their jobs in textile factories with subsistence farming. At the beginning of the century, in practically every town and industrial center east of the Mississippi River, a colony of Ukrainian wage earners could be found. There were many Ukrainian farmers and lumber-mill workers in North Dakota and Minnesota. Small Ukrainian agricultural colonies existed in California and Oregon. Ukrainians were also found in the gold, silver, and zinc mining districts of Colorado, Montana, and Missouri. Because better opportunities existed there, the largest concentrations were in the industrial metropolises: about 50,000 Ukrainians lived in New York and vicinity; 45,000, in Chicago; 35,000, in Pittsburgh; 30,000, in Cleveland; 30,000, in Detroit; 25,000, in Jersey City; and 20,000, in Philadelphia. Large Ukrainian colonies also arose in other cities, such as Boston, Buffalo, Rochester, Newark, Milwaukee, St. Louis, Minneapolis—St. Paul, San Francisco, and Los Angeles.²⁴

The Number of Ukrainians in the United States

Although Ukrainian immigration came later and was smaller, for a time, than other ethnic immigrations to America, it grew much faster and eventually surpassed some of them.²⁵ During the decade 1899-1910, 147,375 Ukrainian immigrants were admitted to the United States. An unofficial estimate indicates that perhaps

²³ Nestor Dmytriv, “Deshcho pro amerykanskykh rusynov: uryvok,” *Svoboda* (Jersey City), 1904, no. 21.

²⁵ Balch, *Our Slavic Fellow Citizens*, p. 134.

²⁴ Davis, *The Russians and Ruthenians*, pp. 23-24; Wasyl Halich, “Ukrainians in Western Pennsylvania,” *Western Pennsylvania Historical Magazine* (Pittsburgh) 18 (1935), no. 1, p. 139.

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136,625 more Ukrainians entered the United States registered as Austrians, Russians, Hungarians, Rumanians, or Poles.²⁶

It is impossible to ascertain the number of Ukrainians in America before 1899, because no statistics are available. They came to America as representatives of an unrecognized and unknown nationality, for Ukraine was occupied by two empires: Austria-Hungary and Russia. Up to 1899 the American Bureau of Immigration classified the immigrants not by nationality, but by the country of their last permanent residence.²⁷ In the official statistics, Ukrainian immigrants were classified variously: as Ruthenians, Rusniaks, Little Russians, Galicians, or Carpatho-Russians. Some were even recorded as Poles, Hungarians, Russians, or Slovaks.²⁸

Nonetheless, there were, in fact, over 500,000 first- and second-generation Ukrainians living in America by 1914, although their presence was indicated neither in the 1920 census nor in United States population statistics in general.²⁹ By 1930 the number of Ukrainians in America was estimated to be least 700,000 to 800,000.³⁰

Occupation

The majority of West Europeans came to America with the idea of making a home for themselves and pursuing the vocations they had in the old country, but for greater rewards. They worked in the manufacturing trades or were shopkeepers, merchants, or professionals.³¹ In contrast, the Ukrainian immigrants were severe-

²⁶ Halich, *Ukrainians in the United States*, p. 18; L. A. Bagramov, *Immigrany v SShA* (Moscow, 1957), p. 31; Bachynsky, *Ukrainska emigratsiia*, pp. 96-97.

²⁷ Halich, *Ukrainians in the United States*, p. 12; Balch, *Our Slavic Fellow Citizens*, p. 236.

²⁸ W. Stepankowsky, "Who are the Ukrainians," *Souvenir Edison Slavs* (1933), p. 63; Myron Kuropas, *The Ukrainians in America* (Minneapolis, 1973), p. 40; Vsevolod Zamorsky, "Iak zhyvut, organizuiutsia i pratsiuut amerykanski ukraintsi," *Vistnyk*, 1937, no. 10, p. 718.

²⁹ I. Lypovetsky, "Ukrainska emigratsiia v novomu sviti," *Na Chu-zhyni: Ukrainskyi Koliendar na 1947* (Augsburg, 1947), p. 88; J. Davis, *The Russians and Ruthenians*, p. 21; Kuropas, *The Ukrainians in America*, p. 40.

³⁰ Volodymyr Kubiiovich, "Ukrainci v Amerytsi: Statystychno-geografichnyi narys," *Vistnyk*, 1939, no. 9, p. 626.

³¹ Z. F. McSweeney, "The Character of Our Immigration, Past and Present," *The National Geographic Magazine* 16 (1905), no. 1, p. 5.

ly handicapped: they knew no English and had a high rate of illiteracy. According to American immigration records, about 50 percent were illiterate at the time of their arrival.³² This was not the result of a lack of interest in education, but of the educational policies in Austrian- and Russian-occupied Ukraine. As mentioned earlier, only a few technical schools existen in the old country. Hence, most immigrants were employed as unskilled laborers in a variety of jobs.³³

Probably nine-tenths of the Ukrainian immigrants made a new start in America, mostly as workers in coal and iron mines, in steel and lumber mills, railroad companies, and factories. In the cities many worked as carpenters, plumbers, printers, cabinetmakers, and furriers, or in hotels and restaurants. Some were shopkeepers or entrepreneurs. Ukrainian immigrant women usually entered domestic service or worked in hotels and textile mills or as dressmakers, seamstresses, waitresses, chambermaids, and shop workers.³⁴ There was a fair number of Ukrainian farmers, especially in the eastern states. In addition, many Ukrainians in the cities saved to buy farms and to settle on the land.

Religious Life

When mass immigration to America began, the Ukrainian immigrants lacked leaders, organizations, and a knowledge of English. Upon arrival, many Ukrainians boarded in Polish or Slovak immigrants' houses; their social and religious needs compelled them to join Polish or Slovak organizations, to attend services in Polish or Slovak churches, and to contribute toward their maintenance. The Ukrainians did not feel at home in these churches or organizations, however, because of their attachment to their own culture and church. Hence, when the number of immigrants in any one place increased to about seventy families, they usually decided to establish their own church. The Ukrainians in Shenandoah, Pennsylvania, took the advice of Catholic Karl Rise and appealed in 1882 to Cardinal Sylvester Sembratovych, the Ukrainian Catholic metropolitan of Lviv, to send them a priest and his "blessing to build a church." Upon receiving money from them

³² Jeremiah W. Jenks, W. Jett Lanck, *The Immigration Problem: A Study of American Immigration Conditions and Needs* (New York, 1926), p. 35.

³³ Allan McLaughlin, "The Slavic Immigrant," p. 30.

³⁴ I Ardan, "The Ruthenians in America," p. 249; "Ukrainians in America," *The Literary Digest* (New York) 63: 40.

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to pay for the priest's transportation, the cardinal dispatched a young priest, Rev. Ivan Voliansky, to America. Voliansky arrived with his wife in December 1884 and settled in Shenandoah.³⁵

A few days after his arrival, Rev. Voliansky traveled to Philadelphia to present his credentials to the Roman Catholic archbishop, Patrick John Ryan.³⁶ Ryan, however, had been informed in advance by a Polish priest from Shenandoah about Voliansky and refused to meet him. Through a representative he informed Voliansky that he did not recognize the jurisdiction given to Voliansky by Sembratovych; moreover, since Voliansky was married, he advised him to return to Ukraine. Although the Vatican had recognized the Ukrainian Catholic (Uniate) Church in 1596 and accepted the right of Ukrainian Catholic priests to marry, Ryan was not willing to allow married priests in his diocese. Voliansky was similarly received by the Polish, German, and Irish Catholic priests in Shenandoah.³⁷ The Roman Catholic clergy and hierarchy in America strongly opposed differentiation on the basis of ethnic origin and promoted the assimilation of all segments of Catholicism into the Roman church. They also feared the loss of income that would occur if the Ukrainians had their own congregations.

In spite of this opposition, Voliansky reasoned that he had jurisdiction from his superior in Lviv and ignored Ryan's advice.³⁸ He began his work, thereby laying a foundation for the Ukrainian Catholic church and other institutions in America. He held the first religious service on 19 December 1884 in Shenandoah at the rented home of Mr. Kern on Main Street. Three days later a temporary chapel was opened. In the spring of 1885 construction of a church, meeting hall, and a residence for the priest began. In the fall of 1886 the church was finished and dedicated to St. Michael the Archangel. This first Ukrainian Catholic church in the United States roughly marks the geographic and chronological starting point of Ukrainian organized life in America. The parish in Shenandoah and subsequent parishes gradually went beyond

³⁵ Andrukovich, *Z zhyttia rusyniv*, pp. 38-42; N. Dmytriv, "Deshcho pro amerykanskykh rusynov"; "Iak tvorylasia ukrainska katolyska parokhia v Shenandoa, Pa.," *Kalendar Syritskoho Domu na rik 1935* (Philadelphia), p. 57.

³⁶ *New Catholic Encyclopedia* (San Francisco), 12: 767-68.

³⁷ Mykhailo Pavlyk, "Pochatky ukrainskoi organizatsii na chuzhyni," *Kalendar Ukrainskoho Narodnoho Soiuzu na rik 1920* (Jersey City, 1919), p. 52; Andrukovich, *Z zhyttia rusyniv*, pp. 44-45.

³⁸ "Istoriia ukrainskoi katol. parokhii v Shamokin, Pa.," *Kalendar Syritskoho Domu na rik 1935* (Philadelphia), p. 80.

performing only a religious function and assumed social, cultural, and political functions as well. Hence, leadership of the immigrants fell largely into the hands of the priests, who were trusted by the people and were able and capable organizers.³⁹ An American author recalled: "I have known a number of Ruthenian priests in this country of consecration, intelligence and energy beyond the ordinary."⁴⁰

The most important aspect of Rev. Voliansky's organizational work was his visitation of all major Ukrainian settlements from New York to Minnesota and Colorado, during which he organized new parishes and urged people to build churches as the first step in organizing their community. Within period of four years Voliansky managed to organize new parishes with their own churches in Kingston (1887), Freeland (1888), Olyphant (1888), Philadelphia (1888), Shamokin (1890), all of them in Pennsylvania, and in Jersey City, New Jersey (1887) and Minneapolis, Minnesota (1887). More priests arrived in America, and the Ukrainian Catholic church there began to grow. By 1898, there were fifty-one functioning churches or chapels.⁴¹

Voliansky devoted much attention to social work and to raising the immigrants' standard of living. In order to inform, teach, and unite Ukrainian immigrants, he began publishing the biweekly Ukrainian newspaper *Ameryka*. The first issue appeared on 15 August 1886. As his religious and social activities widened, Voliansky invited more priests and educated laymen (mainly students) from Ukraine to assist him in his pioneering work. In March 1887, Rev. Zynovii Liakhovych, the first celibate Ukrainian priest in America, and a student, Volodymyr Simenovych, came to Pennsylvania. Soon after, however, in November 1887, Liakhovych died. He was replaced by Rev. Kost Andrukovich. Voliansky, with the aid of his wife and Simenovych, organized and coached dramatic and educational clubs as well as a mixed choir. Later they established cooperative stores in Shenandoah, Plymouth, Freeland, Hazelton, and Olyphant, Pennsylvania. These stores were managed largely by newly arrived students. Voliansky also devoted attention to establishing relations between the Irish and Ukrainian miners. For this purpose he, Liakhovych, and Simenovych joined a secret organization of workers and miners, the Knights of Labor.

³⁹ Davis, *The Russians and Ruthenians*, p. 64; Andrukovich, *Z zhyttia rusyniv*, pp. 7-8, 13-15.

⁴⁰ Balch, *Our Slavic Fellow Citizens*, p. 130.

⁴¹ Bachynsky, *Ukrainska emigratsiia*, p. 258.

In June 1889, the noble work of Rev. Voliansky was brought to an end. As a result of pressures from Irish-American church officials, the Vatican forced Metropolitan Sembradovych to recall Voliansky.⁴² This brought about great confusion and dissatisfaction among the Ukrainian immigrants. Voliansky's work, however, was continued by his successors.

The Irish Catholic officials continued to interfere in Ukrainian church affairs for years to come, causing serious troubles for the Ukrainian immigrants. This interference was skillfully exploited by the Russian Orthodox mission in America and Canada. It initiated an extensive campaign to convert Ukrainian immigrants to Russian Orthodoxy. The mission's activities were first carried out effectively in Minneapolis, Minnesota.⁴³

THE UKRAINIAN SETTLEMENT IN MINNEAPOLIS

Most Ukrainian immigrants settled in the eastern and mid-western regions of the United States. But some went to Minnesota, where they settled in the Chisholm and Hibbing iron mining region, the upper Red River Valley farming area, and the industrial center of Minneapolis. The first known group of Ukrainian immigrants came to Minneapolis in 1882 and included Teodor Syvanych and Iurii Homzyk. It was followed that year by two more groups. The third group included Ivan H. Mlynar. Syvanych, Homzyk, and Mlynar were from the same village, Stebnyk, in Sáros county, Subcarpathian Ruthenia (Transcarpathia). The immigrants settled together on Seventh Avenue N.E., near the Mississippi River. At this time the Ukrainian settlement consisted of two families and fifteen single individuals. These immigrants worked on farms, in the forests, in factories, on the railroad, and in lumber industries.⁴⁴

At the beginning, the immigrants attended Rev. Jan Pacholski's services at the Polish Catholic church. In 1886, when their settlement had grown to two hundred immigrants, they invited

⁴² K. Andrukhowych, *Z zytia rusyniv*, pp. 13-15, 24, 43; Myshuha, ed., *Propamiatna knyha*, pp. 35-37, 40; Iulian Bachynsky, "Z kulturnoho zhyttia nashykh immigrantiv u Zluch. Derzhavakh," *Kalendar Ukrainskoho Narodnoho Soiuzu na rik 1915* (Jersey City, 1914), p. 36; Halich, *Ukrainians in the United States*, pp. 98-99.

⁴³ Bachynsky, *Ukrainska emigratsiia*, p. 258; Balch, *Our Slavic Fellow Citizens*, pp. 384-85.

⁴⁴ Sergei Marchenko, "Poslednii iz mogikan," ms., Minneapolis, 1954, pp. 4-7; *Golden Jubilee Album of St. Mary's Russian Orthodox Greek Catholic Church, 1887-1937* (Minneapolis, 1937), p. 16.

Rev. Voliansky from Shenandoah to Minneapolis. Services were held at the home of Pavlo Podany and Iurii Homzyk. During his visit, Voliansky organized a parish and urged the people to build their own church. The next year Teodor Syvanych, Petro Kuchekha (Kook), and Teodor Sad bought a lot for the church. In 1889 a wooden church was built, and Voliansky returned to dedicate the church in honor of St. Mary the Protectress. The people felt the need for a resident priest and invited Rev. Ivan Zapototsky from Transcarpathia. To their bitter disappointment, Zapototsky chose to stay in Kingston, Pennsylvania.⁴⁵ The people renewed their request for a priest, and on 27 November 1889, Oleksander I. Tovt (Toth), a priest of the Prešov eparchy, came to Minneapolis.

Tovt, son of the Rev. Iurii and Cecilia Tovt, was born near Prešov on 14 March 1853. He received his elementary education at the local school and his higher education at the Roman Catholic Seminary in Esztergom and at the Uniate Catholic Seminary in Uzhhorod. After receiving his degree in theology, he was ordained in 1878 by his uncle, Bishop Mykola Tovt. For a while Tovt served as an assistant in the parishes of Sáros county; then he was named rector of the parish church in Homrog, Abaúj county. Later he became eparchial chancellor. In 1881 Tovt was appointed director of the Prešov seminary and teacher of canon law and church history. He held this post until, on the recommendation of his bishop, Ivan Valii, he departed for America. At that time he was a thirty-six-year-old widower.⁴⁶

Upon his arrival, Rev. Tovt conducted services in the newly built church as the first resident priest. At the time the church was almost unfurnished and had neither sacred church vessels and other needed articles nor funds. Tovt immediately began soliciting funds and contributions from his own parishioners and from other people.⁴⁷ However, Rev. Tovt's main problem, as he soon realized, was not the church's financial difficulties, but the attitude of the Roman Catholic authority toward him. He was faced with a problem similar to Rev. Voliansky's in Shenandoah in 1884.

⁴⁵ Marchenko, "Poslednii iz mogikan," p. 7; Peter G. Kokhanik, comp., *Iubileinyi sbornik Soiuza Prav. Sviashchennikov Ameriki, 1926-1936* (Wilkes Barre, 1936), p. 90.

⁴⁶ Joseph Stephanko, "Batko Amerikanskoi Rusi Pravoslavnoi," *The Russian Orthodox Journal* (Cleveland), 1929, p. 5; Keith S. Russin, "Father Alexis G. Tovth and the Wilkes-Barre Litigations," *St. Vladimir's Theological Quarterly* (New York) 16 (1972), no. 3, p. 130.

⁴⁷ *Golden Jubilee Album of St. Mary's Russian Orthodox Greek Catholic Church*, pp. 17-18.

On 19 December 1889, twenty-two days after his arrival, Tovt, as required, paid a visit to the archbishop in St. Paul, John Ireland. As soon as he appeared, a misunderstanding developed. According to Tovt: “[I] kissed his hand according to custom and presented my credentials, failing, however, to kneel before him, which, as I learned later, was my chief mistake.” Moreover, as the archbishop read that Tovt was a Uniate, “his hands began to shake. It took him fifteen minutes to read to the end.” Subsequently, he asked (they conversed in Latin):

“Have you a wife?” “No.” “But you had one?” “Yes, I am a widower.” At this he threw the paper on the table and loudly exclaimed: “I have already written to Rome protesting against this kind of priest being sent to me!” “What kind of priest do you mean?” “Your kind.” “I am a Catholic priest of the Greek rite. I am a Uniate and was ordained by a regular Catholic bishop.” “I consider that neither you nor this bishop of yours are Catholic; besides, I do not need any Greek Catholic priests here. A Polish priest in Minneapolis is quite sufficient. The Greeks can also have him for their priest.” “But he belongs to the Latin rite. Besides, our people do not understand him and so they will hardly go to him. That was the reason they established a church of their own.” “They had no permission from me, and I shall grant you no jurisdiction to work here.”⁴⁸

Tovt was deeply hurt by the archbishop’s lack of understanding; he replied: “In that case, I ask neither your jurisdiction nor your permission; I know the rights of my church, I know the basis on which the Union [of Berestia] was established, and I shall act accordingly.” In further conversation both the archbishop and Tovt lost their tempers to the extent that, as Tovt later stated, “our conversation is not worth putting on record.”⁴⁹ Two days later the local Polish priest, Jan Pacholski, called Tovt: “For God’s sake, your reverence, what have you done? The archbishop writes me that I must have no intercourse with you. He does not accept you as a regular ordained priest, and I am under strict orders from him to announce this at the altar, forbidding your people to be ministered to by you or to take sacraments from you.” To this Tovt replied: “That is your concern. Do what you think is best. I shall not retreat one step and shall not be influenced by anything

⁴⁸ Stephanko, “Batko Amerikanskoi Rusi Pravoslavnoi,” p. 5.

⁴⁹ Ibid., p. 6.

⁵⁰ Ibid.

you and your bishop can do.”⁵⁰ To be sure, the archbishop’s demands were carried out. The inimical attitude of Archbishop Ireland stemmed more from personal than religious reasons.

Tovt wrote twice to his bishop in Prešov about the event and asked him for instruction; he received no answer. Instead, he received a letter from Canon Iosyf Dziubai, who wrote: “For God’s sake be patient; and if the archbishop doubts you are a faithful Catholic, let him know that you are willing to take your oath on it.” Soon afterward Tovt received another letter from Dziubai, in which Dziubai suggested that Tovt write a detailed account of the incident with Archbishop Ireland, advising Tovt to write “very carefully” because the letter would be sent to the Vatican. Although Tovt wrote such a letter, it apparently was not conveyed to the Vatican because, as Dziubai later wrote to Tovt, “the truth was too harshly stated.” Nevertheless, the Vatican was informed about the complaints. It ordered the Roman Catholic hierarchy in America to respect the rights of the Ukrainian Catholic church. At the same time it asked that Ukrainian married priests be recalled from America and that in the future only unmarried priests be sent.⁵¹

In light of this situation, Ukrainian priests, on Tovt’s initiative, convened a council at Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania, on 17-29 October 1890. The council was attended by eight priests: Tovt, Ivan Zapototsky (Kingston, Pennsylvania), Hryhorii Hrushka (Jersey City), Evhen Volkai (Hazleton), Havryil Vyslotsky (Olyphant), and Stefan Iatskevych (Wilkes-Barre). Two priests, Kos-
tantyn Andrukhovych (Shenandoah) and Kyryl Hulovych (Free-
land, Pennsylvania), chose not to come.

The council was chaired by Tovt. After a thorough discussion of the problems of the Ukrainian church in America, the council resolved: to request that the Ukrainian hierarchy appoint a vicar apostolic from among the priests in America; to retain the Ukrainian church in America under its jurisdiction; to prevent new priests from coming on their own; that only one priest should be appointed to a parish; that only married priests should be appointed, because parishioners had no confidence in unmarried priests; that churches should be deeded to the vicar apostolic, parish priest, and parish trustees; that in the statutes of the church organizations more emphasis be given to church-spiritual needs than to material-human needs; that non-Christians should not be allowed to join

⁵¹ A. Tovt, *Otkrovennoe slovo ko vsem uniatam v Amerike i epilog k Soboru filadeljiiskomu* (New York, 1899), p. 5.

the church organizations and that parishioners should be prevented from joining non-Christian organizations; that the territory of each parish should retain its present boundaries; and that members of the parishes should be those who financially support their churches and priests.⁵²

The council brought to light the problems of the Ukrainian Catholic church in America, but it did not solve them. It signaled, however, the beginning of the struggle for the rights of the church. After the council Rev. Tovt had two alternatives: he could follow Voliansky's example and return to his native country, or he could stay in America. He chose to stay. Although he knew his complete independence vis-à-vis the Roman Catholic hierarchy was irregular, he could perform his duties as a priest under the jurisdiction of his bishop. This fact he had made quite clear to Archbishop Ireland: "I ask neither your jurisdiction nor your permission; I know the basis on which the Union was established and shall act accordingly."⁵³ Tovt's case was not unique. He admitted that "I received letters from several of my fellow priests of the Uniate rite, who wrote that there were a great many of us who had been treated by the Latin bishops and priests just as I had been."⁵⁴

Tovt chose to convert to Russian Orthodoxy instead of fighting together with other priests for the rights of the Ukrainian Catholic church in America. This decision was not a sudden one. Tovt admits: "I made up my mind to do something I had carried in my heart a long time, for which my soul longed; that is, to become Orthodox."⁵⁵ Although there is no indication when Tovt made up his mind, it is known when he first publicly expressed his ideas about conversion. According to Rev. K. Andrukhoverych of Shenandoah, "There were enough different kinds of persecution; though they were grievous, nobody was thinking about conversion to Orthodoxy The first to suggest this idea was Rev. Aleksei Tovt ... at the council of Wilkes-Barre, on 29 October 1890."⁵⁶ When Tovt decided to convert, his main concern was how to convince his parishioners to follow him: "I prayed fervently to God to grant me the power to make all this clear to my enlightened pa-

⁵² Peter Kokhanik, *Nachalo istorii amerikanskoi Rusi* (Trumbull, Conn., 1970), pp. 481-84; Peter Kokhanik, *Rus i Pravoslavie v Severnoi Amerike* (Wilkes Barre, 1920), pp. 12-19.

⁵³ J. Stephanko, "Batko Amerikanskoi Rusi Pravoslavnoi," p. 5.

⁵⁴ Russin, "Father Alexis G. Tovt and the Wilkes-Barre Litigations," p. 134.

⁵⁵ Stephanko, "Batko Amerikanskoi Rusi Pravoslavnoi," p. 6.

⁵⁶ Andrukhoverych, *Z zhystia rusyniv*, p. 83.

rishioners.”⁵⁷ The funds of the Russian Orthodox mission and the illiteracy of the parishioners helped Tovt achieve his goal.

When Alaska was sold to the United States, the Russian government agreed to continue its support of the Russian Orthodox mission in America. The Holy Synod used \$77,850 annually from the tsar’s treasury for the mission. The Missionary Society of Russia donated a further \$1,481 annually. The mission also had a printing press that was financed by the Holy Synod. Moreover, the Russian Orthodox priests in America received retirement pensions from the Russian government.⁵⁸ These Russian government subsidies played an important role in the spread of Orthodoxy in America.

Most early immigrants were illiterate peasants who had an underdeveloped national consciousness. Thus it was easy for Tovt to mislead his parishioners. The arguments he used to persuade them to convert were distorted ones. An eyewitness, Ivan Mlynar, recalled: “Our priest Father Tovt told [us]: ‘If we accept Orthodoxy we will preserve our faith and nationality; however, if [we] do not [the Roman Catholic hierarchy] will make us Catholics.’”⁵⁹ What Tovt, in fact, proposed to his parishioners was that they abandon the Catholic faith and Ukrainian nationality in order to accept Orthodoxy and Russian nationality. Being from western Ukraine, which was under Austro-Hungarian rule, the parishioners were not familiar with the fate of the Ukrainian Orthodox church in eastern Ukraine, where the tsarist regime and the Holy Synod denied it the right to exist independently.

Initially Tovt decided to sound out the head of the Russian Orthodox mission, Bishop Vladimir, about the implication of conversion. He wrote a letter to the Russian consulate in San Francisco using the name of his psalm reader Mykhailo Potochny and asking for the address of the bishop. Ten days later, on 18 December 1890, Tovt received the desired information from the consulate.⁶⁰ Soon after he sent Ivan Mlynar, a twenty-nine-year-old worker, to San Francisco to collect money for the church’s

⁵⁷ Stephanko, “Batko Amerikanskoi Rusi Pravoslavnoi,” p. 6.

⁵⁸ Feofil, “Pravoslavie v Amerike,” *Iubileinyi sbornik v pamiat 150-letiya Russkoi Pravoslavnoi Tserkvi v Severnoi Amerike* (New York) 1: 124; Stephen C. Gulovich, *Windows Westward: Rome, Russia, Reunion* (New York, 1947), p. 135.

⁵⁹ Marchenko, “Poslednii iz mogikan,” p. 9.

⁶⁰ “Vozsoedinenie s Pravoslavnoi Tserkoviu Minneapolisskago prikhoda,” *Kalendar Pravoslavnago Obshchestva Vzaimopomoshchi na 1901 god* (New York, 1901), p. 68; Kokhanik, *Rus i Pravoslavie*, p. 22.

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iconostasis. On 24 December 1890, Mlynar arrived at the Russian church in San Francisco, where he met the abbot Hryhorii Chudnovsky. Mlynar's mission was thus made easier, for Chudnovsky was a Ukrainian from Kiev. They carried on a friendly conversation in Ukrainian, and later Chudnovsky introduced Mlynar to the bishop and acted as mediator.

When the bishop learned about the purpose of Mlynar's journey, he sounded him out as to whether the parish in Minneapolis would "unite with the forefathers' Orthodox church."⁶¹ The bishop offered to the parish aid in liquidating its debts if it would join the Russian Orthodox church. At the end of their meeting the bishop gave to the church a wooden cross, twelve icons, and twenty-five dollars. The bishop's friendly reception, promises, and donation made "a tremendous impression [on a] simple Ruthenian." After his return, Mlynar gave an "enthusiastic" report about his trip to Rev. Tovt and the parishioners. As a result of his experience, Mlynar, together with Tovt, became a strong spokesman for conversion to Russian Orthodoxy.⁶²

Following Mlynar's visit Bishop Vladimir wrote a letter to Tovt asking him to join the eparchy of the Aleutian Islands and Alaska. The abbot Chudnovsky also wrote to Tovt suggesting that he himself might visit Bishop Vladimir. After some deliberation with his parishioners, Tovt followed the abbot's advice. On 11 February 1891, accompanied by a parishioner, Pavlo Podany, Tovt travelled to San Francisco to discuss with Bishop Vladimir the question of conversion to Orthodoxy.⁶³ After a conference with the bishop, Tovt joined the Orthodox church and petitioned the bishop to accept his parish into the fold of the eparchy of the Aleutian Islands and Alaska. On 25-26 March 1891, Bishop Vladimir, assured by Tovt that the parish was prepared for conversion, came to Minneapolis, where he conducted mass in St. Mary's Church and took the parish and most of the parishioners under his jurisdiction.⁶⁴ Thus Tovt and his parish were formally accepted

⁶¹ Matrosov, "Zaokeanskaia Rus'," p. 95; *Iubileinyi sbornik Soiuza Prav. Sviashchennikov Ameriki, 1926-1936* (Wilkes-Barre, 1936), pp. 95-96.

⁶² Matrosov, "Zaokeanskaia Rus'," p. 97; Marchenko, "Poslednii iz mogikan," pp. 8-9; Kokhanik, *Rus i Pravoslavie*, pp. 22-24.

⁶³ "Vozsoedinenie s Pravoslavnou Tserkoviu Minneapolisskago prikhoda," pp. 70-71; *Golden Jubilee Album of St. Mary's Russian Orthodox Greek Catholic Church*, p. 17.

⁶⁴ *Iubileinyi sbornik v pamiat 150-letiia Russkoi Pravoslavnoi Tserkvi v Severnoi Amerike*, 1: 115; Marchenko, "Poslednii iz mogikan," p. 9.

into the Russian Orthodox eparchy. Some of the parishioners did not convert and eventually organized a new parish.⁶⁵

When they found out about Tovt's conversion, the Roman Catholics, including Archbishop Ireland, and the Ukrainians in America and in his native country condemned it. He was accused of "selling the Christian faith to become a Muscovite." Tovt's friend, Rev. Hryhorii Hrushka of Jersey City, wrote Tovt a letter of protest:

Dear Friend! I do not understand! One of the two: are you in the 'Soiuz' (Ukrainian Association) or not? Are you a Ruthenian or a man of Muscovite religion and nationality? I do understand that it is possible to change "religion," but I do not understand how you could forget your own nationality What happened to you?⁶⁶

When Bishop Ivan Valii leaned about Tovt's conversion, he recalled him, but Tovt did not obey his order. The bishop then excommunicated Tovt, and word of his excommunication was conveyed to Archbishop Ireland and to Rev. Jan Pacholski, the Polish priest in Minneapolis. Consequently some parishioners had misgivings about the conversion and stopped donating to the church. At the same time the Holy Synod recalled Bishop Vladimir, Tovt's protector, to Russia, and Tovt was left in a state of uncertainty.⁶⁷

This situation changed, however, when a new bishop, Nikolai, succeeded Vladimir. On 14 July 1892, thanks to his efforts the Holy Synod, after a careful study of the case of Tovt's parish, officially recognized the conversion and conveyed its blessing to Tovt and his parishioners. It granted Tovt an annual salary of \$700 (1,500 golden rubles), and the psalm reader, \$350 (700 golden rubles). It also elevated Tovt to archpriest, with the appropriate biretta, epigonation, and golden pectoral cross. The Holy Synod supplied the church with all necessary church books, including a Gospel, and other church furnishings. Moreover, it provided Tovt with financial assistance to embark on a campaign to influence other Ukrainians to join Russian Orthodoxy.⁶⁸

⁶⁵ "Istoriia rusk. kat. Tserkvy v Amerytsi," *Illiustrovanyi kalendar dia amerykanskykh rusyniv na rik 1915* (Philadelphia, 1914), p. 138.

⁶⁶ Kokhanik, *Rus i Pravoslavie*, p. 29.

⁶⁷ Andrukovich, *Z zhyttia rusyniv*, p. 84; "Vozsoedinenie s Pravoslavnoiu Tserkoviu Minneapoliskago prikhoda," pp. 71-72.

⁶⁸ *Iubileinyi sbornik v pamiat 150-letiia Russkoi Pravoslavnoi Tserkvi v Severnoi Amerike*, 1: 127; Andrukovich, *Z zhyttia rusyniv*, p. 84; *Iubileinyi sbornik Soiuza Prav. Sviashchennikov Ameriki*, 1926-1936, pp. 103-104.

When the original wooden church was destroyed by fire on 24 January 1905, a new church of stone and brick was built in less than one year, at a cost of \$40,000. The Russian government's interest in the parish was manifested by the fact that Tsar Nicholas II himself contributed \$1,029 to the construction of the new church.⁶⁹

The Russian Orthodox mission in America paid special attention to the schools in the converted parish in Minneapolis, making them an educational center for Russian Orthodoxy. Soon after the conversion the mission granted the parish financial support to build a school for the children of the parish and for children from other cities and states. It was opened in the middle of December 1892 and existed for five years, when it was replaced.

The conversion of more Ukrainian Catholics and people of other nationalities to Russian Orthodoxy demanded a larger school, including advanced courses, to prepare teachers and lay readers (psalm readers) for Orthodox parishes. In 1895 the Holy Synod appropriated 7,500 rubles to build a three-story brick house for this purpose. It also granted an annual salary of 1,500 rubles for each teacher, 1,800 rubles for student housing, and 5,600 rubles for maintenance, including a janitor's wages. In the summer of 1897 a second missionary school was opened; like the earlier one, it served the youth of the parish and from other cities and states. The ablest students from the school were sent as scholarship students to theological seminaries in Russia to be prepared for the priesthood in America.

To strengthen further its control over the converted Ukrainian Catholics, the Russian Orthodox mission opened a theological seminary in Minneapolis in 1905 to train Orthodox priests for the growing number of new parishes. As Russian Orthodoxy spread to the eastern states, this seminary was moved to Tenafly, New Jersey, in 1912. In 1923, when it ceased to receive funds from the Russian Communist regime, the seminary was closed.⁷⁰

The anti-Ukrainian-Catholic policy of the Latin hierarchy created troubles in the church life of the Ukrainian immigrants, and the Russian Orthodox mission in America capitalized on the

⁶⁹ *Golden Jubilee Album of St. Mary's Russian Orthodox Greek Catholic Church*, pp. 25, 73.

⁷⁰ "Minneapoliskaia missionerskaia shkola," *Kalendar Pravoslavnogo Obshchestva Vzaimopomoshchi na 1901 God*, pp. 77-84; D. Grigorieff, "The Historical Background of Orthodoxy in America," *St. Vladimir's Seminary Quarterly* 4, no. 4, pp. 11-12.

situation. After the parish in Minneapolis, the next target of the mission and of Rev. Tovt was the Ukrainian Catholic parish in Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania. When the resident priest, Nicholas Stetsevych, left suddenly and under unfortunate circumstances, the parish had difficulty in replacing him.

As soon as Rev. Tovt received news from the Wilkes-Barre parish, he handed over his parish in Minneapolis to Rev. Sebastian Dabovich, a Serbian, and, on 3 December 1892, rushed to Wilkes-Barre to convert the parish. Soon after his arrival he called a meeting of the congregation and explained the conditions of conversion. He demanded from the parishioners not only that they renounce the authority of the pope and the union with the Vatican, but also that they transfer all property deeds to the absolute jurisdiction and ownership of the Russian Orthodox bishop in San Francisco. Paradoxically, Tovt asked the parishioners to submit to the Russian bishop what he himself, like all other Ukrainian priests and parishioners, had refused to submit to the Latin bishops.⁷¹ Although a considerable number of parishioners went over to Orthodoxy and Tovt was appointed resident priest of the parish by Bishop Nikolai, the transfer of the church's property was prevented by drawn-out litigation. The newly converted parish soon became the center of proselytizing activity among Ukrainian Catholics in Pennsylvania and eventually in other eastern states.⁷²

The mission's activities, which were aimed primarily at the Ukrainian Catholics, eventually brought significant results. Although the Russian Orthodox church drew to itself converts from other nationalities (among them Greeks, Syrians, Serbs, Slovaks, and others), by far the largest numbers of converts were from among the Ukrainian Catholics.⁷³ By 1911, 18,224 Ukrainians (11,794 from Galicia, 6,430 from Transcarpathia) had converted to Russian Orthodoxy.⁷⁴ By 1914 Ukrainians constituted 43,000 of the 100,000 members in the Russian Orthodox church in America.⁷⁵ According to one of Tovt's followers, however,

⁷¹ Gulovich, *Windows Westward*, p. 130.

⁷² *Iubileinyi sbornik Soiuza Prav. Sviashchennikov Ameriki*, pp. 129-31; Russin, "Father Alexis G. Toth," pp. 139ff; A. J. Shipman, "Our Russian Catholics: The Greek-Ruthenian Church in Amerika," *The Messenger* (New York) 43, no. 3, p. 671.

⁷³ Balch, *Our Slavic Fellow Citizens*, pp. 126, 384-85.

⁷⁴ Bachynsky, *Ukrainska emigratsiia*, p. 279.

⁷⁵ *Pravoslavnyi russko-amerikanskii kalendar* 1915 (New York, 1914), p. 119.

The success of Orthodoxy and Russianness would have extended even farther, and today there would remain of the 'Union' only a pitiful remnant, if the hierarchy of our Russian Orthodox church had immediately elevated Father A. Tovt, the chief "leader" of all the contemporary Carpatho-Ruthenian clergy, to the bishopric. Unfortunately this proposal was not made to Father Tovt until 1907, that is, after 16 years, on the initiative of Archbishop Platon.⁷⁶

By then it was too late for Tovt, because, as he stated, "I am already too old for it [and] my health is already too poor." At the same time he emphasized that it was a good idea, because

This appointment would demonstrate to them [that is, the Ukrainian Catholic converts] that our highest ecclesiastical authority takes care of them in a paternal manner. [Thus] they can, through the mediation of one of their own people who knows their language, customs, and manners, organize for themselves here their temporal as well as their spiritual welfare.⁷⁷

With the gradual rise of Ukrainian immigrant organizations and national consciousness, the Russian church in America began losing ground. Fewer and fewer people were converted to Orthodoxy. Converts dropped away; some immigrants returned to Ukraine; churches were no longer filled.⁷⁸ The final blow came with the Russian Revolution. Its impact was disastrous. All connections between the Russian Orthodox mission in America and the Holy Synod were broken, and financial support stopped. Consequently Russian Orthodoxy in America lost its previous means of attracting converts. Henceforward the life of the church was torn by financial difficulties, personal ambitions, insubordination, human passions, and political and national arguments.⁷⁹

Rev. Tovt was a very ambitious man. As one of his followers pointed out, "Father Alexei G. Tovt had been secretary to his uncle, Bishop Nikolai of Prague. Not wishing to find himself ranked below [his uncle's] successor, Bishop Ivan Valii, he decided

⁷⁶ *Iubileinyi sbornik v pamiat 150-letiia Russkoi Pravoslavnoi Tserkvi v Severnoi Amerike*, 1: 131-33.

⁷⁷ Ibid. Tovt died at the age of fifty-six on 26 April 1909, in Wilkes-Barre. (*Golden Jubilee Album of St. Mary's Russian Orthodox Greek Catholic Church*, p. 20).

⁷⁸ Halich, *Ukrainians in the United States*, p. 104.

⁷⁹ D. Grigorieff, "The Historical Background of Orthodoxy in America," *St. Vladimir's Seminary Quarterly* 5, nos. 1-2, p. 13; Gulovich, *Windows Westward*, p. 137.

to seek a wider field for his ministry in America.”⁸⁰ Tovt expected to attain a high and prosperous church position there. But the realization of his hope that the Vatican would establish a separate vicariate apostolic for the Ukrainian Catholics in America was only a remote possibility.⁸¹ Hence, Tovt’s expectation that he might be elevated to the office of vicar apostolic was merely a dream. He had no desire to return to his native country, as Rev. Voliansky had done, and the prospect of remaining an ordinary priest in a poor parish in Minneapolis did not fit with his ambitions. Therefore Tovt turned himself in a direction that promised more wordly advantages. “According to the decree of excommunication, Alexis Tovt had received permission to come to the United States to better his financial condition. If this is true, he was not a missioner prompted by supernatural motives.”⁸²

Tovt’s background was also important in his decision to convert to Orthodoxy. Like most Ukrainian priests in America, he came from Transcarpathia, or Subcarpathian Ruthenia, which was ruled by the Hungarians. (In 1894, for example, twenty-six out of thirty priests were from Transcarpathia.) Many of these priests, including Tovt, had been under a strong Hungarian influence at home. They therefore lacked national consciousness and patriotic spirit, often paid more attention to material than to spiritual needs, and did little to foster Ukrainian patriotism among their parishioners.⁸³

Furthermore, the intolerant policy of the Latin hierarchy in America and of the Vatican, which sought to have complete control of the Ukrainian Catholic priests and church, and the subsidies of the Russian Orthodox mission in America brought about the conditions that attracted Tovt to Russian Orthodoxy. Thus Archbishop Ireland, because of his lack of understanding of the Byzantine rite Catholic church, laid the foundation for the Russification of many Ukrainian Catholics in America, and Rev. Tovt was for years the most powerful agent in proselytizing the Ukrainian Catholics and converting them to Russian Orthodoxy.

⁸⁰ *Golden Jubilee Album of St. Mary’s Russian Orthodox Greek Catholic Church*, p. 7.

⁸¹ Andrukhovych, *Z zhyttia rusyniv*, pp. 84, 97.

⁸² Gulovich, *Windows Westward*, p. 132.

⁸³ Myshuha, ed., *Propamiatna knyha*, p. 36; Andrukhovych, *Z zhyttia rusyniv*, pp. 92-93.

Vivian Olander

**“SAVE THEM FOR THE NATION”:
METHODIST RURAL HOME MISSIONS AS
AGENCIES OF ASSIMILATION**

Christian, dost thou see them,
Coming to our shores,
Men from every nation
Knocking to our doors?
Christian up and meet them,
Meet them ere they're lost;
Save them for the nation.
Save them by the Cross.¹

Saving Canada from paganism and multiculturalism by making Ukrainians good WASPs was the aim of the Methodist rural home-mission network covering all three prairie provinces. The first home mission was established in 1901 in Pakan, Alberta. This region northeast of Edmonton was the main area of concentration on the prairies. In Saskatchewan the first home missions were established in 1916. Although Manitoba was the oldest province, home-mission work there began only in 1920, with Vita as the nucleus. Home-mission work among the Ukrainians involved pastoral work, social centres, nursing centres and hospitals, and mission school-homes. A Ukrainian-language newspaper, *The Canadian*, was also published by the Methodist church. The twofold

¹ J. R. Paddock, “Save Them for the Nation,” *Missionary Outlook*, June 1914, p. 138.

purpose of the missionaries was "to convert to Christ, to proclaim the Gospel of good and right living."²

Pastoral Work

The Rev. Dr. C. H. Lawford arrived in Pakan in 1901. His mission field covered an area 20 miles by 30 miles and included 250 families.³ Since Lawford was a medical doctor as well as a Methodist minister, his mission was both pastoral and medical. This Ukrainian block settlement northeast of Edmonton had no resident priests or medical facilities. Although some Ukrainians attended his religious services and all Ukrainians greatly appreciated his medical aid, few chose to formally unite with his church. In spite of his zealous work, Lawford's first church was not built until 1906.⁴ Two years later a Ukrainian church was also opened in the area. When Lawford discovered that the resident Ukrainian priest drank alcoholic beverages with his parishioners at weddings and baptismal feasts, he concluded that the settlers had "little chance to become good citizens" if left under the spiritual care of the Ukrainian church.⁵ In 1909 he introduced a change in policy. Previously he claimed that he merely wanted to preach the way of salvation. Now, however, after the intrusion of the Ukrainian priest into his mission field, he believed it was his duty to openly proselytize and make known the errors of the Ukrainian churches.⁶

A hospital was built in Pakan in 1907, and since Lawford now devoted most of his time to his medical practice, the Rev. J. K. Smith was assigned to the field in 1908. Smith longed for the "day of clean hearts and clean homes" and, unlike Lawford, who never attempted to learn Ukrainian during his twenty-four years as a missionary, was eager to learn the language.⁷ Smith was joined in

² Mrs. James Harrison, "Work among the Austrians and Other European Foreigners," *Missionary Outlook*, November 1919, p. 257.

³ Rev. C. H. Lawford, "Work among the Galicians in Alberta," *Missionary Bulletin*, 3 (1908-1909), p. 233.

⁴ *Faith of Our Fathers. A Century of Victory 1824-1924: The 100th Annual Report of the Methodist Missionary Society* (Toronto, 1924), p. 53. Located in the United Church Archives (UCA), Toronto.

⁵ Rev. C. H. Lawford, "Work among the Austrians in Alberta," *Missionary Bulletin*, 7 (1910-11), p. 53.

⁶ Rev. C. H. Lawford, "Work among the Galicians in Alberta," *Missionary Bulletin*, 5 (1908-1909), p. 449.

⁷ Rev. K. H. Smith, "Work among the Galicians in Alberta," *Missionary Bulletin*, 6 (1909-1910), p. 506.

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1910 by the Rev. W. H. Pike, who often described his occupation as a "Canadianizer."⁸ By 1910 there were also three Ukrainian ministers, bringing the number of missionaries in the Pakan area up to six.

By 1925 there were missions and Ukrainian-language services at Lamont, Radway, Chipman, Smokey Lake, and Bellis. Besides conducting church services, the pastoral workers visited all the homes in the community, selling Bibles and distributing scripture portions, religious tracts, and pamphlets. However, it was not until 1909 that the missionaries realized that their pamphlets were in Russian rather than in Ukrainian. Even after two decades of evangelistic endeavour the actual number of converts was minimal.⁹

Social Centres

Another service the Methodist church provided for Ukrainian immigrants was the social centres established at Insinger and Calder, Saskatchewan, Smokey Lake, Alberta, and Vita, Manitoba. These centres were staffed by married missionaries, "whose modest homes, decently furnished, constitute an object lesson for the community around."¹⁰ The obvious fact that poor Ukrainian farmers could not possibly afford such homes was ignored. Each centre also had a building used for various purposes: clubs, lectures, games, movies, and night-school classes as well as religious services.

The first social centre was organized in 1916 in Insinger, the centre of four townships that were 95 percent Ukrainian. The worker assigned to this new project was Peter Yemen, a lay teacher. Because the local public school was usually closed for the winter, Yemen established both day and night schools. During the great flu epidemic of 1918 he nursed the sick until he too fell a victim to the disease. After his death he became the prototype of the social-centre missionary because of his exemplary devotion to the cause of assimilating the foreign immigrant:

⁸ "A Canadianizer's Ideal of Citizenship," *Missionary Bulletin*, 16 (1920), p. 239.

⁹ "Questionnaire on Churches and Missions Using English and Ukrainian," n.d., *Methodist Church, Canada. Missionary Society Home Department. Correspondence 1906-1926*, box 3, file 15, UCA; cited hereafter as *HD Correspondence*. A survey taken in the early 1920s reported that Chipman had ten communicants; Lamont, five communicants; Radway, twelve; Smokey Lake, twenty-four; and Bellis, thirty.

¹⁰ *Annual Report of the Missionary Society of the Methodist Church, 1920-21* (Toronto, 1921), p. 24, UCA.

His illness lasted only a few days. Much of the time he was delirious. In his delirium over and over again he declared: "The foreign problem can be solved." So it can if other leaders of Peter Yemen's spirit can be found.¹¹

Yemen's successor, the Rev. T. W. Johnson, became a teacher in the local public school, but not without opposition from the local Ukrainians. His wife contributed to the assimilation process by teaching domestic science twice a week at the school in order to introduce the children to Anglo-Saxon food.¹²

In 1920 a social centre was established in Calder, another area heavily populated by Ukrainians. The resident missionary did not teach in the school but was a leading member of the Calder school board and in close contact with the officials in the surrounding school districts. He used his influence to ensure that only Anglo-Saxon teachers were hired.¹³ In Vita, the social-centre missionary also followed the policy of acquiring important positions in the community. The first missionary served as the justice of the peace, and his successor was a teacher in the local high school.¹⁴

Hospitals and Nursing Centres

The Canadian government did not provide medical facilities for the prairie homesteaders. Fortunately, there were experienced midwives among the Ukrainian immigrants, but for any other medical problems the settlers were forced to rely on home remedies. The Methodist church generously provided medical centres to alleviate this serious problem. But the prime purpose of the hospitals was to be a "strong Canadianizing and Christianizing influence" in the Ukrainian communities.¹⁵ Methodists assumed that Ukrainians avoided doctors and hospitals because they had a passive, fatalistic attitude toward sickness and death and a low regard for human life. Thus, a Christian hospital or visiting nurse in the community would introduce new ideals in homemaking, child care, and nursing,

¹¹ *Annual Report*, 1918-19, p. xviii.

¹² "Insinger—An Experiment and A Success," *Missionary Outlook*, June 1922, p. 378.

¹³ *Faith of Our Fathers*, p. 57.

¹⁴ "Rev. W. R. Donogh to Rev. Lloyd Smith, April 27, 1926," *HD Correspondence*, box 4, file 24.

¹⁵ Walter Morrish, "The George McDougall Hospital, Smokey Lake," *Annual Report of the Woman's Missionary Society of the Methodist Church of Canada, 1924-1925* (Toronto, 1924), p. ccxiv, UCA.

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as well as in hygiene and sanitation. That Ukrainians were very poor when they first came to Canada and that medical treatment was expensive was overlooked, as was the fact that transportation was difficult because roads were poor and doctors were usually from twenty to one hundred miles away. Fear of new methods of health care and the language barrier were additional problems.

The first Methodist hospital, the George McDougall Hospital, was built in 1907 in Pakan. In 1911 a second hospital was opened in Lamont, thirty-five miles away. Apparently Ukrainians did realize the value of medical care: half of the funds for the new hospital were collected locally, and nine out of every ten Ukrainians canvassed contributed.¹⁶ After the First World War, Smokey Lake became the commercial centre of the Ukrainian colony northeast of Edmonton. The Methodists believed that their hold on the area was endangered by the plans of the Roman Catholic church to build a hospital at St. Paul, halfway between Edmonton and Smokey Lake. A Methodist hospital at Smokey Lake would consolidate their missionary work in the area and also discourage the Catholics from missionary activity in their field.¹⁷ Thus, in 1922 the George McDougall Hospital was moved from Pakan to Smokey Lake.

Every Methodist hospital had a chaplain, who visited each patient, distributed Bibles and religious tracts, and conducted a worship service on Sunday evenings. The chaplain also often visited patients after they returned home to maintain the contact. Methodists hoped that a stay in one of their hospitals would break down the resistance of a Ukrainian patient to their church.

By the 1920s the missionaries in Alberta noticed that more Ukrainians were using the services of the hospital, which they attributed to their success in teaching new attitudes towards health care. While it is true that fear of the unknown and the language barrier had decreased, other factors must be taken into consideration. Ukrainian farmers now had established farms and had more money available. Furthermore, railroads had been built and other means of transportation had improved. In the early days walking had been the chief means of transportation, but by the 1920s horses were commonly used.

¹⁶ "Rev. J. K. Smith to Rev. James Allen, June 22, 1911," *HD Correspondence*, box 2, file 13.

¹⁷ "Meeting of the Hospital Board Executive and Delegates from Smokey Lake. Edmonton, April 12, 1921," *HD Correspondence*, box 2, file 9.

Medical facilities for Ukrainians were also established in Saskatchewan. In Insinger, a nursing centre with a visiting nurse was set up to serve the Ukrainian community, and in 1923 a hospital was built in Hafford. In Manitoba, a nursing centre was established in Vita, the centre of twelve townships in the Stuartburn Municipality. This area was chosen because it was one of the poorest in the province, with the average total assessed property valued at \$226 per family or \$70 per person.¹⁸ Ruby Manton, the first nurse in Vita, reported that the average child suffered from nervous disorders as well as malnutrition. Furthermore, she added, "many appear much below normal mentally as well as physically and an alarming number show marked symptoms of mental deficiency."¹⁹ Since Manton did not speak Ukrainian and was only trained to treat physical problems, these accusations, although typical, are highly questionable. She also claimed that residents of the area were ignorant of the laws of nutrition and diet:

Children like older folks eat principally raw foods, including uncooked vegetables and fruits, also fat pork [sic]. It is not uncommon to see a young toddler eat a whole cucumber just off the vine. Milk, eggs and cereals are little used owing to the ignorance of their value.²⁰

This seems to be a rather inaccurate description of the local diet, since all the farmers in the area had cattle and poultry. Furthermore, because the farmers in this area were so poor, eggs were an important staple in their diet during the summer months. Moreover, grains and cereals were harvested by the local farmers, and oats and, especially, buckwheat were and still are traditionally a popular part of the Ukrainian diet.

The Rev. T. D. Wildfong, the missionary at the social centre in Vita, assumed that because Ukrainians resorted to home remedies, they lacked an inherent instinct to care for the sick:

These people lack the nursing instinct. In sickness they resort to patient remedies such as Beef Iron Twiies [sic], wines, or pain killers and medicines of that nature. In cuts or wounds they resort to pure carbolic acid and bind the part with cabbage leaves.²¹

¹⁸ "Rev. J. A. Doyle to Rev. C. E. Manning, April 5, 1923," *HD Correspondence*, box 4, file 24.

¹⁹ Ruby Manton, "Health and Home Conditions—Vita District," *HD Correspondence*, box 4, file 24.

²⁰ *Ibid.*

²¹ "Rev. J. D. Wildfong to Rev. C. E. Manning, Aug. 21, 1922," *HD Correspondence*, box 4, file 24.

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The fact that Ukrainians applied home remedies indicates that Ukrainians did not have a passive, fatalistic attitude towards illness and proves, rather than disproves, their nursing instinct. Wildfong also states that a doctor charged from \$35 to \$50 for one visit, an exorbitant price for the poor farmers in the area. The closest hospital was in Winnipeg. Train service was poor, especially in the spring when the snow melted and tracks were washed out. In 1922 the Board of Missions decided to build a hospital in Vita, and in December 1923 the new hospital was opened.

Mission Homes and Schools

The mission schools and homes established by the Women's Missionary Society (WMS) of the Methodist church were vital instruments of assimilation. The WMS missionaries were unmarried middle-class women from Ontario or eastern Canada.

In 1904 the first mission home, with three female missionaries, was established in Pakan. The name Wahstao was chosen for the mission because the missionaries wanted their home to be a light that would lead the Ukrainian people out of darkness.²² Methodists mistakenly thought that Wahstao was the Ukrainian word for the place from which light radiates. (Possibly, Wahstao is a corruption of the Church Slavonic or Russian word *vostok*, meaning the east, which is symbolically the source of light.)

Visitation was one of the main methods used to spread the Methodist view of Christianity and WASP ideals. Twenty-five hundred miles were covered in house-to-house visitation in the year 1909-10.²³ The women were extremely dedicated to their cause, taking advantage of every opportunity to spread their views. Even during Ukrainian Easter celebrations, the missionaries, armed with their guitars and Bibles, boldly invaded each home. They were aware that Ukrainians would not be working for three days and they would thus have a captive audience. Every Ukrainian family was treated to or endured a concert of traditional Protestant Easter hymns, such as "Low in the Grave He Lay" or the mournful "When I Survey the Wondrous Cross," as well as a Biblical commentary on John 20.²⁴ Another method of outreach was

²² Rev. W. H. Pike, *Wahstao "The Light On A Hill": The Story of the Work at Wahstao* (Toronto, 1917), n.p., UCA.

²³ Ethelwyn G. Chace, "Wahstao Mission, Alberta," *WMS Annual Report*, 1909-1910, p. c.

²⁴ Ethelwyn G. Chace, *Easter Day at Wahstao* (Toronto, 1909), n.p. UCA.

Sunday school, which was held in the mission home or in private homes when willing hosts could be found. In addition to traditional religious instruction, "much needed lessons in manners and morals" were taught.²⁵ For the women of the community the missionaries organized weekly meetings. The women sewed, knitted, or made quilts and were served refreshments. An important part of each meeting was the Bible study given by one of the missionaries. The mission home also distributed clothing collected by WMS groups in the east and provided other useful services, such as first aid and reading and writing letters in English.

The missionaries self-righteously believed that they had the right to regulate the standards of the community and thus waged war on Sabbath-breaking, alcohol, and dancing. In isolated small rural communities dancing was one of the few forms of entertainment available to Ukrainians, and since Sunday was the only day free from work, dances were usually held on that day. Armed only with their Bibles, the dauntless women missionaries attempted to stop a dance one Sunday evening:

A number of such young men who came into the neighbourhood for the winter amused themselves with some Sunday dances. When the third one was announced in the one house, we felt it unbearable. It looked like defiance, knowing the principles for which this house of yours stands, to persist in such flagrant Sabbath-breaking in its very shadow. Having marked in the Bible, passages on the subject, we went down, uninvited to the dance. The man of the house was outdoors. "Yes, certainly, come in! You may read the Bible. Why not?" But we didn't. Not even for five minutes, after which we promised to leave again, would they be still. The women settled down to listen, but not so the men.²⁶

In spite of their valiant efforts, the missionaries were defeated. Furthermore, another dance was held the following Sunday. In order to at least save their few adherents from the paths of sin, the missionaries prolonged their Sunday evening service as long as possible and then made certain that every person present went straight home.

The educational work at Wahstao involved both a night school and a day school. In the early years night school was held from November to March. The pupils were usually men and boys who

²⁵ "Wahstao Mission, Alberta," *WMS Annual Report*, 1910-11, p. cxii.

²⁶ Miss Chace, "Work among the Galicians," *Missionary Outlook*, August 1910, p. 191.

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were too busy with farm work during the rest of the year. No fee was charged, but an offering was taken. Although the students came to the mission house only to learn English, the curriculum included singing and prayer as well as a sermon every evening. Biblical passages were also memorized. In 1912 arithmetic, geography, history, and business composition were added.²⁷

A day school was also established in the home and was in operation until 1907, when a public school was opened in the area. One of the missionaries was then employed in the public school for a number of years, although not without protest from some Ukrainian parents.²⁸ A few of the children, who lived too far from the school to travel daily, became boarders at the mission home. In the summer the boarders attended the public school, which was in operation only from April to November, and in the winter, the private school run by the missionaries in the home. Realizing that the parents were content with their own church and traditions, the missionaries decided to concentrate their efforts on the children:

We firmly believe that much of the hope of this work lies in the children whom we have come in closest contact with in the home, and that the sooner provision is made for keeping more children constantly in the house, the better for them and for the future of this neighbourhood.²⁹

The school home offered an excellent opportunity for assimilation: while they lived in the home the children were completely submerged in WASP life and cut off from their parents and Ukrainian heritage.

A second WMS mission house was opened in 1908 in the Smokey Lake area, fifteen miles northwest of Wahstao and ten miles north of Pakan.³⁰ The name of the new mission was Kolokreeka, which supposedly meant "beside the creek" in Ukrainian (*kolo* meaning "beside" and *kreeka* being a Ukrainianization of the

²⁷ Alice A. Sanford, "Wahstao, Alberta," *WMS Annual Report*, 1911-12, p. xciii.

²⁸ "Efforts were made as before to secure another teacher for the school here at Wahstao. 'Miss Chace—too much church work,' though I had been careful to keep within the law as far as definite religious instruction was concerned." Miss Chace, "Work among the Galicians," *Missionary Outlook*, August 1910, p. 191.

²⁹ Sanford, op. cit.

³⁰ Rev. W. H. Pike, *Kolokreeka "The House Beside The Creek"* Being *The Story of Kolokreeka* (Toronto, n.d.), n. pag. UCA.

English word "creek".) Sunday school and other meetings were held as at Wahstao. In 1912 the decision was made to open a residential school. The house was enlarged to board sixteen children, and the school room accommodated thirty-two children. The staff consisted of one evangelistic worker, one school teacher who also taught in the public school in the summer, and the matron. A day in the schoolhome started at 6:00 A.M. At 7:30 the children were served a breakfast of steaming porridge. At 8:00 they assembled for thirty minutes of morning prayers. The children then did their assigned chores until school started at 9:30. Lunch was from 12:00 to 1:30, and then school continued until 4:00 P.M. Until supper at 6:00 P.M., the children had a recreation period and did their evening chores. Supper was followed by evening prayer. Before the children went to bed one of the missionaries had a "heart to heart" talk with each child, who would privately tell her of "triumphs in speaking English, in helping someone else to speak English, in discouraging wrong doing in overcoming some wrong they had seen in themselves."³¹ Virtues such as obedience, purity of speech, and "KKK" ("Kolokreeka kindness") were emphasized. By 10:00 P.M. all lights were out and everyone was safely in bed. Evangelistic and recreational meetings took place during the week, and services on Sunday. Saturday night was bath night.

As soon as they entered the home, the children were taught to perform their various chores in the dormitory, the school room, and the dining room in "English fashion."³² The girls particularly were taught to be "good homemakers," in the hope that when they married their homes would be "miniature mission homes" and an example to the Ukrainian community.³³ The children were not allowed to speak Ukrainian even during their recreation time.³⁴ Every child who managed to survive the day without lapsing into Ukrainian was rewarded with a picture postcard.³⁵ Eventually, however, in order to compete with the Catholic schools the missionaries were forced to permit instruction in Ukrainian three

³¹ Phoebe M. Code, "Kolokreeka, Smokey Lake, Alberta," *WMS Annual Report*, 1912-13, p. cxxxii.

³² *Ibid.*, p. cxxxii.

³³ Mrs. J. K. Smith, "The Ruthenian Colony of Northern Alberta," *Missionary Bulletin*, 13 (1917-18), p. 296.

³⁴ Miss Yarwood, "Austrian Work," *Missionary Outlook*, January 1917, p. 23.

³⁵ Miss MacLean, "Austrian Work," *Missionary Outlook*, July 1913, p. 167.

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times a week. They justified this by claiming that the children could carry the lessons learned at the mission to their parents.³⁶ Thus, even though the Methodist church was officially opposed to the perpetuation of foreign languages on Canadian soil, it was willing to allow Ukrainian to be taught in its mission as a means of conversion and assimilation.

The Yorkton School Home in Saskatchewan established after the First World War was funded by the Board of Missions and staffed by a minister and his wife. The church emphasized that while it was true that rural Ukrainian students could obtain room and board in private homes at the same price, their home would inculcate WASP values and ideals. Methodists believed that the power of the Ukrainian vote in the block settlements of Manitoba had defeated prohibition. The Saskatchewan conference naturally wanted to prevent a similar catastrophe in its province by influencing the future Ukrainian leaders. The Methodists noted that Ukrainian parents were willing to make sacrifices in order to educate their children and that the educated young people would be the future leaders of the Ukrainian community. Thus, by assimilating the future leaders in their school home, Methodists could influence the whole Ukrainian community. This mission of assimilation would also bring benefits to the taxpayer and the country as a whole:

It costs the State much money to punish, and I am sorry to say, that the New Canadian constitute [sic] the majority of the local civil cases. In a manslaughter trial, lasting under two weeks, it costs over \$3,000 besides the loss of two lives. Bill, the barbar, costs the State, how much?³⁸

Thus, although missionary work was expensive, in the long run it would save the taxpayer money as well as keep his country homogeneous and WASP.

Conclusion

The Methodist church openly sanctioned and perpetuated the negative popular reaction towards Ukrainian immigrants; through its home-mission programme it preached the gospel of salvation

³⁶ Code, op. cit., p. cxxxii.

³⁷ "Minutes of the Yorkton Methodist School Home Committee, May 27, 1924," p. 1. *HD Correspondence*, box 4, file 24.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 5.

by assimilation and the adoption of WASP middle-class values. The home-mission policy brought psychological, sociological, and sociocultural consequences for the small number of Ukrainian converts who were, or tried, to assimilate. The psychological result was alienation, that is, estrangement, loneliness, rootlessness, and anxiety.³⁹ A Ukrainian convert who left his ethnic group became separated from the psychological supports provided by his ethnic group and became disoriented, because he had left the known and was trying to adjust to an unknown cultural group and to build a new sense of identity as a WASP. Such assimilated individuals could even become prejudiced against their own ethnic group as a result of the keen desire to adhere to the values and ideals of the new reference group.⁴⁰ Thus, for the convert Ukrainian culture and religious traditions became inferior. Since the Methodist church was the church in which they found salvation, it became the church of Christ in their eyes, and WASP culture became the Christian culture rather than one interpretation of it.

The sociological consequences of assimilation involve the admission or denial of admission into social groups.⁴¹ On one hand, Ukrainian converts gained acceptance into the Methodist church as members; however, they still must have felt ill at ease in WASP society because of their supposed “inferior” background. On the other hand, converts were denied admission into Ukrainian society and were looked upon as traitors. They were thus often alienated from their families and former friends. Even the missionaries themselves noticed that any Ukrainian who converted to Protestantism lost his ethnicity:

There is a marked national spirit abroad in the air, and many feel that to leave their church is to drop their nationality. “He is not Russian,” as a woman once said, “he is a Baptist.”⁴²

The conflict between the convert’s new value system and the Ukrainian value system often brought discord to family relations. One Methodist missionary reported:

After her conversion she took a firm stand on many moral questions, much to the disapproval of her family, who, while they did not

³⁹ M. L. Kovacs and A. J. Cropley, “Assimilation and Alienation in Ethnic Groups,” *Canadian Ethnic Studies* 4 (1972), p. 14.

⁴⁰ Ibid., p. 17.

⁴¹ Ibid., p. 14.

⁴² Ethelwyn G. Chace, “Chipman Alberta,” *WMS Annual Report*, 1912-13, p. cxxxiv.

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actually break relationship with her, showed in many ways their antipathy to her new life and her earnest desire for her salvation⁴³

The sociocultural results of assimilation involve a change of dress styles and recreation. Ukrainian converts were required to doff their traditional clothing and other visible signs of their ethnicity. A WMS pamphlet relates the story of a Ukrainian convert who left the mission school, married a Ukrainian, and moved away.⁴⁴ Once settled in her new home, an "English house" (the style she preferred), she did not go to the local Ukrainian church, because it "did not give her the soul-food she needed." After a while she became mortally ill. When she realized she was going to die, she insisted that she be buried in an "English dress" and that her Bible be buried with her, instead of the cross her family desired. Apparently, she was a model convert whose life other Ukrainians should strive to emulate.

Ukrainian converts were also required to forsake the recreational habits of their ethnic group, especially dances held at weddings and on other special occasions. Methodist missionaries noticed that dancing proved to be a great temptation to their converts:

The Easter festivities were a source of testing to these young men. The older of them was noted as the best dancer of the community, and his friends could not understand his self-denial for conscience sake. Their fidelity to God is very inspiring.⁴⁵

Converts also isolated themselves from community festivities by refusing to drink alcoholic beverages:

One of the girls was commanded by her father to drink whiskey. She begged him not to force her to drink, and after a time managed to slip away. Taking her New Testament, she went out where she might be alone for reading and prayer, having learned at the mission that this was her source of grace and strength in time of need.⁴⁶

⁴³ Pike, op. cit. There are other accounts of converts who were forced or chose to leave home: "One lad who persisted in attending our service has been forced to leave home." *Missionary Outlook*, June 1910, p. 138; "Since then he has left home for an indefinite time partly on account of his convictions." *Ibid.*, p. 143.

⁴⁴ E. Chace, *Tsea: A Mission School Girl at Wahstao* (Toronto, n.d.), n. pag. UCA.

⁴⁵ "Good News from Pakan, Alberta," *Missionary Outlook*, August 1909, p. 175.

⁴⁶ Pike, op. cit.

The reaction to the pressure to assimilate of many students educated in Methodist mission schools was to cherish and to cling all the more firmly to their culture. Many became the leaders of the nascent Ukrainian nationalist movement. A small group chose to assimilate and often changed their names in order to conform to the WASP norm. With their Canadian education they were more readily accepted into WASP society than their parents were. A third group developed an inferiority complex because they accepted the negative ethnic stereotypes imposed upon them by their teachers and thus acquired a highly negative self-definition of ethnicity.⁴⁷ This reaction was not limited to mission school graduates; it was also evident in students who had been influenced by prejudiced teachers in public schools. This group remained in the Ukrainian community, but at the same time subconsciously and sometimes even consciously demonstrated that it believed Ukrainian culture to be inferior. The members of this group often changed their names or anglicized them. They became advocates of the “Ukrainian in my home and Canadian, that is Anglo-Saxon, outside of it” policy.

Although the Methodist home missionaries were very dedicated and their network was extensive, the results they desired were not achieved. Ukrainians were very much aware that the aim of the missionaries was to assimilate them. The Ukrainian press and churches continually warned their people about the work of the Protestants. Protestant ministers were believed to be “Anglo-Saxon nationalist politicians,” and Ukrainian Methodist ministers, “hirelings who have sold themselves to the English.”⁴⁸ Only a small number of Ukrainians converted and were assimilated. Ironically, the Methodist home-mission program in the period from 1901 to 1925 resulted mainly in reinforcing the identification of Ukrainian ethnicity with the two traditional Ukrainian churches. Adherence to the Ukrainian Catholic or Ukrainian Orthodox church remained an important element of membership in the Ukrainian ethnic group. Thus, the Ukrainian churches in Canada became the preservers of the cultural, as well as the religious, heritage of Ukraine.

⁴⁷ Today a similar reaction is evident among Canadian Native Indian students. See David R. Hughes and Evelyn Kallen, *An Anatomy of Racism, Canadian Dimensions* (Montreal, 1974), p. 96.

⁴⁸ “Canadian Ranok Committee Minutes, Ranok Report, 1925.” UCA.

S. Maksudov

THE GEOGRAPHY OF THE SOVIET FAMINE OF 1933

While there is relatively little scholarly literature on the famine of 1933, there is a wealth of eye-witness testimony and demographic evidence, which leave little doubt that it was a man-made famine caused by the forced requisition of grain after a less than bountiful harvest and that it was, along with the world wars and aftermath of the revolution, one of the major demographic catastrophes suffered by the inhabitants of the USSR. One of the major unanswered questions concerning the famine is what was its territorial extent.¹

The 1959 Soviet census allows us to determine which territories suffered most from the famine by comparing the number of survivors born before collectivization (1924-28), during collectivization (1929-33), and immediately after (1934-38). Of course, it would be preferable to group the generations somewhat differently, but we have little choice, since the census tables themselves delineate the generations in these five-year categories.²

¹ On population losses caused by the famine see F. Lorimer, *The Population of the Soviet Union: History and Prospects* (Geneva, 1946), pp. 127, 134; Maksudov, "Poteri naseleniia v SSSR v 1931-1938 gg.," *SSSR: Vnutrennie protivorechiia* (New York) 5 (1982): 104-191.

² All population data in this article are taken from *Itogi Vsesoiuznoi perepisi naseleniia 1959 goda: SSSR* (Moscow, 1962), pp. 54-71, 211-25; *RSFSR* (Moscow, 1963), pp. 62-97, 388-409; *Ukrainskaia SSR* (Moscow, 1963), pp. 32-43; *Kazakhskaia SSR* (Moscow, 1962), pp. 30-41.

In normal conditions we would expect that in any given census each younger group would be more numerous than the group immediately preceding it and that the general curve of the age structure of the male and female population, when placed back to back, would have the shape of a pyramid in which a small number of the aged are at the top and progressively younger age groups spread out in successively greater numbers to form relatively smooth sides toward a base consisting of the newborn. But in the period with which we are concerned such a tendency holds true only for the borderlands of Caucasia, Siberia, and Central Asia. In the European portions of the USSR we are presented with a different picture: in the 1959 census those aged 30 through 34 are more numerous than those aged 25 through 29, and the latter group is more numerous than the group aged 20 through 24. However, this tendency also ceases to hold true for a number of regions in the European part of the USSR, where the 1959 census shows those born in 1934-38 to be more numerous than the group born during the preceding five years.

Let us examine this phenomenon by territory. Since the male population in this age group was more susceptible to death owing to specific causes and the urban population was more likely to be geographically mobile, the most reliable portrait can be gained by limiting our consideration to the female population residing in rural areas. Of course, we cannot exclude the possibility that the younger group (20- to 24-year-olds) might have migrated to the cities and to other republics in greater numbers than the immediately older generations, but in the absence of specific evidence to the contrary, there seems to be little hope of gaining a more exact picture of demographic phenomena other than by limiting our consideration to a group least likely to have suffered unnatural death or to have been geographically mobile. In the final analysis, it also may be hoped that any distortions in the demographic structure of a given region would be naturally offset by neighboring regions.

Table 1 shows that the number of females living in villages and born in 1929-33 is greater in most areas than the corresponding group born in 1934-38. Exceptions are found in northern Caucasia, Kazakhstan, Ukraine, and the Far East. In these regions the 25-29 age group registers a noticeable decline. It must again be recalled that we are dealing with the 1959 census. Therefore the territories of Kazakhstan and the Far East must be viewed in light of the intensive in-migration there in 1939-58. Kazakhstan in particular became the home of many hundreds of thousands of Volga Germans, while millions of Russians and Ukrainians were

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sent there during the "conquest of virgin lands." Thus the area was settled by a significant number of nationalities other than the Kazakhs, and these new settlers brought with them their own age structure.

In addition to examining the population by territory, we must also examine different nationalities. Peoples that have their own Soviet republic are examined in table 2, and they can be divided into three groups:

1. Peoples among whom the fall in the birthrate has exceeded the fall of the mortality rate and who therefore possess an aging population structure: the Russians, the Balts, and, to an extent, the Belorussians.

2. Peoples with high mortality and without limits on births, such that the younger generations greatly exceed their elders in numbers: the inhabitants of Caucasia and Central Asia.

3. Peoples who registered a fall in the number of the generation born in 1929-33: the Ukrainians and the Kazakhs. But the rise in mortality among this generation shows opposite tendencies for the two peoples. The Ukrainians, like the Russians, enjoyed a clear decline in the birthrate, and for this reason the number of the 25-29 age group had to exceed that of the 20- to 24-year-olds such that the difference might be greater than that shown by the table. For the Kazakhs and other Eastern peoples the fall in numbers from young to old (evident from table 2, columns 3 and 1) is such that the huge drop in the 25-29 age group can partially be explained by overall tendencies and partially (perhaps about 15 percent) by increased mortality.

Let us now turn to an examination of the increased mortality of the 1929-33 generation by territory. Kazakhstan, Ukraine, northern Caucasia, and the Volga region are precisely those territories in which numerous eyewitnesses testify to the ravage of mass starvation in 1933. This correspondence is not accidental. Any other explanation of such a generational shortfall in comparison with neighboring territories would be hard to comprehend. It might be possible to argue that Ukraine was the area of the most extensive decline in births because of abortions and that this explains why the 1923-33 generation is larger than of the following five years. But the population of the Volga region, northern Caucasia, and Kazakhstan has never been subject to extensive artificial constraints on the birthrate. At least no one has ever claimed that the rate of abortions there was higher than in the northwestern or central areas of the Soviet Union. Moreover, among the urban population we observe the same tendency as among the

rural population: a peak in the numerical decline in the 25-29 age group in Ukraine, Kazakhstan, northern Caucasia, and the Volga region. One cannot attribute to the inhabitants of these areas any greater frequency of abortions than the inhabitants of Moscow and Leningrad, where almost one-third of all abortions in the Soviet Union were performed between 1928 and 1936.

Let us examine in more detail the numerical relationship of age groups in various regions of Ukraine. Table 3 shows the territories that, according to eyewitness accounts, suffered mass starvation in 1933, and table 4 shows areas annexed by the Soviet Union in 1939 as well as some oblasts bordering on Ukraine in the north and east. Here we see in fifteen of the seventeen oblasts of pre-1939 Soviet Ukraine (table 3) a significant fall in the number of the group born in 1929-33, while nothing of the sort is observed in either the western Ukrainian oblasts or in the RSFSR oblasts bordering on Ukraine (table 4).

The only possible explanation of this phenomenon is the famine, which resulted in high infant mortality.

Table 3 also shows us the geographical extent of the famine in Ukraine and, to some extent, its intensity. The greatest numerical losses occurred in Dnipropetrovsk, Cherkasy, Luhansk, Kharkiv, Kiev, and Kirovohrad oblasts. A somewhat smaller loss of around 20 percent is observed in Zaporizhzhia, Poltava, Mykolaiv, Kherson, and Crimea oblasts. To a third group may be assigned Donetsk, Sumy, Zhytomyr, and Vinnytsia oblasts, where the famine was still less extreme. Only in Chernihiv and Khmelnytsky oblasts do we lack evidence of any intensification of mortality because of the famine of 1933.

Let us now turn to the RSFSR oblasts bordering on Ukraine and examine the numerical position of the 1929-33 generation (table 5). We observe a pronounced fall in numbers similar to the most strongly affected oblasts of Ukraine only in the three northern Caucasian regions: Rostov, Krasnodar, and Stavropol.

In the Volga region the most pronounced evidence of famine, analogous to the second group of Ukrainian oblasts, may be observed in the Saratov and Volgograd oblasts, with evidence of a somewhat lower rate of mortality in the Kuibyshev, Penza, and Gorky oblasts and the Tatar ASSR.

In addition, declines in the 25-29 age group can be seen in some other oblasts of the RSFSR: Riazan oblast (not very great), the two Ural oblasts of Orenburg and Cheliabinsk (in the first case the decline is rather noteworthy, probably because of the large Kazakh population of this region), in Omsk and Amur oblasts (in

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the latter case the loss may be explained either by postwar immigration of groups that brought their population structure with them or by losses of the local population during collectivization).

In this way the analysis of the numerical relationship of the generations born in 1924-28, 1929-33, and 1934-38 allows us to determine the regions in which the second of these age groups suffered increased mortality. This phenomenon occurred only in territories that suffered from extreme hunger in 1933. The greater losses in the 25-29 age group may therefore be attributed to famine in the regions in which such losses occurred.

Table 1 Rural Women in 1959 (in Thousands)

	I	II	III	II:I
	20-24-year-olds (b 1934-38)	25-29-year-olds (b 1929-33)	30-34-year-olds (b 1924-28)	
Leningrad-Karelia region	164	179	191	109
Central industrial region	393	413	470	105
Volga-Viatka region	211	216	227	102
Central chernozem region	241	255	295	106
Lower Volga region	257	243	285	95
Northern Caucasia	322	256	308	79
Ural region	345	348	373	101
Western Siberia	200	205	233	103
Eastern Siberia	145	145	145	100
Far East	60	57	61	95
Kazakh SSR				
a. Kazakh females	147	95	115	83*
b. Other females	102	89	99	87
Ukrainian SSR (pre-1939)	665	546	753	82
Belorussian SSR	244	249	241	102
Baltic region	116	118	116	102
Transcaucasia	270	233	195	119*
Central Asia	377	378	315	120*
USSR as a whole	4,690	4,462	4,820	95

* II:III

Table 2 Rural Women of Each Major Nationality within Their Respective National Republic in 1959 (in Thousands)

NATIONALITY	I	II	III	II:III
	20-24-year-olds (b 1934-38)	25-29-year-olds (b 1929-33)	30-34-year-olds (b 1924-28)	
Russian (USSR as a whole)	1,997	1,972	2,285	99*
Ukrainian (post-1939)				
Ukrainian SSR	988	879	1,061	89*
Belorussian	240	241	234	100*
Uzbek	193	200	155	129
Kazakh	147	95	115	83
Azerbaidzhani	103	84	56	150
Moldavian	91	80	74	108
Georgian	81	75	70	107
Armenian	62	53	49	108
Lithuanian	58	60	57	103*
Tadzhik	53	49	37	132
Kirgiz	34	37	30	123
Turkmen	27	27	23	117
Latvian	23.5	24	24.5	102*
Estonian	14	15	15	107*

* II:I

Table 3 Rural Women in Soviet Ukraine in 1959 (in Thousands)

PRE-1939 OBLAST	I	II	III	II:I
	20-24-year-olds (b 1934-38)	25-29-year-olds (b 1929-33)	30-34-year-olds (b 1924-28)	
Cherkasy	49.9	34.9	57.5	70
Chernihiv	46.7	47.0	62.3	101
Crimea	22.0	18.3	22.2	83
Dnipropetrovsk	34.5	24.5	36.5	71
Donetsk	25.9	22.2	29.2	86
Kharkiv	39.3	28.9	47.0	74
Kherson	22.9	18.3	23.1	80
Khmelnitskyi	51.0	55.1	59.4	108
Kiev	56.9	41.4	58.4	73
Kirovohrad	33.4	24.3	40.2	73
Luhansk	21.8	16.0	23.5	73
Mykolaiv	26.0	21.0	28.3	81

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Odessa	46.8	41.2	49.3	88
Poltava	45.0	36.0	55.5	80
Sumy	40.0	35.5	50.4	89
Vinnytsia	73.6	69.0	85.9	94
Zaporizhzhia	27.9	21.5	29.9	77
Zhytomyr	52.0	46.5	53.6	89

Table 4 Rural Women in 1959 in Ukrainian Oblasts Annexed after 1939 and in Russian Oblasts Neighboring Ukraine (in Thousands)

OBLAST	I	II	III	II:I
	20-24-year-olds (b 1934-38)	25-29-year-olds (b 1929-33)	30-34-year-olds (b 1924-28)	
Chernivtsi	27.8	27.5	25.5	99
Lviv	57.8	61.1	51.8	106
Rovno	39.6	40.0	33.3	101
Stanislav	42.2	43.3	35.8	103
Ternopil	41.3	44.3	39.3	107
Transcarpathia	30.3	30.5	28.5	101
Volhynia	31.3	34.6	31.2	111
Belgorod	38.7	39.5	48.2	102
Briansk	39.0	44.4	48.5	114
Kursk	45.6	48.8	54.6	107
Lipetsk	30.5	31.7	35.9	104
Orel	27.6	29.7	33.4	108
Voronezh	57.6	63.9	74.9	111

Table 5 Rural Women in the Volga Basin, Northern Caucasia, and Other RSFSR Territories in 1959 (in Thousands)

OBLAST/KRAI	I	II	III	II:I	III:I
	20-24-year-olds (b 1934-38)	25-29-year-olds (b 1929-33)	30-34-year-olds (b 1924-28)		
Amur	13	11	11.5	85	88
Cheliabinsk	32	29	34	91	106
Krasnodar	103	74	111	72	108
Omsk	43	41	44	95	102
Orenburg	44	39	47	89	107
Rostov-na-Donu	62	52	68	84	110
Saratov	40	34	45	85	113
Stavropol	62	50	63	81	102

Andrii Krawchuk

PROTESTING AGAINST THE FAMINE: THE STATEMENT OF THE UKRAINIAN CATHOLIC BISHOPS IN 1933

In August 1933 news of the famine in Soviet Ukraine reached the Lviv Archeparchy. Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, together with the Ukrainian Catholic bishops of Western Ukraine, responded promptly by issuing an open statement of protest.¹ Appealing to the Catholic faithful and to all people of good will, the document expressed solidarity with the oppressed and blamed the Stalinist regime for the famine.

First published in the ecclesiastical province of Lviv, the document found its way into Western Europe. It came to the attention of a Roman Catholic hierarch, Theodore Cardinal Innitzer of Vienna, who within two months organized an international aid committee to publicize the famine internationally and to assist its victims by sending food to Soviet Ukraine.²

¹ "Ukraina v peredsmertnykh sudorohakh," *Nyva* (Lviv), August 1933, pp. 281-82.

² Soviet reaction to the committee's formation was predictably negative: it declared it a "Vatican anti-Soviet campaign" (Cf. *New York Times*, 5 February 1934). Such a stance, together with the violent means that were used to enforce collectivization in Soviet Ukraine, make it highly probable that any shipments of food from Western Europe would have been intercepted.

Nevertheless, the committee was effective in publicizing the famine. Its honorary secretary, Ewald Ammende, and M. Motta, the foreign minister of Switzerland, both delivered speeches on the subject to the League of Nations in Geneva. In addition, the former also published an exhaustive documentary sourcebook on the famine: Ewald Ammende, *Muss Russland Hungern?* (Vienna, 1935).

Authorship of the text may be attributed primarily to Metropolitan Sheptytsky. As the senior bishop, he would have had a large measure of influence upon the form and the content of the document. During his thirty-four years in the Catholic episcopate he had been quite outspoken in his condemnation of socialism and atheism.³ The references to religious faith—as the foundation of the social order and as incompatible with Bolshevism—and to the oppressed lower classes are his hallmark. Perhaps more than any of the other signatories, Metropolitan Sheptytsky would have perceived the famine as the definitive example of Soviet Communism in practice.

The following is a translation of the full text of the bishops' statement.

Ukraine is suffering the pangs of death. The population is dying out through famine. Standing on the injustices of deception, atheism, and corruption,⁴ the cannibalistic system of state capitalism has reduced a recently wealthy land to utter ruin.⁵ Three years ago the leader of the

³ See his pastoral letter *O kvestii sotsialnii* (Zhovkva, 1904), an attempt to come to grips with the emerging social doctrine of the Roman Catholic church on the one hand, and anticlerical Ukrainian socialism on the other.

⁴ The association of atheism with prevailing social evils was characteristic of the ideologically laden discourse that had developed over the years between the Ukrainian Catholic church and the Communists. But while the famine in Ukraine did provide powerful evidence in support of the religious argument, the implicit suggestion that a nonreligious political outlook necessarily went hand in hand with the exploitation of workers was not entirely warranted.

Among the voices of protest in Western Ukraine at this time were those of three Ukrainian socialist parties: the Social Democratic Workers' Party, the Social Democratic Party, and the Radical Party. In a joint appeal to all socialist organizations of the world, unencumbered by religious terminology, they condemned Soviet economic policy: "We declare that the single and the obvious cause of the famine in Soviet Ukraine is the unscrupulous economic exploitation of the Ukrainian people by the Bolshevik dictatorship, which considers Ukraine its colony." (Cf. *Tryzub* [Paris], 27 August 1933, pp. 40-41).

⁵ Although the reference here is to the Soviet regime, it is likely that the bishops were aware of instances of actual cannibalism in the famine-stricken areas. On 25 August 1933, one day after the promulgation of the bishops' protest, a similar document was drafted and signed in Lviv by the representatives of thirty-five Ukrainian organizations. Published in the Paris weekly *Tryzub* (27 August 1933, pp. 46-48), it explicitly

Catholic church, His Holiness Pope Pius XI, vehemently protested against all that in Bolshevism is opposed to Christianity, God, and human nature, warning of the terrible consequences of such crimes. The entire Catholic world, including ourselves, joined this protest.

Today we see the consequences of the Bolsheviks' ways; the situation worsens daily. The enemies of God and of humanity have rejected religion (the foundation of the social order); they have deprived people of freedom (the greatest human good); they have turned peasant-citizens into slaves; and they lack the wisdom to nourish them in return for their slavish work and the sweat of their brow.

Faced with such crimes, human nature is left speechless: one's very blood curdles.

Unable ourselves to offer material assistance to our dying brethren, we implore our faithful that they—in prayers, fasting, general mourning, offering, and in whatever works of Christian charity that may be possible—appeal for heavenly help at a time when human help on this earth is not forthcoming.

Before the whole world we again protest against the oppression of the lowly, the poor, the weak, and the innocent, and we accuse the hounds before the Judgment of the Almighty.

The blood of workers, who in hunger tilled the black soil of Ukraine, calls to the heavens for vengeance, and the voice of the hungry reapers has reached the ears of the Lord of Hosts.

We entreat all Christians of the world, all believers, particularly all workers and peasants and our compatriots, to join this voice of protest and anguish and to make it heard in the farthest reaches of the earth.

We ask that all radio stations carry forth our voice into the world; it may thus perhaps even reach the humble huts of the famine-stricken peasants. Faced with the terrible death and the harsh sufferings of famine, may they at least be comforted by the thought that their brethren knew of their terrible fate, that they sympathized and suffered along with them, and that they prayed for them.

And you, our suffering, starved, and dying brethren, invoke the merciful God and our Savior Jesus Christ. Cruel is your suffering: accept it for the sake of your own sins and for those of [our] entire nation and, together with Jesus Christ, say "Thy will be done, O Father in heaven!"

mentions such occurrences. Nor were such atrocities unheard of in Western Ukraine. A decade earlier, in an appeal for donations during the famine of 1922, the Metropolitan Ordinariate of Lviv reported cannibalism in Soviet Ukraine. Cf. *Lvivski arkhyeparkhialni vidomosti*, 25 May 1922. Thus, the precise reason why the present document refers to cannibalism only in polemical terms remains open to conjecture.

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A death that is accepted in order to serve God's will is a holy sacrifice that, united with the sacrifice of Jesus Christ, will bring the Kingdom to you and salvation to our people.

Our hope is in God!

Lviv, on the feast day of St. Olga, 24 August 1933.

Andrei Sheptytsky, metropolitan
Hryhorii Khomyshyn, bishop of Stanyslaviv
Iosafat Kotsilovsky, bishop of Peremyshl
Nykyta Budka, bishop of Patar
Hryhorii Lakota, auxiliary bishop of Peremyshl
Ivan Buchko, auxiliary bishop of Lviv
Ivan Liatyshevsky, auxiliary bishop of Stanyslaviv

Богдан Цимбалістий

НАЦІОНАЛЬНА ОРГАНІЗАЦІЯ УКРАЇНСЬКИХ СТУДЕНТІВ В НІМЕЧЧИНІ

До історії постання НОУС-у. Перед другою світовою війною українські студенти в Німеччині були об'єднані в Національному Союзі Українських Студентських Організацій Німеччини (НасУСОН). Це була надрядна крайова студентська організація з осідком в Берліні. До неї належали самостійні студентські товариства, що існували в деяких студійних осередках на терені Німеччини (від 1938 включно з Австрією). Отже членами НасУСОН-у були: Українське Студентське Товариство (УСТ) „Зарево” в Берліні, Українське Академічне Товариство (УАТ) „Січ” у Відні, Українське Академічне Товариство (УАТ) „Січ” у Грацу, Українська Академічна Громада (УАГ) в Празі (після прилучення Чехії до Німеччини в 1939 р.). Всі ці товариства разом нараховували кілька десятків студентів.

Окупація західних земель України більшовиками в осені 1939 року примусила багатьох українських студентів краю емігрувати на захід. Krakів став тоді майже для всіх першим збірним пунктом. Звідсіля небавом пощастило багатьом дістатися на студії до Німеччини. Інші виїздили туди на фізичну роботу. Та вже по кількох місяцях вдавалося їм звільнитися від неї і розпочати студії в німецьких високих школах.

За оцінкою тодішніх керівників студентського життя весною 1941 року налічувалося на студіях в Німеччині біля 500 українських студентів. Німецька влада не робила в тому часі ніяких перепон ані обмежень для студій українців у своїх

школах. Українські культурні установи давали ступендії: в 1940 році відновлено діяльність існуючої раніше в краю Комісії Допомоги Українському Студентству (КоДУС), що координувала відтоді всю акцію допомоги студентам. Деякі студенти помагали собі побічними заробітками. * Німецька стипендійна установа ім. Гумбольдта признала теж кільканадцять стипендій для українських студентів. Від оплат за студії можна було легко дістати звільнення.

Перші весні роки позначилися не лише чисельним зростом українського студентства в Німеччині. Його психологічне та ідеологічне обличчя було інше, ніж раніше. Це прибули студенти з вири підпільної боротьби, або прямо з польських тюрем. Це були люди політично активні, зорганізовані в більшості в нелегальній в краю Організації Українських Націоналістів (ОУН). Студентський актив перебував вже від довшого часу під непереможним впливом ОУН, яка мала на студентському терені свої головні інтелігентські кадри. На своєму з'їзді 1933 р. Центральний Союз Українських Студентів (ЦеСУС) визнав націоналістичну (тобто оунівську) ідеологію за свою. Студентське життя стало тому дуже чутким показником внутрішньої ситуації в ОУН.

ОУН переживала саме тоді внутрішню кризу, що, як відомо, закінчилася розколом на дві окремі організації з цією самою назвою. Ця криза та всі її перепитії знайшли тоді своє найяскравіше віддзеркалення саме на студентському терені. Цей терен був в тому часі одинокий в цілості зорганізований. На ньому розгорілася тепер боротьба між двома оунівськими крилами за провід в поодиноких студентських товариствах і в НаСУСОН-і. Студентські сходини перемінялися на політичні віча. Очевидної більшості не могла здобути жадна група. Вибори і перевибори чергувалися дуже швидко. Щоб здобути перемогу, не гребувано жадними засобами. Це знову викликало реакцію і сецесію противників. Так постали в деяких осередках з одного два самостійні студентські товариства, кожне з претенсією бути єдиним легальним репрезентантом українських студентів перед німецькою владою. Такий стан рівночасно давав притоку німецькому студентському проводові вміщуватися у внутрішні українські справи.

* В Берліні було легко знайти нашим студентам роботу. Одні розносили ранком газети, інші працювали нічними сторожами по різних фабриках, публічних будинках і бурах. Їх завданням було гасити пожежі після летунського бомбардування. Подаємо цю замітку для характеристики побуту українського студента в Берліні під час війни.

Санацію цієї ситуації перевели самі українські студенти пізною весною 1941 року. Допоміг тут певною мірою грядучий німецько-sovєтський конфлікт. Увага політично найактивнішої частини студентства вже зверталася на схід. Обидві політичні групи готувалися до нових завдань. Затишня, що стало на студентському терені, уможливило провести важливі організаційні реформи.

Після довшого часу боротьби, Управа НaСУСОН-у під головуванням Михайла Качмара скликала з доручення ЦeСУС-у на 5 квітня 1940 р. до Берліну III З'їзд НaСУСОН-у. На цьому з'їзді обрано нову управу з інж. А. Кішкою як головою і надано їй одноразові особливі уповажнення, а саме: випрацювати новий статут студентської організації, в основі якого мав би бути провідницький принцип, перевести переорганізацію українського студентського життя Німеччини згідно з цим статутом і врешті обрати з-поміж себе провідника цієї нової організації. Після цього Управа НaСУСОН-у мала самоліквідуватися.

Управа НaСУСОН-у, у тісній співпраці з Президією ЦeСУС-у, приготовила такий статут. Новій організації надано назву „Націоналістична Організація Українських Студентів” (НОУС). На останньому засіданні, 21 червня 1941, Управа НaСУСОН-у вибрала одноголосно Василя Рудка провідником НОУС-у і сама зліквідувалася. Спадкоємцем НaСУСОН-у став НОУС (2-га точка статуту).

Пояснення до генези назви. Великий внутрішній конфлікт в Організації Українських Націоналістів був тлом не лише для постання, але і для всієї діяльності НОУС-у. В тому часі в усіх партнерів боротьби ще досить живою була віра в те, що оунівський рух все таки являється єдиною підвалиною для тривкого суспільного будування. Спір був за те, хто і як буде його оформлювати. Це був час, коли термін „націоналізм” (в оунівському сенсі) підкреслювано. Розвиток НОУС-у пішов опісля своїми іншими шляхами, що призвело до відходу від позицій оунівського націоналізму і до унезалежнення студентської організації від політичних (оунівських) груп. Вимовним доказом тієї зміни був склад його проводу від 1943 року та ідейний зміст його „Бюллетеня”. Ця зміна знайшла згодом свій зовнішній вираз: на I З'їзді НОУС-у в днях 12 і 13 січня 1945 р. змінено назву з „Націоналістична” на „Національна Організація Українських Студентів”. Зміна назви тільки віддзеркалювала вже давніше існуючий стан.

Організаційна структура НОУС-у. НОУС була інша не лише від структури НaСУСОН-у, але була чимсь новим і досі непрактикованим в українському студентському житті. На чолі НОУС-у стояв його провідник, вибраний що три роки Студентським Конгресом. (Першого провідника НОУС-у вибрала Управа НaСУСОН-у на основі особливих уповноважень.) За 8-ою точкою статуту провідник НОУС-у за свою діяльність відповідав морально перед українським студентством та громадянством і фактично перед Конгресом НОУС-у та Управою ЦeСУС-у. Він теж був судово відповідальний перед німецькою владою за діяльність НОУС-у.

Провідник НОУС-у був зобов'язаний скликати що три роки Конгрес НОУС-у, який заслухував звіти з діяльності дотеперішнього проводу, переводив критику та вибирав нового провідника на три роки. Філії НОУС-у висилали на конгрес своїх делегатів. Перший делегат філії розпоряджав усіма голосами, що йому припадали відповідно до скількості членів філії. На кожних 10 членів він мав один голос.

Провідник НОУС-у покликав собі до помочі кількох референтів і разом з ними творив Централю НОУС-у. В її руках було фактичне керівництво українського студентського життя в Німеччині. Провідник покликав також тричленну контрольну комісію, яка давала свій звіт перед конгресом. Президія ЦeСУСУ-у зі свого боку теж переводила контролю діяльності НОУС-у.

НОУС був єдиною українською студентською організацією, зареєстрованою в суді, що мала право діяти на терені Німеччини і тодішнього Протекторату (Чехії). Її осідком був Берлін. На основі рішень З'їзду НaСУСОН-у всі досі самостійні студентські товариства повинні були стати філіями НОУС-у. Де було менше, як десять студентів, НОУС мав право основувати свою делегатуру.

Філії НОУС-у, які, до речі, затримали свої давні назви, мали повну свободу у своїй внутрішній, світоглядово-виховній, практично-громадянській і організаційній діяльності. Вони теж могли свободно нав'язувати культурні, товариські та офіційні зв'язки з чужинецькими колами та місцевими німецькими академічними та урядовими чинниками. Тільки представництво інтересів усього українського студентства, або однієї філії, або і поодинокого студента перед центральними німецькими властями належало до Централі НОУС-у. Залежність філії від централі проявлялася ще й в тому, що централь іменувала або затверджувала голів філій. Іменовано зви-

чайно кандидата, пропонованого попередньою управою філії або обраного загальними зборами членів. Голова, вибраний на загальних зборах філії, не міг обністи проводу філії без згоди Централі НОУС-у. Іменований голова добирав собі співробітників. Треба признати, що в організаційній площині НОУС не витворив строгих, легально продуманих принципів. Наприклад, при іменуванні голів філій важили різні критерії: опінія Ради Сеніорів, це така існувала, опінія попередньої управи, вибір загальними зборами, і котрий з них і коли мав бути вирішальним що робити, коли б настали суперечності між ними (яких, на щастя, впродовж релятивно короткої діяльності НОУС-у не було) не визначалася ніяким регламентом.


Два періоди діяльності НОУС-у. Перший період тривав до кінця 1942 року, другий від початку 1943 року до кінця війни (травень 1945). Початковий період це був час праці над будовою організації на нових принципах. Їх треба було випробовувати, часто міняти відповідно до вимог обставин. Переход самостійних студентських товариств на становище філій НОУС-у відбувся без окремого натиску й тому досить повільно. Теж загальна ситуація на студентському терені була інша як у пізніших роках. В тому часі ще продовжувалася боротьба поміж двома групами оунівського руху. НОУС ще не міг бути в початках „третіою силою”. Третя позиція не знайшла б в той час ніякої піддержки. Тому НОУС спирається спочатку на підтримку студентів-націоналістів з ОУН полк. Мельника. До праці в Централі НОУС-у включалися одиниці з політичним минулим і досвідом. Проте, склад постійно мінявся: одні виїздили з Берліну, інші тратили охоту працювати далі в студентській організації і посвячувалися виключно студіям (щоб надробити втрачене), ще іншим не подобалася тенденція проводу НОУС-у щораз більше унезалежнювати студентську організацію від прямого впливу політичної групи. Окремо треба відмітити видатну участь в праці Централі НОУС-у в тому першому періоді Клявдія Білинського на пості заступника провідника НОУС-у. Саме його участь, як останнього голови Крайової Студентської Репрезентації, вибраного на цей пост IX Конгресом Союзу Українських Студентських Організацій Польщі напередодні другої світової війни (22 березня 1939), мало своє значення і вагу.

Коли на студентському терені політичний антагонізм притих, НОУС знайшовся в критичній ситуації. Організатори

НОУС-у старалися створити організацію з максимум явності, легальності, з проводом, який умів би сам відповідати за свої рішення, а не лише бути виконавцем доручень закулісних чинників. Це був виклик пануючим поглядам і практиці. Проти лінії НОУС-у почали виступати також націоналісти з ОУН полк. Мельника. Це було причиною малої кризи внутрі актиу НОУС-у. Треба було підшукати нових осіб до праці в централі, що не було легко в тому часі. Від початку 1943 року почала діяти централія зложена з цілком іншого типу людей. В більшості вони не були політично-партийно заангажовані, а були радше зацікавлені серйозними студіями і наукою. В тому періоді організаційні справи не забирали багато часу й енергії. Головну увагу звернено на світоглядово-виховну працю в студентських товариствах (про що буде мова пізніше).

В другому періоді почався також процес децентралізації. Не нарушаючи місцевих товариств (філій НОУС-у), два члени централі стали її представниками на Австрію і на Чехію. Їх завданням було допомагати філіям НОУС-у у їх роботі. Переекинення ініціативи на ці терени відтяжило централію в Берліні і дало змогу нав'язати контакт з ширшими колами студентства та притягнути до співпраці щораз більше одиниць. Найбільш успішну роботу розгорнуло представництво Централі НОУС-у в Празі, де в 1944 році ішла жвава відчітово-дискусійна праця, що цілковито закинула методу „світоглядово-політичного вишколу”; зате введено студійний підхід. Наприклад, вперше від довшого часу на празькому студентському терені дискутовано спадщину Драгоманова і Липинського без тієї згори негативної настанови, що її пропагували раніше Донцов і за ним оуністи.

Склад централі цього періоду остаточно скристалізування був такий: Василь Рудко (Берлін) — провідник НОУС-у; Андрій Козак (Берлін) — заступник провідника і організаційний референт; Богдан Цимбалістий (Берлін) — секретар і студійний референт; Михайло Ліщинський (Берлін) — фінансовий референт; Іван Лисяк-Рудницький (Прага) — член редакційної колегії „Бюллетеня НОУС-у” і уповноважений централі на Чехію; Омелян Пріцак (Берлін) — діловий редактор „Бюллетеня НОУС-у”; Євген Пизюр (Віден) — уповноважений централі на Австрію. Цей провід діяв до I Конгресу НОУС-у, що відбувся в днях 12 і 13 січня 1945 р. в Берліні. Складано його на півроку пізніше, як цього вимагав статут. Причиною були зовнішні умови життя в Німеччині під час війни. На цьому конгресі Василь Рудко зложив свій ман-



Провід НОУС-у в 1944 році. Сидять зліва до права: Андрій Козак, Євген Пизюр, Василь Рудко, Михайло Ліщинський. Стоять зліва: Богдан Цимбалістий, Іван Лисяк-Рудницький, Омелян Пріцак.

дат і провідником НОУС-у обрано Євгена Пизюра з Відня. До централі під його проводом ввійшли: Богдан Цимбалістий — заступник провідника і організаційний референт; Василь Шкудор (Берлін) — секретар і студійний референт; Михайло Ліщинський (Берлін) — фінансовий референт; Омелян Пріцак (Берлін) — редактор „Бюллетеня НОУС-у”; Іван Лисяк-Рудницький (Прага) — уповноважений централі на Чехію. Цей другий провід діяв до кінця війни (травень 1945). Кінець війни приніс великі зміни: найчасленніші студійні осередки — Відень, Прага, Бресляв, Данциг, Берлін — перестали існувати. Майже всі студенти опинилися в різних місцевостях західної Німеччини, де НОУС не мав раніше ніякої своєї філії, яка могла б їх організаційно охопити. Крім того число студентів майже в четверо зросло, бо ж багато прибуло з краю в 1944 і 1945 роках. Німецькі високі школи ще не діяли.

Українські студенти жили в різних таборах ДП, розкинущих по усій західній Німеччині. Дуже швидко почали поставати нові студентські товариства, що об'єдналися в Центральному Еміграційному Союзі Українського Студентства (ЦЕСУС), не зважаючи на те, що ЦеСУС (Центральний Союз Українського Студентства), створений ще в 1923 р., не представ існувати. Вправді його діяльність під час війни була мінімальна наслідком арештувань німецькою владою. В міжчасі поодинокі члени Централі НОУС-у почали організовувати філії НОУС-у там, де відкривалися високі школи і де були українські студенти (головно в британській зоні Німеччини). Однак, на своїому засіданні з 3 лютого 1946 р. в Мюнхені, провід НОУС-у вирішив припинити свою діяльність як Централі НОУС-у і включитися в працю ЦеСУС-у, що почав саме тоді змагання за привернення організаційної єдності в студентському житті закордоном.

Одні студентські товариства підтримували давній ЦеСУС, інші визнавали Центральний Еміграційний Союз Українських Студентів (ЦЕСУС). Тло цього двополу було політичне. ЦЕСУС був створений і підтримуваний прихильниками ОУН Бандери. Члени Централі НОУС-у очолили змагання за привернення правопорядку в студентському житті і за незалежність студентської організації від політичних партій. Вони почали видавати циклостилеві журнали „Стежі” і „Студент”, які були продовженням роботи „Бюллетеня НОУС-у”. Два члени централі (Євген Пизор і Богдан Цимбалістий) і останній голова віденської філії НОУС-у (Роман Залуцький) були членами спеціяльної комісії, створеної обома „цесусами” (з великим і малим „e”) для переговорів і підготовки поєднавчого з’їзду. Такий з’їзд відбувся в 1947 році і на ньому створено одну управу Центрального Союзу Українських Студентів, вільну від партійних лояльностей. На кілька днів до поєднавчого з’їзду давній ЦеСУС відбув свій з’їзд, на якому Централі НОУС-у склала звіт зі своєї діяльності і внесла пропозицію розв’язати НОУС. З’їзд цю пропозицію прийняв 27 червня 1947 р.

Рада Сеніорів. Щоб внести в студентське життя певний елемент традиції і зрівноваженості, провід НОУС-у в 1942 році попросив до співпраці старших громадян, знаних зі своєї наукової та громадянської діяльності. До цієї Ради Сеніорів входили: проф. Зенон Кузеля — голова, проф. Іван Мірчук, проф. Борис Крупницький і доц. Євген Димінський як члени. Після І Конгресу НОУС-у в січні 1945 до Ради Се-

ніорів запрошено ще Василя Рудка. Рада мала з природи тільки дорадчий голос, хоч дуже важливий і респектований. В засіданнях ради брав участь провідник НОУС-у. Хоч не завжди була однозгідність в думках, але завжди була взаємна лояльність, довір'я і співпраця. Існування такої Ради Сеніорів було певною охороною перед втручуванням німецької влади, яка слідкувала за працею НОУС-у і часто кликала провідника організації до звіту.

Існування Ради Сеніорів давало змогу Централі НОУС-у проводити роботу з тенденціями, які не йшли з пануючим „духом часу” в Німеччині. Іншими словами, Рада Сеніорів прикривала своїм авторитетом роботу НОУС-у. Таку саму охорону давав Український Науковий Інститут в Берліні з директором проф. І. Мірчуком в проводі. Інститут дозволив примістти бюро Централі НОУС-у в його будинку та постійно й активно підтримував діяльність Централі НОУС-у, не вмішуючись до неї. Це відношення інституту до НОУС-у і дозвіл централі користуватися одною кімнатою врятували мабуть НОУС від більших неприємностей з боку німецької влади. Для неї інститут відігравав ролю опікуна та був мов би співвідповідальний за працю Централі НОУС-у.

Дещо зі статистики. НОУС мав до літа 1944 року шість філій і три делегатури. З приїздом кілька десяткох студентів львівської Ветеринарної Школи до Ляйпцигу в 1944 р. постала в тому місті сьома філія НОУС-у. Філіями НОУС-у були: Українське Академічне Товариство „Січ” у Відні, Українське Академічне Товариство „Січ” у Граці, Українська Академічна Громада в Празі, Українська Студентська Громада „Основа” в Данцигу, Українська Студентська Громада „Мазепинець” в Берліні, Українська Студентська Громада „Чорноморе” в Бресляві та Українська Студентська Громада „Ватра” в Ляйпцигу. НОУС мав делегатури в Мюнхені, Дрездені та Інсбруку.

В літньому семестрі 1944 р. НОУС мав 662 члени. Майже всі вони почали свої студії в Німеччині ще перед кінцем 1941 року. До того часу, за старими традиціями доступ на студії в німецьких високих школах для українців був вільний. Дня 10 грудня 1941 р. німецьке міністерство освіти проголосило заборону приймати українців на студії в Німеччині. Ця заборона була одним з проявів нової ворожої політики німецького уряду до України. Тільки ті, що вже давніше прибули могли докінчувати свої студії в Німеччині. Ані Український

Центральний Комітет у Кракові, ані Рада Сеніорів, ані Централя НОУС-у не зуміли добитися скасування цієї заборони. Тому в роках 1942-43 нікого з українців не прийнято на студії в Німеччині. Щойно в 1944 році міністерство освіти дозволило вийнятково кільком десяткам наших студентів, що прибули з львівських високих шкіл ветеринарії і медицини провожати свої студії в Німеччині.

За опитом, переведеним канцелярією НОУС-у літом 1944 року філія НОУС-у у Відні нараховувала 285 студентів; філія в Празі — 135; у Берліні — 83; у Граці — 46; у Бресляві — 40, у Ляйпцигу — 24; в Данцигу — 23; в Дрездені — 10; в Інсбруку — 9; у Мюнхені — 7. За вибором студій 30.3% студіювало медицину і дентистику, 20% — техніку, 15.5% — торгівлю, 7% — мистецтво, 7% — право та суспільні науки, 6% — філософічні (гуманітарні) науки, 6% — ветеринарію, 4.6% — сільське господарство, 2.6% — природничі науки, 1% — богословію. За територіальним походженням було 82% уродженців Західної України, 7% Східної України, 11% уроджених на еміграції. За соціальним походженням ці студенти поділялися так: 58% синів і дочок інтелігентських родин, 32% — селянських родин і 10% — робітничих.

Що було нового в діяльності НОУС-у? Під зовнішнім поглядом праця в поодиноких студентських клітинах відбулася за здавна прийнятым в нас методами. Доповіді, дискусії, культурні та товариські імпрези, зустрічі з чужинцями, видавання свого журналу і т. п. Зате всі зусилля йшли надати цій праці іншого змісту і стилю. Відкинуто метод ідеологічного „вишколу”, що завівся в ОУН і перекинувся у великий мірі на студентство. Головну увагу звернуто на те, щоб ворушити самостійну, критичну думку та спонукувати студіювати солідніше суспільно-політичні проблеми. Першою спробою такого підходу була діяльність „Секції для досліду культурних і суспільних проблем” берлінської філії НОУС-у при визначеній участі в її праці членів централі. Берлінська філія була взагалі полем шукання і випробування нових принципів світоглядово-виховної праці в студентських товариствах. Овочі праці централі були найвидніші серед берлінських студентів. За прикладом філії в Берліні пішли згодом інші осередки, головно Прага і Віденсь. Варто тут відмітити великий вклад Ореста Зілинського в працю празького осередку, де він був заступником голови Української Академічної Громади та керівником її культурної референтури.

Передвісником нового подуву в роботі Централі НОУС-у

була брошура Р. Лісового (псевдонім В. Рудка) „Тридцять роки студентського Львова” (друкована в ювілейному збірнику УАГ в Празі, весною 1941 р.). Однак, головною трибуною ширення нового стилю і змісту виховної роботи в студентських товариствах став „Бюлетень НОУС-у”, що становив собою приклад збірного зусилля в цій ділянці. Бюлетень появлявся як циклостиливе видання на правах рукопису. З початкових 14 сторінок друку він розрісся до 40. За два роки його видання (1942-43) з'явилося 15 чисел. З важливіших статей „Бюлетеня” наземо такі: Андрія Білинського „За правильну оцінку бою під Крутами” та „Переломові роки XVIII і XIX ст. з сучасної перспективи”; Ореста Зілинського „Про місце культів в духовості спільноти”; І. Брусного (псевдонім Івана Лисяка-Рудницького) „Студентський Львів”; Р. Лісового (псевдонім В. Рудка) „Прогулька в гущу (до проблеми духової ситуації студентства)”; Омеляна Пріцака „Децо про наш історизм”; Василя Рудка „До проблеми нашої суспільної сфери”, „Шляхи широкій” та „На переломі (Завваги до проблематики сучасного українського студентства)”; Івана Лисяка-Рудницького цикл статей про „Виродження та відродження інтелігенції” та „Чи національна ідея пережилася?”; і Володимира Янева „Український студент на порозі нового семестру”. З дальших авторів треба згадати Олександра Шарка, Євгена Пизюра і Петра Воробія. Із старших авторів найбільше публікувався в „Бюлетені” проф. Борис Крупницький („Емоція і раціо в українській національній вдачі”, „Ідея прогресу в соціологічній системі В. Липинського”, „Мазепа в світлі психологічної і логічної методи”, „До характеристики української еліти”.). Між авторами „Бюлетеня” стрічаємо теж Євгена Маланюка. На сторінках цього видання прина гідно забирали слово до актуальних справ проф. Іван Мірчук і проф. Зенон Кузеля. Варто відмітити, що бюлетень не друкував поезій, ані оповідань, ані святково-ліричних статей. Низка статей „Бюлетеня” НОУС-у була передрукована в „Краківських вістях”, в „Українській дійсності” (Прага) і в „Студентському Пропорі” (Львів). Головним редактором „Бюлетеня” від початку його появи до останнього числа був Василь Рудко. Він писав для нього не лише вгорі згадані статті, але теж свої коментарі („Гльосси”) підписані „xxx” або без підпису.

Не тільки через „Бюлетень” старався актив НОУС-у впливати на студентський загал. Члени централі відвідували поїздки до філій, давали доповіді, переводили дискусії.

Щоб зрозуміти те „нове”, що НОУС приносив у світоглядово-виховну роботу серед студентства, треба пригадати собі той духовний стан, в якому знайшлося тодішнє студентське покоління: наголошування ірраціоналізму, волюнтаризму в противагу нібито безсилому розумові; культ примітивно зрозумілої і нагої сили, як вирішального фактора в суспільно-політичному житті; свідома аморальність в ім'я цілей, часто тільки групово-партійних, розпалені до білого емоції, скеровані на найближчі цілі; тому цілковита байдужість до дальшої майбутності, звідси нерозуміння вартості і потреби муравлиної господарської, культурної і наукової праці. Це призвело до обниження рівня політичної культури усієї суспільності і до занепаду історичних, соціологічних, економічних і політичних дослідів та браку охочих досліджувати ці ділянки. Тодішня молодь була переконана, що старше покоління є приречене відійти від керми суспільно-політичного життя дуже скоро. Щоб його відхід приспішити, використовувано кожну нагоду, щоб загострювати „конфлікт поколінь”.*

Розлам в ОУН, взаємне винищування себе оуністів включно з убивствами, розчарування політикою Німеччини в Україні, зустріч з живими людьми з підсоветської України — були шоком для багатьох молодих студентів. Вони бачили тільки особисті трагедії і терпіння багатьох старших, політично активних товаришів, яке не принесло ніякої користі нікому. Розкол в ОУН та його наслідки завели надії в її суспільно-творчі спроможності. Ці молоді студенти не виявляли жадного зрозуміння і пошані для жертвенности (хоч нераз сліпої) та суспільної активності їх трохи старших по-передників. Звідси певний цинізм, кпини з всякого суспільного труду, втеча в сферу свого особистого та матеріального життя, в кращому випадку проповідь фаховости як виховного ідеалу, часті випадки деморалізації.

НОУС почав діяти на грані стику цих двох студентських генерацій з їх так різними настановами. Перед НОУС-ом стояло завдання рятувати одних від деморалізації, других стягнути з хмар власних ілюзій і схем думання на твердий ґрунт реальної проблематики життя та світу, а цілому студентському

* Для ілюстрації думання тодішнього студентства варто навести такий факт: партійні „дорадники” заборонили нововибраному голові НаУСООН-у (в 1941 р.) скласти програмову заяву, в якій була мова про „потребу співпраці між старшими і молодими”. Тоді вважалося, що таке ствердження не буде популярним серед студентів і може штовхнути багатьох до протилежного політичного табору, який продовжував свою кампанію проти покоління батьків.

життю привернути питому йому, не перебільшенню вагу в суспільності та розпочати працю над основами світогляду новогоЦ студентського покоління.

На маргінесі варто відмітити різниці між діяльністю НОУС-у і Об'єднання Праці Українських Студентів (ОПУС, крайової організації в роках 1942-43). Більшість активу і членів ОПУС творили молоді студенти, що про розкол ОУН довідалися щойно в 1941 р. і прийняли його як доконаний факт. Західну Україну і крайове студентство майже повністю опанувала ОУН Бандери. Організуючи підпілля проти німців, ОУН зберігала серед молоді моральний авторитет та піддержувала віру в її політичні спроможності. Крім того, увага політично-активного студентства була скерована в першій мірі на боротьбу проти окупанта. Все це зумовило, що крайове студентство духової кризи в націоналістичному русі і в суспільності, як теж потреби переоцінки своїх дотеперішніх заложень в тому часі не відчувала. (Ця криза і переоцінка прийшла пізніше, вже після війни, наслідком чого ОУН Бандери розкололася на два табори.) Зате, закордоном більшість творили старші студенти, які найчастіше мали за собою довгі роки політичної діяльності в ОУН. Всі вони так або інакше ангажували себе під час розламу в ОУН. Звідси зрозуміло, чому діяльність НОУС-у мусіла бути якоюсь відповіддю на витворений стан.

Зміст і стиль роботи Централі НОУС-у був протилежним до того, що проповідував Дмитро Донцов, під якого впливом виховувалася західно-українська молодь 30-их років. Проте, на сторінках „Бюллетеня” чи в публічних доповідях відкритої критики Донцова та його ідеології не було. Провід НОУС-у вважав, що така критика була завчасна й загал студентства не був готовий її прийняти. Зате постійно критиковано, наприклад, поставу оунівських націоналістів до Михайла Драгоманова, Вячеслава Липинського й до покоління Визвольних Змагань. На Конгресі НОУС-у в 1945 році було підkreślено конечність розбудови двох головних течій українського суспільного життя: демократичної (включно з лівим крилом) і консервативної, в розумінні Липинського. Змагання НОУС-у не було скероване на творення нової партії та партійної ідеології, але на коректу способу думання молодого покоління, його відношення до світу людських вартостей, на етичний вимір усякої дії.

Всупереч дотеперішнім поглядам, що створили сліпі та „осліплюючі” політичні віри з такими ж догмами, звернено зусилля на те, щоб молоду інтелігенцію привчати бачити

великі проблеми реального життя, студіювати і пізнавати їх в їхній власній закономірності. В такій безпосередній зустрічі з питаннями життя, нашого й чужого, минулого й сучасного, без спроб наломити його до вже готової схеми думання, до формули, можна навчитися найелементарнішої абетки раціонального політичного думання. Український студент повинен віднайти безпосередній доступ до джерельних творів наших суспільно-політичних класиків і не вдоволятися брошурками. Аналіза питань суспільного життя повинна бути якнайбільше об'єктивна, речева, тобто треба бачити проблеми в їх власній логіці, без ілюзій, навіть коли та логіка говорить проти нас самих, проти нам досі „святого”. Об'єктивна, речева проблематика в'яже людей, дає базу для порозуміння та спільної дії.

У зв'язку з цим стояло змагання активу НОУС-у здобути заінтересування та любов до культурних вартостей. Студентське покоління було втратило органи сприймати їх безпосередньо. На ці вартості дивилося воно під кутом вузької політичної доцільності та хвилевих користей. В першій мірі треба було регабілітувати науку та культурну творчість як вартості самі в собі, даліше вказувати на їх значення для суспільності в теперішньому й далекому майбутньому. В цих ділянках життя нема різниці поколінь. Звідси намагання нав'язувати всюди якнайтісніші взаємини з старшими представниками української науки та культурної праці.

Передумовою успішної праці внутрі студентських товариств було створення відповідного клімату, де панувала б пошана та толерантність до погляду інших, де б визнавалася на ділі свобода та вартість їх. Це все лежало теж на лінії змагань НОУС-у.

Централя НОУС-у стала вперше серед молодого покоління вказувати на постать Вячеслава Липинського, досі так вперто промовчуваного, якого пізнати та вистудіювати мусить кожна людина, що хоче в нашій суспільній сфері щось творити. Ціле змагання НОУС-у проходило в свідомості того, що в нашій сучасності живуть і зустрічаються в українському духовому процесі дві генеральні лінії: одна, що має коріння в народницькому демократизмі, течія, що підкреплює рух, силу народу, мас, стихії та революцію, як методу. Друга це та, яку характеризує глибоке розуміння ієархії вартостей, традиційність, суверенна мудрість відповідального діла. Її представником у сучасному є саме В. Липинський. Шукання зустрічі цих двох ліній повинно бути головним знаменником на-

шої духової сучасності. Під таким знаменником намагалася йти праця проводу студентства. Бажалося в той спосіб скріпити або й створити здергуючі та будуючі сили суспільного життя, які зуміли б організувати та дисциплінувати вибухи емоцій мас, „стихію”, які б могли надати їй русло, бути „видючою” і відповідальною її кермою.

Оцінка. В цьому кінцевому розділі будемо старатися з'ясувати значення, яке мав НОУС та його діяльність в історії українського студентського життя.

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1. Під організаційним оглядом являється НОУС дійсним „новум” в нашому студентському житті. Тут вперше українські студенти створили добровільно організацію, побудовану на провідницькому принципі. Практика диктаторських політичних режимів, іх жахливі наслідки для суспільного життя, дальнє тріумф демократії, причинилися сьогодні до негативної оцінки всяких організацій та рухів, що кладуть собі в основу одноособовість та авторитарність проводу. Досвід НОУС-у вказує, що провідницький принцип організації являється в деяких моментах та умовинах життя конечністю, від якої залежить дальнє існування та добро цілого колективу. Провідницький принцип НОУС-у допоміг оздоровити українське студентське середовище за кордоном. Пост провідника НОУС-у, обсаджуваний відразу на три роки, став тривалим полюсом, якого не можна було що семестра усувати та зводити бої за нову обсаду. Силою наданих йому прав та компетенцій і довшого часу урядування, набирав пост провідника НОУС-у власної незалежної влади та ставав важкою суспільною функцією. Санація відносин, яку вдалося завдяки провідницькій системі і НОУС-у перевести, означала одночасно рятунок цілого організованого студентського життя в Німеччині перед ліквідацією.

В 1941 р. німецька влада виразно давала до зрозуміння, що вона розв'яже українське студентське товариство, або навіть заборонить українцям студіювати в Німеччині, якщо вони не перестануть своїх внутрішніх буч та заколотів. Завдяки провідницькій системі стали в студентських товариствах органічно виростати певні провідні середовища, що гуртували в собі найкращі та найбільше відповідальні елементи, вироблялись досвід та тяглість праці. Творення рад сеніорів з пред-

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ставників старшого покоління та колишніх студентських діячів сприяли теж нарощанню цього досвіду та тягості. В часі існування НОУС-у не було ані одного непорозуміння та розбіжностей між волею загалу та волею провідника, згл. Централі НОУС-у. Не було теж жадних виявів, тоді ані пізніше, невдоволення та критики цілої провідницької системи зі сторони членів НОУС-у. Провідництво в НОУС-і не виродилося в якусь диктатуру партії, кліки або особи.

Що так не сталося треба завдячувати таким обставинам: Провід НОУС-у вважав своїм найважливішим завданням промошувати шлях до іншої духової орієнтації, іншого підходу до явищ суспільного й культурного життя, до іншої самосвідомості української студіючої молоді. Тому він не присвячував уваги тому, хто під чиїм впливом стоїть і не боровся за те, щоб вдержати „владу” за всяку ціну. Членами централі ставали одиниці з почуття свого громадянського обов’язку. Ця група людей не була зв’язана ані партійною лояльністю, ані визнаванням якоїсь одної суспільної ідеології. Вони були об’єднані однозвучним розумінням дійсного стану серед студентства, його потреб, цілей і метод дальної праці. На маргіні несі варто відмітити, що ніяка інша українська студентська організація не зуміла раніше чи пізніше витворити такого середовища. П’ятьох членів проводу НОУС-у (централі й голів філій) стали нашими видатними науковцями (Омелян Пріцак, Іван Лисяк-Рудницький, Петро Воробій та вже покійні Євген Пизюр і Орест Зілинський), інші залишилися активними в нашому культурному й громадському житті.

Провідник НОУС-у не був самовільним „диктатором”. Він сам свою „владу” обмежив. Свої рішення переводив за згодою більшості членів централі та за порадами Ради Сеніорів. Іменування голів філій відбувалося звичайно згідно з волею більшості членів та за порадою попередньої управи і місцевих провідних студентів.

Через перекинення частини функцій провідника й централі з одного центру на кілька, творилися клітини, що діяли майже самостійно. Ці станиці централі ставали осередками кристалізації найкращих сил поодиноких студентських осередків.

2. НОУС перевів на ділі зasadу самостійності студентської організації. До 1945 р. студентські товариства, назверх самостійні, були в дійсності тільки видимими органами невидимої політичної організації. Вибрані студентські проводи були тільки маріонетками в руках інших, нестудентських сил.

Звідси діставали вони інструкції для праці. В такій обстановці не могло вироблятися в них почуття особистої відповідальності за свої дії. Крім того, всякі спори внутрі політичної партії переносилися на студентський терен, а це унеможливлювало виховну роботу. НОУС зробив кінець такій практиці, дарма, що деякі політичні кола проти цього протестували. Студентський терен перестав бути полем експериментів політичних груп. Студентство віднайшло свою скромну, далеко не авангарну, зате природну суспільну вагу. І це був ступінь розвою, який, як показалося пізніше, став тривалим здібутком.

Тільки на основі цього можна як слід оцінити вартість такого досі в нас непрактикованого принципу, як іменування голів філій провідником НОУС-у. Це був засіб, що виключав можливість підпорядкувати студентські товариства політичній партії. У внутрішнє життя філій централя якнайменше вмішувалася. Через цей засіб фактична керма студентського життя переходила на людей яких знали і які за свою роботу відповідали. Без того була б, наприклад, Рада Сеніорів довго не проіснувала. Ніхто зі старших не хотів би прикривати того, чого пружини невидимі.

Треба однак відкрито сказати, що організаційні принципи НОУС-у самі в собі були небезпечні, бо могли на довшу мету створити нагоди для надувань влади і компромітації усього студентського товариства. Постання НОУС-у в такій саме формі було зумовлене вийнятковими обставинами, про які була вгорі мова. Серед тих обставин НОУС, як організаційний експеримент, себе повністю виправдав.

3. Однак, до найбільших надбань НОУС-у, що стало тривалим внеском в історію української студентської думки, безперечно належало формування нового духового змісту світоглядово-виховної діяльності студентських товариств. Здобуті НОУС-ом позиції стали ще на довгі роки по його ліквідації вихідною точкою і базою для дальших шукань. При оцінці ролі НОУС-у завжди слід тяжити тло, на якому НОУС-ові довелося розвивати свою роботу. Ця робота була відповіддю на ситуацію, в якій опинилася молодь після розлому в ОУН й зустрічі з дійсністю під час другої світової війни. Багато рішень проводу НОУС-у можуть видаватися очевидними, самозрозумілими й логічними для молоді інших народів і для повоєнної української студентської молоді в західних країнах світу. Ці рішення не були такими самозрозумілими в 1941-45 роках. Згадати хоч би введення засади автономії організованого

студентського життя, тобто організаційної та ідеологічної незалежності студентських товариств від політичних партій (точніше монопартій). Це був здобуток НОУС-у всупереч до теперішнім традиціям і настанові частин студентства. Або співпраця студентів зі своїми професорами, не тільки на полі фахових студій, але теж у внутрішній виховній діяльності студентських товариств, замість дотеперішнього конфлікту поколінь. Додати до цього — намагання регабілітувати науку і вартості розуму й досвіду в політичному життю, студійний підхід до проблем громадського життя, підкреслювання вартостей традиціоналізму, видвигнення М. Драгоманова та В. Липинського зі забуття і т. д. Все це було новим для студентського покоління воєнних часів.

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Janusz Radziejowski

THE LAST YEARS OF MYKHAILO SLABCHENKO

Mykhailo Slabchenko was an outstanding Ukrainian historian, a specialist in the economic and legal history of Ukraine in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. He was born in Odessa in 1882 and studied there as well as in Saint Petersburg and Germany. In 1918, during the revolution, he taught at the Ukrainian university in Kiev and Kamianets Podilskyi; afterwards he worked in his native Odessa. He was the author of thirteen books and over two hundred scholarly articles. In 1929 he became an academician of the All-Ukrainian Academy of Sciences (VUAN).

In the same year, however, his brilliant career came to a sudden and evil end, when he was arrested for alleged nationalist activity. In 1930 he was convicted at the first major show trial in Ukraine, the trial of the Union for the Liberation of Ukraine (SVU), and exiled to the Solovets Islands in the White Sea. According to the *Entsyklopediaia Ukrainoznavstva*, "his exact fate thereafter is not known."

The following memoir is the first to shed light on Mykhailo Slabchenko's last tragic years. It was contributed by the Polish historian Janusz Radziejowski, author of *The Communist Party of Western Ukraine 1919 - 1929*, which was published by the CIUS earlier this year (1983). Radziejowski, who was born in Ukraine in 1926, met Slabchenko in 1948. Radziejowski had just been returned to the Soviet Union after serving in the Polish Army in Germany and Poland.

John-Paul Himka

I came to the small town of Pervomaisk, not far from Odessa and Mykolaiv, in 1948, after serving in the Polish Army. I enrolled in the tenth grade of an evening school for adults. In that same year a new German teacher, an older man by the name of Mykhailo Slabchenko, came to the school. He was shabbily dressed and very

thin and had pock marks on his face. We found out that he was a former history professor at the University of Odessa and a very accomplished scholar. He was not allowed to return to the city of his birth, because he had just been released after many years of imprisonment and his civil rights were still restricted. He was warmhearted and friendly and interested in his students. He was especially interested in those who had experienced more of life, who had served on the front or done physical labour. This was probably what made him take an interest in me, and we quickly became close. Older residents of the town and other teachers told us that Slabchenko knew a dozen or so languages. He did, in fact, read many languages. German, which he taught us, he knew very well, but rather from the theoretical side. He caught and corrected all our grammatical errors, but he did not match some of his students in the fluency of his speech. They had learned German through practice, in conversation with Germans. If German was spoken too quickly at a lesson, he could not catch everything and lost control of the student's answer.

He asked me to get him the classics of French literature in order, as he said, to enjoy the company of lively intellect. I remember that it proved possible to acquire Madame de Staél's letters on Germany, which touched off many conversations about that country. Among the several books that survived from his original library I saw publications in ancient Persian—old, accidentally preserved relics that once served him in his scholarly work. At his request I also supplied him with books by the Polish writer Stefan Żeromski, whose work he knew quite well. He was very interested in Poland. He was also interested in the psychological problem of what impression the first encounter with the West, with people of a different mentality, made on a young man (that is, myself) who had been raised until he was eighteen in the East. He often returned to this theme, and it seems he had experienced something similar himself.

Slabchenko stood out markedly from the average representative of the local intelligentsia. He surprised the people he talked to by his free and easy attitude to official theoretical authorities, such as Marx, whose economic writings he seemed to know well. He allowed himself to be ironic about the campaign waged at that time against "kowtowing to the West." When he was in the city hospital for treatment, he spoke to the doctors about the anti-Semitic sentiments emerging in certain circles and wondered whether Marx's early writings on the Jewish question had not perhaps contributed to their emergence. Slabchenko began to be regarded as an eccentric.

He liked to talk with students about their plans and aspirations. He urged Ukrainians to foster their national culture. In spite of the painful experience he had had, he never learned the circumspection so necessary in those times and in that place. This was to become the cause of his subsequent tragic ordeal.

At first, however, he advanced somewhat in society. The City Department of Education appointed him inspector of foreign language instruction. In this capacity Slabchenko attended the lessons of a certain Petro Telehinsky, a teacher of French. The French of this teacher was the butt of jokes among the other teachers, but he was extremely feared, because he was vindictive and had a talent for denunciations. Slabchenko described Telehinsky's lessons as "arduous childbirth," not instruction. Of course, the offended teacher had to avenge himself. At one of the meetings of the methodological section of the Department of Education, Telehinsky suddenly demanded that the minutes include the information that "an ideologically alien person" (Slabchenko) was active in the teachers' milieu, that this "ideologically rotting corpse is poisoning our atmosphere, poisoning our children." As a result of this "political" affair, Slabchenko was fired. This was relatively mild punishment, but the tragedy was that at that time the USSR had no provisions for retirement and one worked to the end of one's life. Physical labour was not possible for a man of Slabchenko's health.

I was not there when Slabchenko was fired, having already gone to Moscow to study. When I returned to Pervomaisk for my summer vacation in 1950, Slabchenko was already without work and without income. With him was an older woman, a companion from an earlier period in his life, but not the mother of the dead son he spoke of frequently. I begged him to take a small sum of money, but he was evidently embarrassed to accept help from a student and proposed that I buy him instead a few old French books on the theory of state law. We had struck a compromise. This form of help, in spite of the sham involved, suited him better. Knowing of my family connections with the medical world, another time he asked me to get him some poison. He saw no other way "to finish with all this." Several times he walked on the high railway bridge over the Buh River, but a strong fear of heights made suicide impossible.

One summer I returned to Pervomaisk and he was no longer alive. I know that in the meantime the local intelligentsia had helped him out. A surgeon named Zakharov, who was exiled from Odessa for some petty offenses during the German occupation, on several occasions provided Slabchenko with flour. He was also

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helped by the history teacher Serhii Kushch and a woman who was a well-known stundist activist. But this help was irregular. People were either unable or afraid to organize a steady flow of aid. I was told that Slabchenko's woman companion had been seen begging in the local bazaar. She died, he was left alone, people forgot about him for a while. When they did go to see him again, during the bitter winter of 1952 (I think), he lay dead in an ice-cold, long unheated, one-room apartment. No external signs of suicide were found, but no autopsy was performed. The neighbours never heard him cry for help, but then he had never asked for help. One can only hope that death came to him quickly, that he did not suffer long alone in his freezing apartment without food and assistance.

Bohdan Krawchenko and Jim A. Carter

DISSIDENTS IN UKRAINE BEFORE 1972: A SUMMARY STATISTICAL PROFILE *

Dissent as we know it today began in the late 1950s. It was a by-product of Khrushchev's de-Stalinization policies, which dismantled the most nauseous features of the apparatus of terror that had developed under Stalin. The "emancipation from the paralysis of fear" that ensued made dissent possible.¹ This short communication is intended to shed some light on the hundreds of individuals in Ukraine who, by voicing their dissent, overcame the legacy of fear and political inertia left by Stalin.

Dissent is a much more widespread phenomenon than it is generally imagined to be. In our study we defined a dissident as any individual who expressed disapproval of the existing regime or of some of its policies or actions in a public way, be it by signing a petition, authoring or circulating *samvydav* (*samizdat*), writing a letter of protest, participating in unofficial gatherings such as discussion groups or demonstrations, writing slogans in public places, and so on. The defining characteristic of this form of public

* We wish to thank Natalka Chomiak for her assistance and the Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies for its support.

¹ Bohdan Bociurkiw, "Political Dissent in the Soviet Union," *Studies in Comparative Communism* 3 (1970), no. 2, p. 74.

activity was that it went beyond official forums and channels and was perceived by the authorities, as well as by those in dissident circles reporting the activity, as having violated the authorities' norms of permissible behavior. It is important to note that our study is not a study of political prisoners, because not all who participated in dissent activity were arrested and sentenced to terms of imprisonment.

Our investigation was limited to the territory of Ukraine; former residents of the republic involved in dissident activity outside the boundaries of Ukraine (for example, in the camps) were not included. Neither did we include residents of other republics who acted on a Ukrainian issue. Because we limited our sources to the major documents of the Ukrainian dissident movement and the Moscow *Khronika tekushchikh sobytii* (Chronicle of Current Events), our study is not a comprehensive analysis of individuals involved in dissident activity in the republic. Religious movements, for example, are inadequately covered in these sources. This study does, however, provide fairly complete information on the Ukrainian national current and on the human-rights movement.

Our sources covered the period from 1960 to 1972. The latter date marks the dismissal of Petro Shelest, first secretary of the Communist Party of Ukraine, on charges of national deviation and the mass arrests of dissidents. However, since the bulk of our information was obtained from issues of the samizdat journals *Ukrainskyi visnyk* and *Khronika*, and since these publications were initiated only in 1970 and 1968 respectively, the study primarily focusses on individuals active in the dissident movement from 1969 to 1972.

It was possible to identify 942 individuals who participated in dissident activities as we have broadly defined them. Let us first examine some demographic characteristics of these individuals. By nationality, 77.2 percent of the dissidents were Ukrainian, 0.5 percent were Russians, 9.9 percent belonged to other nationalities (mostly Jews and Crimean Tatars), and the nationality of 12.4 percent was impossible to determine. Bearing in mind that almost 20 percent of the total population in the republic in 1970 was Russian and that their representation in the urban population was 30 percent, Russians were clearly underrepresented among dissidents, even if we assume that the majority of those for whom there are no data regarding nationality were Russians. Since the Moscow *Khronika* was also used as a source of information, Russians participating in the movement for human rights in Ukraine ought to have appeared in the sample. It is therefore unlikely that

the source base biased the results. We can only conclude that, being a relatively privileged group, Russians were less likely to engage in protest activity.

An examination of the dissidents' sex indicates that the low level of participation of women characteristic of official political life was also characteristic of dissent. It was possible to determine the sex of 799 dissidents: of these, 78.8 percent were male, and a mere 21.2 percent were female.

The place of residence of the individuals at the time of their dissident activity reflects the geographical distribution of dissidents in the republic. Information was available in 749 cases. The single largest contingent—283, or 38 percent—came from the city of Kiev. The city of Lviv had 190 dissidents, or 25 percent. Thus, the lion's share of dissidents—63 percent—lived in these two cities. The Crimean oblast accounted for 61 dissidents; Ivano-Frankivsk oblast, 55; Dnipropetrovsk oblast, 34; Kharkiv oblast, 24; Odessa oblast, 21; and Ternopil oblast, 15. The remaining oblasts had less than ten dissidents each. Only seven dissidents resided in the heavily industrialized Donetsk oblast.

Dissent in Ukraine was very much an urban phenomenon. It was possible to identify the type of residence (city, town, or village) in 626 cases. Of this total, 89 percent, or 555 individuals, lived in cities, and 3 percent, or 17 people, in towns. Thus, 91 percent of dissidents lived in urban centres. Only 9 percent, or 54 people, lived in villages. In the 1960s the city had emerged as the focal point of the Ukrainian national revival.

Examining dissidents from the point of view of official Soviet characterizations of social class, it is evident that the opposition in Ukraine came from the socially mobilized sectors of society. Our sample here included 659 individuals: 86 percent were white-collar staff, 13 percent were workers, and only 1 percent were collective farmers. The vast majority of those belonging to the white-collar category were in fact members of the intelligentsia, that is, people with some higher education. Clerical workers accounted for only 13 individuals out of the total 567 found in the white-collar category. Technicians accounted for 12; the scientific and technical intelligentsia, 151; the creative intelligentsia, 227; teachers, 98; and students, 66.

Detailed information on the actual occupation of dissidents was available for 584 individuals. That information showed the following:

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Teachers	63	Priests	30
according to subject		Visual Artists	26
humanities	36	Managers/Directors	24
scientific and technical	17	Journalists	21
social sciences	7	Academics	
other	3	in the Social Sciences	21
Workers	59	Performing Artists	19
skilled	46	Translators and Editors	14
unskilled	13	Literary Critics	12
Research Scientists	56	Clerical Workers	11
Writers and Poets	55	Unemployed	8
Engineers	52	Laboratory Technicians	8
Students	48	Collective Farm Laborers	7
humanities	19	Pensioners	6
scientific and technical	10	Lawyers	5
social sciences	8	Military Officers	5
other	11	Nurses	4
Academics in the Humanities	30	T O T A L	584

Data on the level of educational achievement of dissidents were available for 215 individuals. The results showed that this was a highly educated group: 94 percent had some postsecondary education. Of this total 52 had the rank of candidate of sciences, and 12 held the title of doctor of sciences.

It was possible to identify the issues raised by individual dissidents in 753 cases. These people were involved in a total of 2,186 dissenting statements and actions. (Some individuals were involved in more than one statement or action.) The majority—1,044—addressed the issue of democratization, that is, freedom of speech, thought, assembly, and so on. Statements and actions in defense of the victims of repression ranked second in frequency: 754, with almost 600 being undertaken on behalf of Ukrainian political prisoners. The specific issue of Russification and protest against limitations of the cultural, political, and economic rights of Ukraine was the subject of 388 actions and statements.

Marko Pavlyshyn

**OLES BERDNYK'S
OKOTSVIT AND ZORIANYI KORSAR:
ROMANTIC UTOPIA AND SCIENCE FICTION**

The eighth volume of *Istoriia ukrainskoi literatury*, published in Kiev in 1971, gave the following evaluation of Oles Berdnyk:

This prose writer is the advocate of a fantastic literature that is unlimited in its flights [of imagination] and does not shrink from peering beyond the frontiers of probability. But this advocacy in Berdnyk's case goes hand in hand with a marked disregard for the real, life-oriented foundations (scientific, social, moral, and psychological) upon which rests the ideological and aesthetic structure of a work.... the door is opened to the fanciful, the subconscious, and the mystical, leading the author into ideologically shaky, scientifically unsound conceptions.¹

The judgement was in keeping with what had just happened and would soon happen in Berdnyk's literary career. In 1970 his novella *Okotsvit*, which would have been his sixteenth book, was destroyed in the printery, with the exception of a few copies. A year later his major novel, *Zorianyi korsar*, was abruptly withdrawn from distribution. Thereafter Berdnyk's new works appeared only in the underground press. In 1976 his works were removed from the book trade and from libraries; in 1979 he was arrested, tried, and

¹ *Istoriia ukrainskoi literatury*, 8 vols. (Kiev, 1967-71), 8: 484. This and all subsequent translations from Ukrainian texts are my own.

sentenced to nine years' imprisonment and exile for his active participation in the Ukrainian Helsinki Group.²

The facts of Berdnyk's biography, then, identify him as a dissident writer. This paper is concerned with those of his books that stand at the margin of dissidence: the two prose works that at first seemed to the censor to be in keeping with official ideology, but were then recognized, correctly, as a challenge to it. This challenge will be described here as an attempt to posit a *romantic* alternative to the materialist utopia produced by technology and the achievement of communism, which is envisaged by Marxist philosophy. The notoriously imprecise term "romantic" is used here in a narrow and specific sense and means "analogous in philosophical content and aesthetic method to the works of such writers as Friedrich Schlegel and Friedrich von Hardenberg (Novalis), whom German literary scholarship has called 'Early Romantics.'"³ I shall argue, first, that Berdnyk is a romantic in his attitude to myth, in the nature of his postulate of humankind's future perfection, and in his derivation of the myth of human secular redemption from national roots; and second, that there are strong historical and social reasons for his "untimely" romanticism.

As a knowledge of Berdnyk's works cannot be assumed, an introductory description of the two books under discussion is necessary.

Berdnyk calls *Okotsvit* a "fairy-tale novella" (*kazkova povist*);⁴ directed (ostensibly) toward children, it is rich in narrative

² For biographical and bibliographical information, see Oleh Kylymnyk and Oleksandr Petrovsky, *Pysmennyyk Radianskoi Ukrayny: Bibliohrafichnyi dovidnyk* (Kiev, 1970), p. 28; Jurij Dobczansky, "Oles Berdnyk: A Bibliographical Overview," *Journal of Ukrainian Graduate Studies* 4 (1979), no. 1, pp. 77-83, with a supplement by John A. Barnstead in *Journal of Ukrainian Graduate Studies* 4 (1979), no. 2, pp. 114-15; and the afterword in Oles Berdnyk, *Sviata Ukraina: Esei i lysty*, ed. Bohdan Arei (Baltimore and Toronto, 1980), pp. 205-206.

³ The connection between Berdnyk and European romanticism has been made only once in the critical literature: by M. Dolenho-Klokov in his "Novyi tvir Olesia Berdnyka," afterword to Oles Berdnyk, *Dity bezmezhzhia: Roman-jeieria* (Kiev, 1964), pp. 359-63, here p. 360. Dolenho-Klokov draws parallels between the pathos of Berdnyk's novels and the romanticism of Shelley's "Prometheus Unbound." The similarity between Berdnyk's poetic philosophy and that of the "Frühromantiker" in Germany has not hitherto attracted comment.

⁴ Oles Berdnyk, *Okotsvit: Kazkova povist* (Kiev, 1970). Page references after quotations from *Okotsvit* in the text refer to this edition and are prefixed by the initial *O*.

material and simple in structure. There are two parts. The first is set in a Ukrainian village near the Dnieper River. The hero and heroine, both young schoolchildren, encounter two beings from another world; one of them has the outward form of Baba-Yaha, while the other takes the shape of a young girl, a ball of flame, or an eye-flower. The extraterrestrials are from the Planet of Flowers, which is threatened by extinction and can be rejuvenated only by human beings with a deep faith in *kazka*—the fairy tale. Such a quality is possessed by the hero and heroine, who in the course of the second part undergo a series of adventures in quest of the Planet of Flowers. They hitch a ride on a spaceship run by a civilization on Jupiter and, with the aid of a Jovian youth, reach the objective of their wanderings. Their arrival magically redeems the planet, restoring it to life from its sorcery-induced sleep.

Zorianyi korsar is more complex. The narrative has three important time levels and a number of subsidiary ones, not counting the long, self-contained episode that forms the first book of the novel. Hryhir Bova, a young Kiev detective living in about 1980 (level one) becomes aware that he and his soulmate, Halia Kurnina, are incarnations of a group of noble rebels from another, highly advanced but degenerating, civilization on the planet Orana (level two). This information reaches Hryhir at first by way of dreams, in which the story of the rebellion takes shape. Ariman, the tyrant of Orana, had proposed a remedy for the depletion of Orana's psychic energy: he produced an old-fashioned world in primitive three-dimensional space and established there an evolutionary process leading to intelligent beings who live by "contradictions, unrest, revolutions, enthusiasm and depression, sex ... and yearning for infinity" (ZK, 170/64).⁵ That world is the planet Earth (level one), whose psychoenergetic activity Ariman proposed to harvest for Orana's benefit. Against Ariman's exploitative plan a number of Orana's best spirits rose in revolt. They defected to Earth, there to guide evolution in the direction of self-liberation.

In their struggle the rebels are abetted by the Stellar Corsair, a sublimated, disembodied intelligence whose origin lies in a time level that is regarded as archaic even on Orana. At this third level, a conflict had arisen between Kareos, advocate of the social ideal

⁵ Oles Berdnyk, *Zorianyi korsar: Fantastichnyi roman* (Kiev, 1971). A Canadian edition, abridged by the omission of the first of the novel's three books, is more generally available: *Zorianyi korsar: Fantastichna povist* (Toronto, 1981). Quotations from *Zorianyi korsar* in the text are followed by the code ZK and page references to the 1971 and 1981 editions, in that order.

of peace, order, comfort, and repose, and Horior, who believed that thinking beings must extend themselves constantly in a never-ending battle to fulfill their own (infinite) potentialities. Kareos was initially victorious, but Horior, who came to be known as the Stellar Corsair, subverted his plans and threatened to gain the upper hand.

The three narrative levels are brought together at the end. Ariman is about to neutralize the rebels by locking some into the nineteenth century and leaving others in the twentieth. But the Corsair rescues them and elevates them to a higher plane of existence, where they may join the struggle to extend the frontiers of human possibility at a more advanced level than that of twentieth-century Earth.

It is clear from the résumés that the two novels contain mythical themes: the origin of worlds and civilizations, their redemption, and conflicts between heroic personalities. Yet Berdnyk, like any modern writer, cannot organize these stories into a myth in the strict sense of that word. Contemporary scholars of myth regard myths as *true* stories—in the sense that, in order to have the status of a myth in a certain society, a narrative must be regarded by that society as literally—not just symbolically—true.⁶ No modern fiction, of course, presents itself to the reader as literal truth. But there is another, romantic, sense in which Berdnyk's novels are mythogenic.

The question of the need for myth in modern rationalist society had been discussed by Friedrich Schlegel in his "Rede über die Mythologie" in the year 1800. When Schlegel laments the absence of a mythology in modern European culture, he means that there is no generally valid, unifying, and creative system of symbols or beliefs. A unifying belief appropriate to the age, however, is about to be found or could be found in the conviction of humankind that it is free to develop the possibilities of human thought and action without limit. This belief Schlegel considers to be at the root of idealist philosophy, whose contemporary popularity he regards as a reflection of the fact that "mankind struggles with all its power to find its own centre."⁷ Whoever understands "the great principles of general rejuvenation and of eternal revolu-

⁶ See Mircea Eliade, "The Structure of Myths," in *Myth and Reality*, transl. William R. Trask (New York and Evanston, 1963), pp. 1-20, esp. 8-11.

⁷ The quotations follow the text of Friedrich Schlegel, *Dialogue on Poetry and Literary Aphorisms*, transl., intro. and annot. by Ernst Behler and Roman Struc (University Park and London, 1968). Here: p. 83.

tion”⁸ will be able “to recognize and to know the activity of the first men as well as the nature of the Golden Age which is to come.”⁹

It is not, therefore, a set of narratives that Schlegel holds up as the focus of mythical belief, but a philosophical viewpoint: that is what distinguishes his new mythology from the old. The old, traditional mythologies—the Classical and the Indian—are to be used by modern poets as sources of symbols that can make this viewpoint palpable to the senses and the emotions.¹⁰

Like Schlegel, Berdnyk wants a new, secular myth of the future; the *literally* mythical quality of his belief in the reorganization of human life along utopian lines is evidenced by his utterances and actions outside the sphere of literature. In 1976 Berdnyk cofounded an Initiative Council for Alternative Evolution, which called on the United Nations to inaugurate a radical approach to the solution of Earth’s environmental problems: namely, to fund research into means that would convert humans from creatures that eat, and therefore kill, to survive into beings that directly absorb energy from the ether and thus can enter into nonexploitative relationships with the rest of nature.¹¹ Odd and implausible though the objective might be, the fact that Berdnyk formed a committee and wrote declarations in its name is proof that his vision of the future is mythical in the undiluted sense of the concept.

This vision inspires *Okotsvit* and *Zorianyi korsar*, where its literary formulation shows far-reaching parallels with works by romantic predecessors. Like Novalis, Berdnyk develops triadic models of history: a highly civilized past is followed by a diminished present, in which human consciousness is at a low ebb, and which will be followed by a glorious utopian blossoming of human possibilities.¹² In *Okotsvit* the golden age of Earth’s history is the high culture brought from another planet by the first colonizers;

⁸ Ibid., p. 88.

⁹ Ibid., p. 88.

¹⁰ Ibid., p. 86-87.

¹¹ “Memorandum Initsiiatyvnoi hrupy alternatyvnoi evoliutsii,” dated 7 December 1976, in Berdnyk, *Sviata Ukraina*, pp. 171-76.

¹² For the most complete account of Novalis’s triadic myth of history, see Hans-Joachim Mähl, *Die Idee des Goldenen Zeitalters im Werk des Novalis* (Heidelberg, 1965). A review of the tradition of the tripartite model of history may be found in Walter Veit, “Studien zur Geschichte des Topos der Goldenen Zeit von der Antike bis zum 18. Jahrhundert,” Ph.D. diss., University of Köln, 1961.

the present is dominated by narrow-minded and utilitarian rationalists like the hero's father; the infinitely richer future that awaits humankind if it remains as imaginative and strong-willed as the child heroes is sketched as the more advanced human civilization on Jupiter.

Zorianyi korsar confronts the reader with a picture of the imperfect present on all three time levels. Hryhir Bova is a detective because there is crime in his world—and, as episodes in the novel emphasize, corruption (*ZK*, 288/179), war (*ZK*, 122/19), injustice (*ZK*, 149/44-45, 129/26), illness and death (*ZK*, 132/28). The temporally removed worlds of Ariman and Kareos are dictatorships posing as paternalistic welfare societies, with abuses that a reader might well interpret as references to such specifically Soviet ills as arrest and banishment for unconventional views (*ZK*, 163-74/58-68), abuse of psychiatric institutions (*ZK*, 230-31/123, 224/117, 284-85/177), and the official reconstruction of history to exclude names and events that have become taboo (*ZK*, 222-23/117). But at each time level there is a past in which the outlines of what Hryhir calls the “cosmic law” (*ZK*, 118/16) may be discerned. At the most archaic time, that of Kareos and Horior, the cosmic law is represented by a teacher, Aeras, from whom Horior learns to subject matter to his own will, a skill that permits him to act effectively as liberator. For the rebels of Orana, the legend of the Stellar Corsair is an inspiration from the past. In turn, these rebels at first appear in Hryhir’s dreams as exemplary figures from a distant antiquity. In all cases, intuitions of a nobler humankind in the past prove to be perceptions of human potential in the present and augurs of human possibility in the future.

Not only Berdnyk’s scheme of history, but the symbolic expression of his future utopia links him to the romanticism of Schlegel and Novalis. This is not the place to elaborate on the derivation of Novalis’s utopian thinking from the epistemological idealism of Kant and Fichte.¹³ Suffice it to say that from Fichte’s concept of “productive imagination” Novalis developed the idea that the human self *creates* the objective world in the act of perception. Consequently, humankind could, and in the utopian future *shall*, control the universe through the exercise of will. The notions of Novalis’s “magic idealism,” as the theory came to be called, lend themselves well to literary presentation through images. The

¹³ A brief but illuminating overview of this exhaustively documented and discussed topic is to be found in Karl Heinz Volkmann-Schluck, “Novalis’ magischer Idealismus,” in *Die deutsche Romantik: Poetik, Formen und Motive*, ed. Hans Steffen (Göttingen, 1967), pp. 45-53.

utopian human being, having control over reality, can exercise unlimited physical self-control, even to the comical point of growing extra limbs at will; because utopian human consciousness penetrates every part of the cosmos, dialogue with plants and animals is possible; and so on.

Such images of human omnipotence and omniscience fill Berdnyk's novels as they do Novalis's *Heinrich von Ofterdingen* (1802). The most elementary step in overcoming the limitations imposed by matter is to break the cycle of eating in order to live. The advanced creatures from the Planet of Flowers in *Okotsvit* absorb solar energy directly, even when they adopt human form (*O*, 60); in *Zorianyi korsar* Aeras instructs Horior that eating is but a habit (*ZK*, 232/124-25), and Horior learns to do without food, to take conscious control of all his bodily organs, to overcome gravity, to concentrate the energy of his own body in a way that enforces his will on inanimate objects, and to travel through space unaided by technology (*ZK*, 235/127-28). Horenystsia, one of the future-oriented scientists of the twentieth century, foresees

the expansion of our sensations and our minds into the multidimensionality of the world, the conquest of space and time, the growth of the human being from a limited three-dimensional creature, mortal and feeble, into an all-powerful titan, who shall conquer infinity and synthesize within himself all the depths of the Macrocosmos. (*ZK*, 280/171)

In *Okotsvit* the same principle of omnipotence over matter is given more homely, comic realization: Nanti, the child of another planet, astonishes villagers by playfully causing heavy bundles to fly (*O*, 63), producing baskets of berries from thin air (*O*, 89) and, most revealingly, walking on water (*O*, 62). The allusion to Christ links Nanti's minor miracle to the theme of human redemption. (The question of whether Berdnyk interprets redemption in religious terms will concern us below.)

As is the case with Novalis, Berdnyk's utopian future also holds the promise of omniscience for humankind: human consciousness will be expanded, so that the individual will be conscious not only of the self, but of all elements of the cosmos.¹⁴ Horykorin, one of the rebels against Ariman, promises "Instead of a single mind—the whole universe... instead of one or two friends—the

¹⁴ On omniscience as an attribute of utopian humankind in Novalis's thought, see Marko Pavlyshyn, "The Topos of the Inexpressible. Poetic Argumentation in Tieck, Novalis and Hoffmann," Ph.D. diss., Monash University, 1982, pp. 257-74.

whole multifaceted variety of the psychic life of the cosmos" (ZK, 173/67). This conscious identity of self and world implies one of the concepts common to all romanticism: the unity of all natural things with each other and with humankind. Preutopian human beings can perceive this unity intuitively. Thus Halia in *Zorianyi korsar* senses "mysterious connections that link everything in this world to everything else—even people to stones, stars, trees" (ZK, 145/41). Unity manifests itself emotionally in love, which at higher levels of evolution will link all elements of the universe, but which at present is anticipated in interpersonal relationships. For this reason all of Berdnyk's heroes and heroines are joined not only by a common striving to create a new world, but also by love for each other.

Berdnyk illustrates the utopian notion of humankind sharing one consciousness with nature with a number of concrete images in *Okotsvit*. The *okotsvit*, or eye-flower, itself is an element of vegetable nature endowed with perception and consciousness and therefore capable of dialogue with humans. More whimsically up-to-date are the flowers on Jupiter. Not only do they engage in dialogue: because they are part of the single consciousness of the universe, they can provide a questioner with any required information about the natural cosmos. Thus the ancient motif of articulate nature (*natura loquitur*) is united with the computer-age image of the data terminal.

The question of Berdnyk's presentation of the *process* that will lead humankind into utopia is complex. Upon it hinges the issue of whether Berdnyk—at least on the strength of *Okotsvit* and *Zorianyi korsar*—should be regarded as a religious writer.¹⁵

¹⁵ The issue of Berdnyk's religiosity has been the subject of some discussion. On the basis of an analysis of Berdnyk's "Vidkryte druzhnie poslannia" to Pope John Paul II, Ivan Hrynoch argues that Berdnyk's cosmology, his interpretation of Jesus Christ, and his anthropology are essentially Christian, though critical of the church as an organization: "Oles Berdnyk (Utopist chy kharyzmatyk na obrii druhoho tysiacholittia khrystyanstva v Ukraini?)," *Suchasnist*, 1980, no. 4, pp. 86-99; and Iwan Hryniokh, "Oles Berdnyk. Utopist, oder Charismatiker am Horizont des zweiten Jahrtausends des Christentums in der Ukraine?," *Mitteilungen* 17 (1980): 70-110. As Hrynoch's articles are exclusively concerned with a single text written eight years after *Okotsvit* and *Zorianyi korsar*, we shall not debate them here except to comment that the "Poslannia" is very different from Berdnyk's novels, and observations based on it cannot be regarded as generalizations valid for the whole of his opus. Nor does Hrynoch make such generalizations, except by implication.

Certainly, Berdnyk's images of the transition have much in common with religious and eschatological notions. When Horior and Gledys move into the Neosphere ("noosfera"—*ZK*, 237/129), they discard their physical form in a manner that cannot but remind the reader of Christian notions concerning the soul's departure from the body at the point of death (*ZK*, 237/130). Explicitly religious vocabulary is used to formulate central concepts: the motto in book two of *Zorianyi korsar* is "In order to be resurrected one must die" (*ZK*, 112/9); and in *Okotsvit* the testing question put to the hero by the interplanetary visitor is "will you not be afraid to die in your present form in order to be resurrected in an eternal, invulnerable one?" (*O*, 39). Nevertheless, these are cases not of Berdnyk's adopting a religious attitude, but of his borrowing religious symbolism to support his essentially secular myth. For although in the neosphere "the notion of birth and death... will be replaced by a process of the eternal regeneration of the individual" (*ZK*, 237/130), this will in no sense be an afterlife in a sphere of the supernatural, but a continued life of struggle and self-overcoming *within* nature, though at a higher level of it. The neosphere is Berdnyk's symbol for the maximum potentiality of individualism and freedom in the world of nature—ideals that belong to the traditions of secularism and enlightenment.¹⁶

Hitherto I have been concerned with the nature and meaning of Berdnyk's mythology; it is time to say something of its origins. Schlegel, in his "Rede über die Mythologie," had formulated a project for a new mythology that would combine the symbolism of numerous old mythologies to serve a new purpose. Just such a romantic combination of mythologies is practiced by Berdnyk, who recognizes the rhetorical value of imparting to his notions, through allusion and association, the aura of familiarity. Consequently, the reader encounters a cosmopolitan medley of symbols, motifs, and allusions. Some are universally comprehensible (the

¹⁶ This interpretation differs from that advanced in Walter Smyrniw's "The Theme of Man-Godhood in Oles Berdnyk's Science Fiction," *Journal of Ukrainian Studies* 6 (1981), no. 1, pp. 3-19. Smyrniw correctly asserts that no system of theistic belief can be abstracted from Berdnyk's novels (p. 18). But he underestimates the degree to which Berdnyk's vision is symbolic and therefore reads the works (and particularly the later essays and letters) as dogmatic statements promoting an alternative religion: a "religious cult based on a science-fiction premise" (p. 17). For the same reason Smyrniw chooses for Berdnyk's emphatically anthropocentric view of humanity's future (whose expression in literature *does* involve some religious symbolism) the religiously coloured name of "Man-Godhood."

sun and its opposite, darkness), others more obscure. In the dualist system of late Zoroastrianism, Ahura Mazda, or Ormazd, is the spirit of truth, righteousness, and order, while his demonic adversary is Ahriman;¹⁷ hence Berdnyk's tyran Ariman is opposed by Horior, (the "Korsar"), Horykorin and Horenytsia—all of them linked through the syllable “-or-” to Ormazd. The symbol of the crystal goblet that contains the wine of immortality refers to several cultural matrices: to Zoroastrianism again (where the drink of immortality ushers in the new world at the end of finite time), to Christianity (the Communion chalice), and to European chivalric romance (the Grail). The motif of the rejuvenation of the sleeping kingdom is familiar from the Grimm brothers' tales and from Klingsohr's "Märchen" in Novalis's *Heinrich von Ofterdingen*. "Okotsvit," the flower who is also a woman, is an echo of an Indian motif¹⁸ as well as of Novalis's arch-romantic "blaue Blume." Christian motifs occur: Ariman and the noble rebels against his will constitute an inversion of the creator and the fallen angels. One could expand the list further.

The exoticism of much of Berdnyk's symbolism is balanced by native folklore and national tradition. In *Okotsvit* only those who love and understand folk tales—children—have minds that are open to communication with extraterrestrial beings. Folk anecdotes concerning Baba-Yaha and the magic flower in the novella prove to be true records of visits from outer space, and belief in *kazky* is a prerequisite for futuristic space adventures with higher intelligences. That is why the action is set not in a modern cosmopolitan city with no cultural roots in folk tradition, but in a Ukrainian village whose inhabitants speak half-seriously of the *domovyk* (*O*, 21) and the *nechysta syla* (*O*, 21, 26). Those who reject the claims of folk belief out of hand are condemned, in standard romantic fashion, as philistines. The hero's father is such a sceptic; his son transfixes him with the memorable question, "Does man live by borsch alone?" (*O*, 42).

In *Zorianyi korsar* the national myth of Ukrainian cossackdom provides a frame for the myth of universal human regeneration.

¹⁷ See Mary Boyce, *Zoroastrians: Their Religious Beliefs and Practices* (London, 1979). The presence of an allusion to ancient Persian demonology was noted by Igor Kaczurowskyj in "Zwei Dichter im Kampf" [Mykola Rudenko and Oles Berdnyk], *Mitteilungen* 17 (1980): 241-63; here p. 263.

¹⁸ Stith Thompson, *Motif-Index of Folk-Literature*, in 6 vols., rev. ed. (Copenhagen, 1955-58), items D.212.1, D.212.2, D.212.3, D.431.1, D.621.2.2.

tion. The heroine, Halia Kurinna, has a cossack name: *kurinnyi* is the rank of a Zaporozhian cossack officer. At the conclusion of the novel Halia drinks from a crystal goblet containing the wine of immortality and accompanies Horior to the frontiers of human existence. The wine is the symbolic catalyst of the transformation; therefore its origin, too, must be symbolically relevant. Halia's father, having fallen into a Rip-van-Winkle-like sleep, dreams of attending a banquet with his cossack ancestors. As in Kotliarevsky and Shevchenko, the cossacks are incarnations of vitality, individualism, love of freedom, and even anarchy. They drink from the crystal goblet and give it to Halia's parent, who brings it as a material object into the twentieth century. The goblet episode allegorically advances the notion that the universal striving of humankind for higher levels of perfection is mystically connected to, and draws energy from, the national past. Berdnyk thus alludes to an idea that he later developed more explicitly in the underground press: that the nation is a natural spiritual unit of humankind and will remain so in the utopian future, which will be harmoniously constructed by free and equal "spiritual republics."¹⁹

The position is a romantic one, though less in the spirit of Schlegel and Novalis than of later romantic nationalism. In the context of the theory of the "drawing together of nations," which during the 1970s was the official Soviet view on the future of nations,²⁰ it is provocative in a manner that is separate from the provocativeness of Berdnyk's utopianism in general.

From the evidence marshaled thus far, it is evident that there is ample justification for describing Berdnyk's rhetoric of optimistic individualism as "romantic." There remains the question: why is there so striking and detailed a parallel between the ethos of Berdnyk's novels and that of the Early Romantics in Germany—a parallel that spans 170 years? Whether Berdnyk read or was influenced by Schlegel or Novalis is not known; nor is this a relevant issue. What is important is the fact that Berdnyk's novels, on one hand, and the philosophical reflections and literary works of the Early Romantics, on the other, are critical and oppositional responses to different social and political systems between which, however, there are significant analogies. A standard sociopsychological model is frequently invoked to account for the rise of German idealism and, in its extreme form, the romanticism of Schlegel

¹⁹ See, for example, "Ukrainskym hromadam Zemli," dated 9 May 1974, in *Sviata Ukraina*, pp. 151-55.

²⁰ See Myroslav Prokop, "Na novomu etapi natsionalnoi polityky KPRS," *Suchasnist*, 1983, no. 4, pp. 100-116.

and Novalis.²¹ In the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries central Europe was politically backward, the dominant state form being the absolute monarchy—a system that continued to frustrate the aspirations of the culturally dominant middle class. Liberty and the individual's sovereignty over his or her own destiny, which could not be accomplished in the political and economic arena, were postulated, as a form of compensation, in the realms of philosophy and art. According to this model, the omnipotent, creative ego as visualized by Novalis is a consolatory self-image: a project for the realization in a utopian future of what is impossible in the present. The same might be said of Berdnyk in the totalitarian Soviet state: the interpretation of the human condition as unfree leads reactively to a rhetoric that calls for the establishment of the greatest possible human freedom.

Given what we know of the nature and content of Berdnyk's romanticism, it is not surprising that the two works expressing it most provocatively could not be presented to the public in a state that insists on ideological uniformity. What is surprising under the circumstances is the fact that *Okotsvit* and *Zorianyi korsar* were even printed. Why did the censor approve them in the first place?

This question can be answered, speculatively, by reference to the rhetorical dimension of literature. An ancient principle of rhetoric states that an orator can persuade an audience best if he convinces it that his point of view is essentially the same as its own.²² It is advantageous, therefore, to present new ideas in the guise of old, familiar ones that are known to be acceptable. This is Berdnyk's strategy. He writes science fiction, a genre in which the postulation of other worlds is an unavoidable necessity, and which is officially regarded as "progressive": "In the age of the building of communism," asserted *Ukrainska radianska entsyklopediia* in the early 1960s, "science fiction (especially books about technical progress and the taming of the cosmos) has considerable epistemological and educative significance, especially among young readers."²³ Furthermore, much of Berdnyk's rhetoric, particularly the

²¹ See, for example, Hans Dietrich Dahnke, "Literarische Prozesse 1789-1906," *Weimarer Beiträge* 9 (1971), no. 11, pp. 68-69, and Gonthier-Louis Fink, "Die Revolution als Herausforderung in Literatur und Publizistik," in *Deutsche Literatur: Eine Sozialgeschichte*, ed. Horst Albert Glaser, vol. 5 (Reinbek, 1980), pp. 110-29, esp. pp. 123-29.

²² See Aristotle, *Topica*, 100b.

²³ "Naukovo-fantastichna literatura," *Ukrainska radianska entsyklopediia*, vol. 9 (Kiev, 1962), p. 555.

golden age of the future and the liberation of humankind from all forms of dependence and servitude, does not contradict the Marxist-Leninist view of the future. It is this appearance of conformity that might have initially placated the censors.

But Berdnyk mixes these acceptable rhetorical elements with provocative, ultimately intolerable ones. His utopian human transcends the world of matter, and with it he discards technological progress, the conquest of nature, and work in the sense of material production. The objective of a satisfied, secure, uniform society is rejected as antihuman, and the triumph of humanity is envisaged instead as a triumph of individual will. Because Berdnyk's novels were at the last moment recognized for what they are—challenges to central Marxist doctrines of materialism and collectivism—they could not be permitted to exercise their persuasive power in the public sphere.

REVIEW ARTICLE

Victor Haynes

THE UKRAINIAN HELSINKI GROUP: A POSTMORTEM

THE HUMAN RIGHTS MOVEMENT IN UKRAINE: DOCUMENTS OF THE UKRAINIAN HELSINKI GROUP, 1976-1980. Trans. and ed. Bohdan Yasen and Lesya Verba; intro. Nina Strokata-Karavanska. Baltimore and Toronto: V. Symonenko Smoloskyp Publishers, 1980. 277 pp.

"INFORMATSIINI BIULETENI" UKRAINSKOI HROMADSKOI HRUPY SPRYIANNIA VYKONANNIU HELSINSKYKH UHOD. Ed. Osyp Zinkevych; annot. and postscript Nina Strokata. Baltimore and Toronto: V. Symonenko Smoloskyp Publishers, 1981. 200 pp.

THE PERSECUTION OF THE UKRAINIAN HELSINKI GROUP. Toronto: Human Rights Commission, World Congress of Free Ukrainians, 1980. 66 pp.

POHROM V UKRAINI, 1972-1979. Ed., annot., and intro. Roman Kupchynsky. N.p.: Suchasnist, 1980. 312 pp.

MYKOLA RUDENKO, EKONOMICNII MONOLOHY. N.p.: Suchasnist, 1978. 200 pp.

OLEKSII TYKHY, ROZDUMY: ZBIRNYK STATTEI, DOKUMENTIV, SPOHADIV. Comp. Osyp Zinkevych. Baltimore and Toronto: V. Symonenko Smoloskyp Publishers, 1982. 79 pp.

UKRAINSKA HELSINSKA HRUPA 1978-1982: DOKUMENTY I MATERIIALY. Ed. Osyp Zinkevych. Baltimore and Toronto: V. Symonenko Smoloskyp Publishers, 1983. 998 pp.

ZUPINIT KRYVOSUDDIA! SPRAVA LEVKA LUKIANENKA. Ed., annot., and intro. Stepan Sadovsky. N.p.: Suchasnist, 1980. 264 pp.

The Ukrainian Helsinki Group (UHG) was formed as a direct consequence of detente and an increase in civil-rights activities throughout Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. Groups to monitor the implementation of civil rights were openly formed in most countries of the Soviet empire after the governments of these countries signed the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe in Helsinki in August 1975. The civil- and national-rights activists in Ukraine were relatively quick off the mark in forming a Helsinki group. The repression that followed against all the Helsinki groups was much more severe in Ukraine, partly because of Ukraine's isolation from world opinion and partly because of the Soviet elite's paranoia about the possibility of Ukraine seceding.

The purpose of the Helsinki final act was to codify detente between the United States, Canada, and Western Europe on the one hand and the USSR and Eastern Europe on the other. The final act consisted of three sections, or "baskets." The first basket related to security matters and civil rights. The Soviet Union wanted an agreement on security that would be essentially a recognition of its and the Eastern European state boundaries. In return it agreed to respect human rights on the basis of the UN Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the UN Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights. The second basket focussed on cooperation in trade, science, technology, culture, and the environment. The third basket dealt with the rights of individuals: personal contacts, family reunification, family visits, marriages, travel, religious contacts, the right to information, and so on.

The first response to the final act occurred in Poland as early as December 1975. In the debate around the new Polish constitution, groups of intellectuals and students called upon the Polish government to implement the final act. The workers' strikes of June 1976 and the events leading to the formation of Solidarity superseded the platitudes in the final act. Subsequently there has been very little reference to these accords in Poland.

Elsewhere in Eastern Europe, the civil-rights movement did not reach the heights of success it did in Poland. In Czechoslovakia, at first it seemed that another Prague Spring was on its way. In January 1977 disparate individuals and groups formed Charter '77 to monitor the implementation of the final act. Within two years about a thousand people had joined Charter '77. About half were in their twenties. Members included believers and atheists, Dubcek Communists and Trotskyists, intellectuals and workers. However, by 1982 the Czechoslovak authorities had managed to contain and, for all practical purposes, to destroy Charter '77.

In Rumania, whose government has one of the most inglorious records of abuse against its civil population, no civil-rights movement suc-

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ceeded in organizing itself. The writer Paul Goma took the bold initiative of publicly speaking out against human-rights abuses. Later he was joined by a chorus of oppressed miners, forced labourers on the Danube-Black Sea Canal, Protestants, individuals placed in psychiatric hospitals for political reasons, and representatives of the harrassed Hungarian minority. No national civil-rights movement emerged, however, because the very powerful Rumanian secret police quickly smothered any attempts at creating one.

In the rest of Eastern Europe the use of the Helsinki final act was slight. In East Germany individuals used it mainly to apply to emigrate. In Hungary and Bulgaria there was very little response.

In the USSR the first Helsinki group to organize was the Russian, in Moscow on 12 May 1976. It was followed by the Ukrainian group on 9 November 1976, and in turn by the Lithuanian, Armenian, and Georgian groups. All groups were subsequently repressed out of existence by the Soviet authorities. The Ukrainian group was extinguished by arrests by the beginning of 1980. The Russian group, also depleted by arrests, formally dissolved itself in September 1981.

The best and most complete source on the destruction of the Ukrainian Helsinki Group is the recently published collection of documents and materials, *Ukrainska helsinska hrupa, 1978-1982*. Almost one thousand pages long, superbly edited by Osyp Zinkevych, it includes a list of the thirty-seven members of the UHG, a bibliography of their documents republished in the West, and a chronology of the group's activities. The documents are divided into two main sections: a shorter section containing the group's statements, and a much longer section of documents by and about the repression of thirty-one members. The remaining six members are not included here because they are now in the West. All the documents on the individual members are preceded by a short biographical introduction and a chronology of their activities. The collection has a well-prepared index of names and a table of contents. The same editor and publishers had previously published a volume of the UHG's documents during its first two years of existence, 1976-77—*Ukrainskyi pravoza-khysnyi rukh* (1978).

The UHG produced at least a dozen statements and two dozen bulletins: of these, eighteen memorandums were issued from December 1976 to December 1977 and six information bulletins were issued from July 1978 to early 1980. Not all the statements and bulletins seem to have reached the West. A number of the early statements and ten of the eighteen memorandums available have been published in English: *The Human Rights Movement in Ukraine*. Five of the six information bulletins have been published in the West in Ukrainian in "Informatsiini biuletensi." The following postmortem of the Ukrainian Helsinki Group is based primarily on the documents in *Ukrainska helsinska hrupa* and on the

writings of the UHG's three leading members that are not among these documents: Mykola Rudenko's *Ekonomichni monolohy*; Oleksa Tykhy's *Rozdumy*; and Lev Lukianenko's writings in *Zupynit kryvosuddia!* Less important for this review but nevertheless an excellent collection of articles by and about thirteen Ukrainian political prisoners is *Pohrom v Ukraini, 1972-1979*. Some of these prisoners later became members of the UHG. A short and useful guide to the UHG is the pamphlet *The Persecution of the Ukrainian Helsinki Group*, though it is slightly out of date.*

There were thirty-seven public members of the UHG and an unknown number of undeclared members. The group existed precariously from November 1976 to the beginning of 1980. As new members declared themselves publicly they would be arrested, only to be replaced by others. The group's activities terminated when no new members came forward. KGB raids, beatings, arrests, trials, and imprisonments made it absolutely clear that the Soviet government would not tolerate the existence of the group.

During its existence, twenty-three members were tried and imprisoned. Vasyl Ovsienko, one of the youngest members, was sentenced to a total of eighteen years. Six of the members received fifteen years each: Lev Lukianenko, Oleksa Tykhy, Ivan Kandyba, Vitalii Kalynychenko, Vasyl Stus, and Ivan Sokulsky. Three members were sentenced to twelve years each: Mykola Rudenko, Myroslav Marynovych, and Mykola Matusevych. Thirteen members got from three to nine years: Oles Berdnyk (nine years), Iurii Lytvyn (eight years), Vasyl Striltsiv (eight years), Iaroslav Lesiv (seven years), Petro Sichko (six years), Vasyl Sichko (six years), Oksana Meshko (5½ years), Viacheslav Chornovil (five years), Mykola Horbal (five years), Olha Heiko-Matusevych (three years), Petro Rozumny (three years), Iosyf Zisels (three years), and Petro Vins (one year).

Six members were allowed to leave for the West: Petro Grigorenko (December 1977), Petro Vins (June 1978), Nadia Svitlychna (October 1978), Sviatoslav Karavansky and Nina Strokata (both in November 1979), and Volodymyr Malynkovych (January 1980). Petro Vins left after serving one year of imprisonment. Karavansky left after being imprisoned for a total of twenty-five years. Nina Strokata left from her enforced exile outside Ukraine.

Ten members could not fully participate in the group's activities because they were either imprisoned or in enforced exile in remote areas of the Soviet Union. In exile during the whole period of the group's

* An update to this pamphlet was published: *The Persecution of the Ukrainian Helsinki Group: Fifth Anniversary Update, November 9, 1981* (Toronto: Human Rights Commission, World Congress of Free Ukrainians, 1981), 36 pp. — Ed.

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existence were: Chornovil, Strokata, Iurii Shukhevych, Zinovii Krasivsky, Oksana Popovych, and Iryna Senyk. In prisons or concentration camps were: Karavansky, Bohdan Rebryk (now serving a sentence of exile), Rev. Vasyl Romaniuk (last reported to have been released and living in the town of Kosmach), and Danylo Shumuk (now in exile).

Stefaniia Shabatura left the UHG in the summer of 1980 and is reported to be living in Lviv. The last of the thirty-seven members, Mykhailo Melnyk, committed suicide in March 1979 after a KGB raid on his home.

Why then, was the Ukrainian Helsinki Group formed? Past experience showed it was bound to provoke repression from the authorities. Yet the majority of the group's members found their life had been made unbearable because of constant demands by the KGB and the Communist party that they declare their loyalty to the state. Many of them were former political prisoners who felt action had to be taken to put a stop to the repression they endured for their beliefs. They formed the Helsinki group because it provided them with an opportunity to internationalize the question of civil and national rights in Ukraine. The gamble did not pay off. The international media and governments paid scant attention to what was happening to the group and its monitoring of final-act violations. To a large degree this was owing to the relative isolation of Ukraine compared to Moscow, where the Russian Helsinki Group was based. But even when the Ukrainian group did receive international attention, it was no guarantee against prosecution, as events have shown.

It is clear from the documents that if the members of the group had not banded together and gone on the offensive, they would have been persecuted anyway, because they held views that were seen as seditious by the authorities. They not only maintained that Soviet society lacked fundamental civil rights, but that Ukraine was a Russian colony. In its major statements the UHG defended the right to agitate for Ukraine's secession as being inseparable from civil rights and pointed out that this right was guaranteed in the Soviet constitution.

What did the Ukrainian Helsinki Group achieve? It showed that it was possible to set up a public organization in Ukraine, though its existence was very unstable and relatively short. This was no small achievement, however, considering that the UHG became the first public organization not controlled by the Communist party since the revolutionary period in eastern Ukraine and since the existence of the OUN and UPA in western Ukraine. Despite the relentless KGB terror against the group's members and supporters, a great number of documents were published listing final-act violations.

The political views of the individual members varied. Mykola Rudenko, in his *Ekonomichni monolohiy*, states he is still a communist but

not a Marxist. He claims that the roots of Stalinism lie in Marxism, because Marx made important mistakes in his analysis, for example, equating agriculture with industry. Ivan Kandyba, however, developed more than just an ideological difference with Marxism. In an article, found in *Ukrainska helsinska hrupa*, he writes: "After my arrest, trial, and sentence, the Soviet government and its Marxist-Leninist ideology became not only foreign to me but also an enemy."

Other members thought that the Communist party and its government had nothing to do with Marxism or communism, but everything to do with Russian chauvinism. Ivan Sokulsky wrote that Ukrainians would be persecuted for being Ukrainian rather than Russian Marxists, "even if the Ukrainians were Marxists three times over." Vitalii Kalyuchenko expressed the view that the only thing the Soviet government believed in was "the future world empire of Great Russia."

The political backgrounds of the group's members varied even more than their views. This was especially true of those in the group who became adults before the death of Stalin: ten eastern Ukrainians and nine western Ukrainians. The initiators of the group were three eastern Ukrainians who at some point were members of the Soviet elite. The story of General Grigorenko, one of the founding members of the group, is well known (see Petro Grigorenko, *Memoirs* [London: Harvill Press, 1983]. Lev Lukianenko had just joined the elite as a party legal advisor in Lviv when he was arrested in 1961 and sentenced to fifteen years' imprisonment for attempting to create an alternative political party. Lukianenko's case has also been well documented (see Michael Browne, ed., *Ferment in the Ukraine* [London: MacMillan, 1971]).

The political biography of the group's founder, Mykola Rudenko, is less known and is worth retracing. At the age of nineteen, in 1939, Rudenko was recruited to the NKVD Dzerzhinsky Division to guard Stalin and the government in Moscow. During the siege of Leningrad he was a political commissar and was severely wounded. He recovered to work as a political-propaganda instructor in military hospitals during the war. Afterwards he returned to Ukraine, where he held a number of party positions in the literary field: chief editor of the literary journal *Dnipro* and secretary of the Writers' Union of Ukraine. He was for a time a member of the Kiev party organization's central committee. Rudenko began losing his official positions when he attempted to initiate discussions within the party about Stalinism and Marxism following Khrushchev's speech denouncing Stalin at the 20th CPSU congress. He was thrown out of the party in the early 1970s. As a substitute for the dialogue he wanted to have with the party's elite, he wrote a monologue, *Ekonomichni monolohy*. It is not only a critique of Marxism, but also of the Soviet Union, and has autobiographical interpolations throughout the text. In 1975 Rudenko was arrested for a short period for joining

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Amnesty International. As further punishment, the Writers' Union of Ukraine expelled him. In the spring of 1976 he was forcibly placed in a psychiatric hospital for two months with the approval of his wife, who was a loyal party supporter. (Since that time Rudenko has remarried, and his present wife supports the Ukrainian Helsinki Group.) His Moscow contacts with Grigorenko and others led him to establish the Ukrainian Helsinki Group in 1976.

The other seven eastern Ukrainians did not have any political experiences within the upper classes of Soviet society. Most of them were political prisoners in the late 1940s and early 1950s: Meshko, Berdnyk, Tykhy, Lytvyn, and Karavansky. Two experienced repression in the 1960s and 1970: Rozumny was arrested for a short period in 1961 and Strokata was sentenced from 1971 to 1977.

The western Ukrainians in the group have a more homogeneous political background. All of them (and only one eastern Ukrainian, Karavansky) first experienced Soviet repression during the Soviet war against the UPA. Karavansky, Krasivsky, Popovych, Senyk, Shumuk, Petro Sichko, and Striltsiv were imprisoned for belonging to the UPA. Shukhevych was sentenced at the age of fourteen in 1948 because he was the son of an UPA-OUN leader and is still imprisoned. Romaniuk was deported during the Soviet war against the UPA. Rebryk was affected by the deportations, because his father was sentenced during the UPA period and died soon after returning from many years in the concentration camps. In contrast, only Kandyba did not suffer during this period and completed law school in Lviv in the year Stalin died. He was sentenced in 1961 together with Lukianenko to fifteen years' imprisonment.

The seventeen younger members of the group were all born and educated in the Soviet Union. Only one of them, Melnyk, belonged to the party, though some were very active in the Komsomol. The majority experienced their first arrest and imprisonment in the 1960s and early 1970s during the party's crackdown on unofficial Ukrainian cultural activities. Four tasted prison life for the first time as a result of their membership in the UHG.

More important than the political views and experiences of the UHG's members is the question why the majority of the population has been inactive or indifferent in the defense of its civil and national rights in the last two decades. The group's documents attempt to grapple with this question. In the first group document in *Ukrainska helsinska hrupa*, the silence of the population is attributed to the state's permanent system of repression, which causes fear and produces a society where members have a slavish consciousness of their rights. Romaniuk writes that the destruction of people, even only a few, aims to remind millions that the same punishment awaits them if they complain. The theme of mass fear is taken up by Lukianenko in *Zupynit kryvosuddia! Sprava Levka Lu-*

kianenka: "Logic has no place, because fear is stronger . . . it is stronger than intelligence and directs."

Fear of the state, combined with the fear of losing out in the job market and in educational opportunities, seem to have been the prime causes of Russification in the last decade. The party spearheads Russification in all workplaces. According to the first group document in *Ukrainska helsinska hrupa*, Shcherbytsky's speech in Russian at the CPU congress as the new leader signaled that the time had come for the final elimination of Ukrainian from all workplaces.

Russification has gone much further than official statistics would suggest. The language of all the major urban centres, excluding Lviv, has tilted toward the Russian. The popular language is not quite Russian, but a combination of Russian and Ukrainian known as *surzhyk*. It is the language of the Ukrainian lower classes who have not been fully assimilated by the primarily Russian educational system. *Surzhyk* has penetrated everywhere according to Kalynchenko, who writes that Ukrainian is only heard in remote villages. Lukianenko writes that the language of his native city of Chernihiv is scandalous: "They cannot speak Russian but they have gone very far from Ukrainian." Lukianenko, in a letter to Vasyl Stus, writes that the city of Kharkiv, once the cradle of Ukrainian culture, has become a major centre of Russian culture, and of a poor variety at that. Sokulsky describes the major industrial city of Dnipropetrovsk as Russified to the core: Ukrainian is not used in the street or in the workplace, and there are no Ukrainian schools at any level of the educational system. Tykhy, a construction worker, in his article on the Ukrainian language and culture in Donetsk Oblast, writes that to hear people speaking Ukrainian is the exception. Both Tykhy and Striltsiv, an English teacher, complain that television programs in Ukrainian are rare. The elite not only Russifies the mass media and discriminates against those at work who do not use Russian, but treats those who complain against Russification as criminals.

The UHG members did not fear the elite; as a result they were severely punished. In the forefront of the state's arsenal of repression is its ability to deny the right to work because it is the sole employer. This fact is enough to make most people think twice before challenging the authorities. Every member of the group was denied the right to employment in his or her profession and even the right to any work—and therefore income. The documents on individual cases present numerous examples of a person being denied employment because of his or her political views. Such practice is not unknown in Western countries. However, it is not as widespread there as it is in the USSR. Zisels remarks, in one of the documents covering his case, that Soviet newspapers write with much false indignation about the exclusion of people the state deems disloyal from employment in the West German civil service.

The Soviet state's total control of jobs and housing also means that it can use them to buy loyalty and informers. The documents repeatedly illustrate the use of these bribes. Ivan Kandyba was offered a job, a better place to reside, and freedom from permanent police surveillance in return for a public confession in the mass media by no other than the procurator of Lviv Oblast, Rudenko. After refusing this offer, Kandyba was seen by the head of Lviv Oblast's KGB, General Poluden, who warned Kandyba that his refusal to cooperate meant that the price of freedom would now be much higher.

The documents show how a number of UHG supporters were bribed by the KGB. Serhii Bilokin, who for years was persecuted and not allowed to work in his profession as a historian, finally gave in to the KGB. In September 1978 he gave them a collection of materials meant for the group's information bulletin. In return he was given a job in his profession. Two other supporters, Larysa and Imre Vasko, finding their careers threatened, gave the KGB the UHG's archive in October 1978.

The Soviet state fosters the idea through the use of bribes that it is a citizen's duty to inform. One informer, a Kiev metalworker by the name of Kriuchok, is quoted in the documents as boasting that he informed on his neighbour and group member Meshko in order to supplement his income.

In the case of the Sichko family, the KGB took its revenge on the whole family. The father, Petro Sichko, a former UPA officer, refused to become an informer and lost his job as chief engineer at the Dolyna metalworks. As a direct result of his refusal to cooperate with the KGB, his older son, Vasyl, was expelled from Kiev University's school of journalism, where he also edited the school newspaper. In response, both Petro and Vasyl joined the UHG and were later arrested and imprisoned. The KGB continued the collective punishment by having the younger son, Volodymyr, expelled from Kiev University's Faculty of Mechanics and Mathematics. Then he was ordered into the army, and when he refused, he was also imprisoned. Sichko's wife and daughter are also under threat for writing protests against the imprisonments.

The documents illustrate how the KGB stage-manages "the people's anger." Meetings of work collectives and local newspapers were used to attack the group and its members. In one case the ploy boomeranged. A trade union meeting of teachers in the town of Dolyna insisted that their denounced colleague, Striltsiv, have a chance to reply before a judgment was passed. The school's party secretary refused to accept this request.

"Traitors" are usually also attacked in the local media, and there is no right of reply. Lviv's major newspaper, *Vilna Ukraina*, on 6 July 1978 attacked Petro and Vasyl Sichko in an article titled "Khai zhyne

ounivska brekhnia" (May the OUN Lies Die). The day before both Sichkos had been arrested. This attack was followed by another in the raion newspaper *Chervona Dolyna* on 23 August 1978. Zisels and the UHG were lambasted by Chernivtsi's *Radianska Bukovyna* on 22 and 23 November 1978. The Pustomyty Raion newspaper *Leninskyi prapor* on 3 August libeled Kandyba. The only way to react to these attacks is to write in underground publications, for which there is a severe punishment.

The documents provide evidence that the KGB beats and at times murders people it deems disloyal. It is widely believed in Ukraine that the popular-music composer Volodymyr Ivasiuk was killed by the KGB. A crowd estimated to number about ten thousand came to his funeral on 12 June 1978, which is also the day western Ukrainians traditionally remember their dead. Both Petro and Vasyl Sichko spoke at the funeral as UHG members. There are many other unsolved murders that are thought to have been the work of the KGB. In the first document in *Ukrainska helsinska hrupa*, the deaths of the poet Oleksander Hryhorenko and the priest Lutsky are presented as KGB murders.

Evidence that the KGB beats people it dislikes is overwhelming. The documents show a number of UHG members were beaten up because of their activities. Olha Heiko-Matusevych was at first threatened by KGB officers with a prison sentence for theft or prostitution. Then they beat her up on a street near her home. Later the two men visited her at her place of work and threatened her with rape and murder. Later still she was beaten up on the street, arrested with a friend, and taken to the police station, where she was accused of starting a fight. Finally she was arrested and sentenced to three years' imprisonment for "dissemination of deliberately false fabrications that discredit the Soviet state and social order," article 187.1 of the criminal code. Her husband, also a member of the group, had been arrested two years earlier and sentenced to twelve years for "hooliganism" and "anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda."

Other members of the group were charged with fabricated criminal activities. Horbal was attacked in a Kiev street, arrested, and charged with attempted rape and resisting arrest and sentenced to five years. Chornovil was also sentenced to five years on the charge of rape. His case takes up the greatest number of pages and documents in *Ukrainska helsinska hrupa*. Lytvyn was beaten up by the militia and then charged with resisting arrest and threatening the militia. Lesiv and Vasyl Sichko were charged for supposedly possessing and using hashish. Rozumny and Tykhy were charged with possessing dangerous weapons. Vins was imprisoned for parasitism.

The trials are relatively well documented, given the fact that, at best, only closest relatives are allowed to attend them. Usually the only "public" that is allowed to witness a trial is a select audience of party

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supporters whose job is to display the “people’s anger.” The trial is conducted by a judge without a jury. The defense lawyers, except in one case, were on the side of the state, as were the judges. It is not surprising that in the whole history of the Soviet judicial system there does not seem to be one instance of a defendant at a political trial winning his case against the state. The staged trials are meant to terrorize the defendants and everyone related to them.

The only trial of a UHG member where the defense lawyer was not a lackey of the state was that of Zisels. Here the lawyer, Nymrunksa from Voroshylivhrad, made many good defense arguments. For example, she argued that the letter in which Zisels wrote that the UHG members tried in 1977-78 were sentenced to a total of sixty-seven years was not a fabrication, as claimed by the prosecutor, but a fact. Nevertheless, Zisels was sentenced to the three years demanded by the prosecutor.

The trial of Stus went extremely badly for the state. The evidence against him was so flimsy that it was even an embarrassment at a staged trial. The judge abruptly halted the proceedings by sentencing Stus to fifteen years before Stus had had the customary last word. There was one trial where the facade of a staged trial was dispensed with completely. There was no prosecutor, defense lawyer, or even a handpicked audience. Volodymyr Sichko was sentenced by a lone judge with a number of militia men in attendance.

The sentences to prison, concentration camp, and/or exile to some remote part of the USSR will at least destroy the prisoners’ health. They will be subjected to hunger, cold, overwork, and isolation, as well as occasional beatings and special punishments. There is no guarantee that they will not be resentenced just before completing their sentence. This has already happened to Lytvyn, who, having served three years, got another five years. Similarly, the following group members have been resentenced: Petro and Vasyl Sichko (three years, then another three years); Striltsiv (two years, then five years); and Ovsienko (three years, then another fifteen years). The older members—Berdnyk, Kandyba, Lukianenko, Lytvyn, Rudenko, Petro Sichko, and Striltsiv—might not survive their sentences. Meshko will probably die during her sentence. She was seventy-five at the time of her arrest in 1980 and is now banished to a remote part of Siberia until 1986.

What impact did the Ukrainian Helsinki Group have on the population in Ukraine as a whole? The answer must be highly speculative given the lack of even the most elementary survey. Most probably the UHG held much hope for the few thousand people in Ukraine who were involved in civil- and national-rights activities in the last two decades and the few hundred who are known to have been arrested during this period. As for the vast majority of the adults in the population of fifty million, the UHG most likely made very little impact. The only large-scale public

contact the group had was when Petro and Vasyl Sichko spoke on its behalf at Ivasiuk's funeral.

What is the international significance of the destruction of the Ukrainian Helsinki Group? It must be taken for granted that the vast majority of politically active people in the world probably know of Ukraine as being part of Russia if they have ever heard about it. However, the destruction of the UHG provides more evidence that civil and political rights do not exist in the USSR and Eastern Europe. It reaffirms that Ukrainians have no national rights and that the Soviet elite's championing of national-liberation movements is a facade for its great-power intrigues. Finally, it is further evidence that the Soviet rulers and their East-European vassals did not abide by the agreement they signed in Helsinki. Can they be trusted to uphold any other agreement?

REVIEWS

ROBERT EDELMAN, *GENTRY POLITICS ON THE EVE OF THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION: THE NATIONALIST PARTY 1907-1917*. New Brunswick, N. J.: Rutgers University Press, 1980. xvii, 252 pp.

As Geoff Eley and other students of nationalism have pointed out, the growth of national movements in multinational states depends a great deal on the measures taken by the dominant nation's elite towards emerging national movements. Through various methods, ranging from cooptation to outright repression, the dominant elite thus contributes to the overall development or lack of development of an inchoate national movement.

Within the Russian Empire, government measures followed a pattern of extreme variation. By the last half of the nineteenth century, the Ukrainian language was banned from publication, and most manifestations of Ukrainian cultural activity were viewed as subversive activities by the authorities. Ukrainian society benefited from the reforms that followed the 1905 revolution, but even then subscribers to newly established Ukrainian newspapers and periodicals were intimidated, Ukrainian institutions were shut down, and most of the gains were reversed. From this period on Russian nationalism took the form of unbridled chauvinism, and persecution of national minorities intensified. Despite the marked tendency by some scholars and "literati" to view the last decade of tsarism as a period of glory and emerging democracy, these years were exemplified by a hysterical campaign of repression against national and individual rights—a point reiterated recently by Professor Ivan L. Rudnytsky in the *Times Literary Supplement*.

From this overall perspective, Professor Edelman's book is a very welcomed addition to our knowledge and understanding of the strength of Russian nationalism and gentry class interests in the ethnically Ukrainian provinces of the Russian Empire. Even though the author knows little about the Ukrainian national movement and its political significance, the study shows how deeply rooted conservative Russian nationalism was among the Russian and assimilated Ukrainian gentry in Ukraine. This had a very important influence on the development of Ukrainian national awareness, because in advocating greater repression against even cultural manifestations of Ukrainian national identity, the Nationalists helped generate interest in things Ukrainian and pushed the Ukrainian movement even more into the oppositional camp. Although the book does not deal with events after February 1917, it nevertheless gives us a better appreciation of those conservative social forces that supported the German-backed regime of Hetman Skoropadsky in 1918. The author successfully shows

that the Nationalist party had a small but clear social base and that it was not, as is usually portrayed, an artificial creation of the tsarist regime.

The Nationalist party was formed in 1909 by several hundred large-property owners who were led by nobles from the empire's western borderlands. The party became the second largest group in the Third State Duma, which gave special voting privileges to the nobility. The Nationalist party became very closely associated with Petr A. Stolypin, the president of the Council of Ministers and a staunch Russian chauvinist. This alliance was not altogether surprising, because, as Edelman argues, "The Nationalists were not so much a party of nationalism as a party of the dominant Russian nationality in a multinational empire. They sought to achieve the complete domination by the Russians within the Empire" (p. 10).

A new and aggressive conservatism arose after the 1905 revolution. Throughout 1906 and 1907 the zemstvos were taken over by the right-wing nobility. In 1907, owing to the newly revised and restricted franchise system, the State Duma for the first time became dominated by the right. Concessions to the peasantry were no longer seen as useful or important under martial law and "Stolypin's reaction." As Edelman argues, the extreme right and the Nationalists drew their support in regions where the nobility felt particularly threatened by the peasantry and other nationalities: in the western borderlands of the Empire, which were overwhelmingly socially peasant, ethnically Ukrainian and partly Belorussian, and where Jews dominated the city assemblies and the landed wealth was in Polish hands. Also significant was the fact that the Ukrainian provinces were known for their intensive capitalist agrarian relations and production. This put the Russians at a distinct disadvantage, because many of them had been civil servants who had been given land by the tsar as part of the effort to displace the economic and political strength of the Polish nobility. These Russians found it difficult to compete against the serious farmers of the region. It is not surprising, therefore, that the Nationalists, both out of economic and political insecurity, cooperated very closely with the Russian clergy (in fact members of the clergy sent several Nationalist representatives to the Third and Fourth Dumas) and raised such slogans as "Russia for the Russians." Neither is it surprising that one important organizational base of the new party was the Kiev Club of Russian Nationalists and the chauvinistic Kiev newspaper, *Kievlianin*.

The Nationalist's program was clear and self-evident: the unity of the empire; the protection of Russians in all parts of the empire; Russia for the Russians; loyalty to both autocracy and representative institutions; development of the church, especially in the villages; improvement of the peasants' economic situation and support for private peasant land-owning; the inviolability of private property; the right to work; development of local government to protect Russians in areas in which they were

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a minority; opposition to equal rights for Jews; national agricultural and industrial planning; and development of Russian national self-consciousness in the schools (p. 95).

Edelman traces in great detail the twists and turns of Nationalist politics and government reaction to their lobbying. In the end, the Nationalists, too, began to criticize the tsarist regime for its inability to run the war effort and for its inflexibility in dealing with critical issues. While not enthusiastic about the downfall of tsarism, the Nationalists did at first support the Provisional government. Then they were sidestepped and rejected by the "progressives" as an historical anachronism; in Edelman's words, the Nationalists spent "the months before the Bolshevik Revolution lamenting the death of noble landholding and preparing for the worst."

Despite the fact that it fails to draw a more comprehensive picture of the historical context and deals inadequately with the factor of ethnicity and nationality, Edelman's study can be utilized to gain a better understanding of the obstacles that confronted the Ukrainian national movement in the last days of tsarism and during the revolution.

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SOIUZ VYZVOLENNIA UKRAINY, 1914-1918. VIDEN'. New York: Chervona Kalyina Ukrainian Publications Cooperative, Inc., 1979. 199 pp.

The Union for the Liberation of Ukraine (Soiuz Vyzvolennia Ukrainy) was one of several collaborationist organizations during the First World War that was and has been more criticized than praised, more misunderstood than comprehended, and yet more in need of serious examination than most organizations and groups in modern Ukrainian history and society. Consider this partial list of the Union's vociferous critics: the tsarist regime, Russian nationalists, Lenin, Trotsky, Aleksinsky, some Ukrainian socialists headed by Lev Iurkevych, the "national communist" Rozdolsky, the Soviet authorities, the Russian nationalist historian George Katkov, and, more recently, Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn in his book *Lenin in Zurich*. This is all the more reason why the book under review should be welcomed, for it is positive about the Union's activities in the Austrian and German POW camps for soldiers of the Imperial Russian army.

This book is really an anthology of memoirs, mainly by those who were instructors in camps set up especially for the Union by the Central Powers to carry out Ukrainian and, to a lesser degree, pro-German and Austrian propaganda and educational activity. From this point of view the book complements the major but incomplete study by Omelian Terletsky, *Ukrainci v Nimechchyni 1915-1918*, vol. 1: *Istoriia ukrainskoi*

hromady v Rashtati (Leipzig, 1919). But the title is misleading, for while this educational activity was an important area of the Union's work, there were many other activities that could have been discussed. We are not informed of the composition of the editorial board that supposedly put together the anthology, nor are we given the original source(s) of the published contributions. There are major typographical errors, and on one occasion the captions for the photographs are incorrect (p. 27) and should be reversed. The absence of an index and bibliography make the work less useful than it could have been. Nevertheless, given the paucity of material available on the Union, researchers can make use of the book's information and recollections about this important educational activity, which helped develop national consciousness among thousands of Ukrainians who served in the Russian army and who, because of the regime's politics, were more inclined to view themselves as *khakhly* than Ukrainians.

The time has certainly come for a reappraisal of the Union's significance. Scholars now have at their disposal the valuable secondary works of Professor Oleh Fedyshyn and the Ph.D. dissertation by Jerry Hans Hoffman, and those of Alfred Senn and Stephan Possony, to name a few others. All of them are based on German and Austrian archival records. The Public Archives of Canada in Ottawa will soon make available the Andrii Zhuk collection. It includes the papers, financial records, and publications of the Union—the most complete documentation by and about the Union—which have never been used before by scholars. This source, together with the Ievhen Batchinsky collection at Carleton University, also in Ottawa, will prove invaluable for anyone interested in doing original work on the Ukrainian national movement on the eve of the revolution and the civil war.

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IVAN TESLIA AND EVHEN TIUTKO, *ISTORYCHNYI ATLAS UKRAINY*. Ed. Liubomyr Vynar. Montreal, New York, and Munich: Ukrainian Historical Association, 1980.

The historical atlas of a country is somewhat like a dictionary of national biography or a national encyclopedia. It is a tool for both the pedagogue and the scholar and is usually an object of national pride. Thus, the Ukrainian Historical Association can rightly feel that it has done a real service to the development of the Ukrainian national heritage in publishing the first full-scale historical atlas of Ukraine.

Istorychnyi atlas Ukrayny contains forty-three colored maps arranged in chronological order and covering all periods of Ukrainian history. The first map describes the findings of Stone Age archeology, while the

last maps describe the twentieth-century migration of Ukrainian settlers and refugees throughout Asia, Europe, and the Americas. The second half of the atlas consists of a narrative, which provides a schematic synopsis of the major historical events and processes depicted in each map. The volume also contains an index of place names and a few introductory remarks by the authors and editor.

The general approach of the authors accords well with the national interpretation of Ukrainian history. Following the scheme first clearly defined by the historian Mykhailo Hrushevsky, the authors map out and describe Kievan Rus', the principality of Galicia-Volhynia, the Lithuanian expansion, and the emergence of modern times. Like Hrushevsky, the authors are concerned with showing the extent of the Ukrainian ethnic lands throughout the centuries; unlike Hrushevsky, there is—and this could never have been done by cartographers working in the Soviet Union—a clear emphasis on the various instances of Ukrainian statehood. Thus, not only is there a map of the Ukrainian state during the hetmancy of Bohdan Khmelnytsky, but also maps of Petro Doroshenko's Ukrainian state, Mazepa's Ukrainian state, the Ukrainian People's Republic and the Western Ukrainian People's Republic of 1918, and independent Carpatho-Ukraine in 1939. Given the strictly enforced Soviet ban on these subjects, it is perhaps natural that the authors should put a special stress on Ukrainian "statehood" at various points in history. The authors are, moreover, fully aware that this emphasis was accomplished at the expense of social, economic, demographic, cultural, and religious history.

It is questionable whether the sacrifice was worthwhile. This reviewer would have preferred to see less military history, less "wandering of the peoples" (map no. 5), less of Doroshenko's state (no. 26), less of Carpathian independence (no. 35), and more about the distribution of schools and monasteries during the renaissance, the struggle between religious confessions, the movement of population, and the constantly changing Ukrainian ethnic composition. Military and political history is well and good, but why could Catholic, Orthodox, and Protestant schools and colleges not have been shown on map 22, which depicts the Ukrainian lands on the eve of Khmelnytsky's uprising? Was not this conflict as much a religious and social upheaval as it was a national-political one? (Cf. A. Jobert, *De Luther à Mohila* [Paris, 1974], p. 245). The same point could be made for other periods as well. Furthermore, the introduction, "Ukraine in World History," is too polemical in tone and too general to add anything to the rest of the work. It should have been dropped and replaced by a few more maps, or substantially revised.

On another level, certain technical peculiarities are sure to disconcert even the general reader. The unusual color scheme, which minimizes the use of red, can be forgiven in a publication meant to compete with a future Soviet product. But what of the enormous and wasteful margins?

These occur both in the map sections and in the commentaries. Moreover, map 12, describing princely Kiev, fills less than one-quarter of an otherwise empty page. Would it have added to the cost of production to fill these empty spaces with an extra map or two? Or could not have the existing maps been made more detailed and been enlarged? After all, forty-three maps do not come close to doing justice to the complex and splendid panorama that is Ukrainian history.

On the other hand, several positive points can be made. Teslia and Tiutko's maps are well executed and generally accurate. With only a few exceptions, they are not too empty and not too cluttered. In this respect, they compare well with other East European efforts. (Compare, for example, the bewildering detail of the *Atlas zur Geschichte*, 2 vols. [Leipzig, 1973-75]). Teslia and Tiutko's volume also surpasses similar East European publications in the finesse of its printing. In this respect, it compares favorably with the full-color *Atlas historyczny świata* (Warsaw, 1974). The editors could have taken a leaf from the Warsaw publication and, on their endpapers, reprinted one or two classical examples of Ukrainian cartography, such as de Beauplan's famous map. They chose not to and instead used plain-color endpapers. The simple beauty of the deep blue binding that they opted for only partly makes up for this oversight.

Nevertheless, Teslia, Tiutko, and the Ukrainian Historical Association are to be commended for their efforts. They entered boldly where others feared to tread. The infelicities mentioned above do not significantly diminish their achievement.

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НАУКОВИЙ ЗБІРНИК МУЗЕЮ УКРАЇНСЬКОЇ КУЛЬТУРИ У СВІДНИКУ, т. 10. За редакцією І. Русинка, відповідальний редактор І. Мацинський. Пряшів, 1982. Стор. 664+252. Ціна 115 Кчс. Тираж 1400 прим.

В 1965 р. Свидницький музей української культури (ЧССР) видав перший том свого „Наукового збірника”, присвяченого пам’яті передчасно померлого дослідника народної мови русинів-українців Пряшівщини Ва-силя Латти.

Зараз же наступного року видано монотематичний збірник „Шлях до волі”, про участь українців Чехословаччини в національно-визвольній боротьбі проти фашизму.

Третій том збірника (1967 р.) було присвячено пам’яті найвизначнішого збирача й дослідника фолклору Закарпаття В. Гнатюка; четвертий (1969) — пам’яті діялектолога Івана Панькевича. Окремим додатком до цього тому видано працю І. Панькевича „Матеріали до історії мови південнокарпатських українців” (1970). П’ятий том — „Дерев’яні церкви східного

обряду на Словаччині" (1971) — це досконала документація 111 дерев'яних церков, каплиць та дзвіниць із 100 сіл Пряшівщини (439 фотографій та 432 пляні). Шостий том (1972) видано знов у двох книгах: перша містить різні наукові статті з історії, етнографії, мистецтвознавства: друга — монографію П. Марковича „Українські писанки Східної Словаччини" з кількома сотнями зразків цього старовинного виду народного мистецтва. Сьомий, восьмий та перша книга дев'ятого (1976, 1977, 1978) знов присвячені науковим розвідкам з різних ділянок науки. Друга книга дев'ятого тому (1979) охоплює матеріали комплексного дослідження семи українських сіл Старицької долини, що незабаром будуть занесені з карти у зв'язку з побудовою водоймища на цьому місці. І нарешті у 1982 р. читачі одержали в руки десятій ювілейний том цього цінного видання. *

Десять томів — це шість тисяч сторінок друку, десятки наукових статей та розвідок, звітів, оглядів та перш за все оригінальних першоджерельних матеріалів. Біля кожної статті чи архівного матеріалу подано чужомовні резюме (словашкою, російською та німецькою мовами), що значно поширює коло користання збірниками. В кожному томі подано іменний та географічний покажчики. Отже „Науковий збірник Музею української культури у Свиднику" за незначними винятками відповідає всім критеріям солідного наукового видання. За всім цим прихована кропітка і виснажлива праця авторів, рецензентів, редакторів, коректорів, упорядників, перекладачів, технічних робітників, друкарів тощо. Від початку 70-их років основну працю виконує відповідальний редактор збірника Іван Мацинський, на плечах якого лежить весь тягар видання.

Щоб мати уявлення про характер збірника, детальніше зупинимося на його десятому ювілейному томі, присвяченому по суті 200-річчю від народження видатного закарпатоукраїнського письменника, філософа та культурного діяча Василя Довговича (1783—1849), хоч цього факту на титульному листі не наведено.

Спомік всіх попередніх томів він є найоб'ємнішим (916 стор.). Відрізняється він від інших ще й тим, що містить перш за все першоджерельні матеріали і зараз на початку треба сказати, що йдеться про першоджерельні матеріали виняткової наукової вартості, які становлять вагомий внесок не лише в дослідження історії й культури Закарпаття, але й цілої України. Таких матеріалів у рецензованому збірнику три: рукопис поетичної збірки В. Довговича „Poemata Basili Donovits" з 1832 р., „Буквар" І. Брадача з 1770 року та „Словник української мови" Я. Головацького з 1857-59 рр.

Кожний з вищезазваних матеріалів заслуговував би на окреме книжкове видання (і були би це солідні книжки); однак в умовах музею легше видати один збірник, ніж три книжки. Та тут важлива не форма, а зміст.

* Примітка редакції: Між часом з'явився і одинадцятий том збірника.

Новознайдений твір „Поезії В. Довговича” з 1832 р. разом із вступною статтею І. Мацинського займає майже дві третини збірника (560 сторінок).

Історія цього мало відомого рукописного твору одного з основоположників закарпатоукраїнської літератури надзвичайно цікава. Рукопис Довговича крім автобіографії та бібліографії містить 190 поезій (131 латинських, 41 угорських та 18 українських). Першу інформацію про нього подав В. Бирчак у „Літературних стремліннях Підкарпатської Русі” (Ужгород, 1921). Інформацію В. Бирчака потрапила й в інші видання, однак майже ніхто з дослідників не мав у руках оригіналу, який між часом став власністю А. Волошина. Після війни рукопис вважався загублений; однак на початку 60-их років І. Мацинський знайшов його у бібліотеці К. Заклинського (останнього управителя працього Музею Визвольної Боротьби України) і, набувши його, у 1972 р. передав у фонд Свидницького музею української культури. Збірником зацікавилися пряшівські і закарпатські дослідники (О. Рудловчак, Л. Бабота, В. Маслюк, В. Микитась, Ю. Сак) і їх спільним зусиллям цей цінний рукопис було підготовлено до друку. У рецензованому виданні його опубліковано фототипічним способом (на жаль у дуже поганій репродукції, завиненій неякісною фотокопією) з паралельним перекладом чужомовних матеріалів українською літературною мовою. Українські вірші подані в оригіналі.

Збірник В. Довговича відкривається обширною розвідкою І. Мацинського „Кінець XVIII — перша половина XIX ст. та життя і діяльність Василя Довговича” (с. 23-110). Розвідка на багатому фактичному матеріалі освітлює період просвітительства на Закарпатті (включно з Пряшівчиною) і на фоні конкретних історичних умов розглядає діяльність В. Довговича. Це є найглибша і найвизначніша характеристика не лише цього мало відомого діяча української культури, але і доби в якій він жив і працював.

Фототипічним способом передруковано у збірнику (на цей раз з бездоганними фотокопіями) і дальшу цінну пам'ятку закарпатської літератури — „Букварь — или руководіє хотящим учитися письмены руско-славянскими” з 1770 р., приписуваний І. Брадачу. Буквар було надруковано 1770 р. у Відні, однак крижевецький єпископ Василь Божичкович, що виконував роль духовного придворного цензора, знайшов у ньому кілька місць, які на його думку суперечили догмам католицької церкви і в листі до Марії Терези обвинував Брадача у схизмі. Наслідком цього обвинувачення цілий тираж „Букваря” було спалено. В науці закоренилася думка, що зберігся лише один примірник, який переховується у Віденській науковій бібліотеці, однак нещодавно було виявлено ще один примірник цього „Букваря” (трохи пошкоджений) і саме цей примірник передруковано у збірнику. Принагідно зазначимо, що в останніх роках у Пряшеві було фототипічним способом передруковано „Буквар” де-Камеліса з 1669 р. та „Книжицю читальну” О. Духновича з 1847 р. С. Гостиняк у короткому вступі не наводить істо-

рію знайдення цього цінного примірника, обмежившись лише коротким зауваженням: „Знайдено його 1950 р. в Кошицях. Змінивши кількох приватних власників, примірник той нарешті опинився в Свидницькому музею української культури” (с. 234). Однак упорядник збірника І. Мацинський на іншому місці того ж збірника пише, що він „у 1964 р. в кошицькому парофіяльному будинку виявив тоді єдиний відомий примірник букваря І. Брадача 1770 р.” (с. 99). У цих двох твердженнях бачимо певні розходження, однак пріоритет відкриття „Букваря” без сумніву належить І. Мацинському.

Буквар І. Брадача значно відрізняється від сучасних букварів. „Букварна” частина в ньому займає лише перших 13 сторінок. На дальших 58 сторінках подано молитви та основні правила християнської віри. Отже, буквар був одночасно молитовником та основним підручником релігії.

Третій оригінальний документ непересічної наукової ваги, повністю опублікований на сторінках рецензованого збірника, це „Матеріали для словаря малоруського наречія, собраня в Галиції і в Северовосточній Венгрії Я. Ф. Головацьким” (с. 351—612), підготовлені до друку ще у 50-их роках м. ст. На жаль, Я. Головацький закінчив лише першу частину свого словника (літери А — З), яка охоплює майже 10.000 слів, з того 460 специфічних закарпатоукраїнських діалектних слів. Упорядники цього новознайденого словника Й. Дзензелівський та С. Ганудель присвятили йому обширну вступну статтю (с. 311-42), в якій вважають цей словник „найвизначнішою працею Я. Головацького” (с. 313). На їх думку це „досконалій регіональний українсько-російський словник сучасних йому говорів Галичини, Буковини та Закарпаття. Хронологічно це один із перших наших власне діалектологічних словників, своїм розміром він перевершує всі українські опубліковані і відомі рукописні праці такого типу. У цьому регіональному словнику вміщено велику кількість специфічної діалектологічної лексики, яка досі ще не фіксувалася наявними друкованими джерелами і яка вперше вводиться в науковий обіг” (с. 329-30).

Окремі слова у словнику ілюстровані цінними строфами народних пісень, звичаями та іншими фольклорними творами. До вступної статті долу-чену фотокопії обкладинок збірників, якими Я. Головацький користався (Вацлава Зелеського, І. Лозинського, Жеготи Паулі, О. Ачанасьєва-Чужбинського). Та на жаль, не подано фотокопії жодної сторінки публікованого словника Я. Головацького.

Крім трьох першоджерельних матеріалів, рецензований збірник містить ще три наукові розвідки з історії, етнографії та археології українців Східної Словаччини.

В першій з них, „Спільна революційна боротьба трудацьких Закарпаття та Східної Словаччини в 1930-33 роках” (с. 7—21), ужгородський історик І. М. Гранчак розглянув деякі аспекти діяльності комуністичної партії на території Закарпатської України та Східної Словаччини у період економічної кризи.

Розвідка молодої працівницеї Свидницького музею Надії Вархол (раніше Варян), „Жінка-демон в народних віруваннях українців Східної Словаччини” (с. 275-309), побудована на власних польових записах 1977-80 рр. В ній вона розглянула такі жіночі демонічні істоти, як богиня, дика баба, єжібаба, одміна, сатана, мамона, перелесниця, повітруля, вітерниця, колесниця, глушкання, колера, смертка, русалка, варвара, босорканя та деякі інші. Більшість з них вона документує оригінальними народними оповіданнями. Шкода, що вона не зробила більш чітку внутрішню диференціацію та характеристику цих магічних істот, хоча б за зразком праці В. Гнатюка „Знадоби до української демонології”.

Стаття словацького археолога Л. Олексу „Історико-археологічне дослідження у Красному Броді в 1976 році” (с. 613-40) подає звіт про археологічні розкопки території василіянського монастиря у Красному Броді, знищеноого в часі першої світової війни і з того часу не відновленого. В дослідженні, що тривало понад три тижні, крім автора брало участь дванадцять студентів-істориків Пряшівського філософського факультету Університету ім. Шафарика.

Краснобрідський монастир зіграв дуже важливу роль в історії закарпатської культури. Як відомо, тут існувала філософська школа (невідомо чому автор деградував її на „підготовчий навчальний заклад”), в якій працювали видатні педагоги (Коцка, Шугайда), була багата бібліотека, тричі на рік тут відбувалися масові зборища з „жіночими ярмарками”, тощо. Не дивно, що громадськість з великим інтересом стежила за результатами розкопок. Та як випливає із поданого звіту, „всупереч затраченим зусиллям не вдалося виявити ані непрямі докази існування середньовічного оселення місцевознаходження. Не було знайдено ані фрагменти мурів, ані черепки кераміки, які б можна було датувати до XVII сторіччя” (с. 623). Виходячи з археологічного дослідження монастиря автор піддає сумніву факт його існування перед XVIII ст. і закликає дослідників до „обережності з датуванням давніх фаз будування монастирського комплексу, бо донині не виявлено підтвердження його середньовічного існування” (с. 623). На іншому місці він твердить, що заснування Краснобрідського монастиря у XVI ст. „нічим не задокументовано” (с. 614). Я не є археологом і не хочу судити про сумлінність експедиції при дослідженні даного об'єкту, однак історичні факти зовсім не піддають сумнівові існування Краснобрідського монастиря у XVI ст. Так із 1612 р. маемо вже детальний публікований опис селянського бунту у Краснобрідському монастирі влітку 1611 р., викликаний прагненням Другета та перемиського єпископа Крупецького запровадити унію на Закарпатті (див.: К. Заклинський, Нарис історії Краснобрідського монастиря, „Науковий збірник МУК”, т. I., Пряшів, 1965). Ще до того часу монастир було знищено власником Гуменського панства Другетом і наново побудовано. Отже, якщо вже 1611 р. Краснобрідський монастир було обрано

центром проголошення унії, то він мусив існувати хоча б пару десятиліть раніше.

Правда, в документах наводиться, що монастир у своїх першопочатках був дерев'яним, він кілька разів вигорів дотла і його муровані споруди є і справді новішого походження.

Десятий том „Наукового збірника Музею української культури у Свиднику” є найоб'ємнішим і зімстово найбагатшим томом цього періодичного видання. Його найбільше значення полягає у публікуванні першоджерельних матеріалів з історії та культури закарпатських українців. Щиро рекомендуємо його зокрема українським історикам, літературознавцям та мовознавцям.

Віримо, що по наміченому шляху піде збірник і в майбутньому.

Микола Мушинка
Пряшів

Wooden Churches in the Carpathians/Holzkirchen in den Karpaten. Photographs by Florian Zapletal, selected and with an introduction by Paul R. Magocsi. Vienna: W. Braumüller Universitäts-Verlagsbuchhandlung GmbH, 1982. 176 pp.

В рецензованій книжці вміщено 240 фотографій чеського журналіста і дослідника Флоріана Заплетала (1884-1969). Все це фотографії дерев'яних і муріваних церков та інших споруд народної архітектури з українських сіл Закарпаття та Пряшівщини; між ними вміщено також кілька фотографій місцевого населення в народних убраннях. Увагу привертає відносно висока якість фотографій, якщо взяти до уваги, що вони зроблені в першій половині 20-их років. Всі фотографії, звичайно, некольорові.

Основна цінність цієї публікації полягає в тому, що значна кількість церков та інших споруд, які фотографував Ф. Заплетал, вже сьогодні не існує. Про деякі знищенні церкви та споруди не зберігся або ніякий, або лише недостатній документаційний матеріал. Тому ця книжка є помітним внеском до дослідження історії народної архітектури згаданих українських етнічних областей.

Крім фотографій Ф. Заплетала тут публіковано передмову П. Р. Магочі до цієї публікації, далі статтю Флоріана Заплетала „Дерев'яні церкви південнокарпатських русинів” і кілька рисунків до фотографованих церков із публікації Володимира Січинського (V. Sičinský, Dřevěné stavby v Karpatské oblasti. Praha, 1940). В кінці книжки наведено алфаветний реєстр всіх сіл Закарпаття і Пряшівщини, з яких тут опубліковано фотографічний матеріал. Всі ці матеріали (передмова, стаття Ф. Заплетала, пояснення до фотографій, алфаветний реєстр) наведено паралельно німецькою і англійською мовами. В кінці також вміщено карту Закарпатської України і Пряшівщини з назвами сіл, з яких тут опубліковано фотографічний матеріал.

В передмові П. Р. Маґочі робить стислий огляд історичного розвитку українського населення Закарпаття і Пряшівщини і торкається чесько-українських культурних і суспільних стосунків в 19—20 століттях. Він вважає одним із результатів зацікавлення чеської інтелігенції західними українцями те, що Ф. Заплетал зосередив свою увагу на населення і культуру цих областей. Так пояснює він також виникнення публікованого комплекту сьогодні вже історичних фотографій.

В передмові також подано в основних рисах біографію Ф. Заплетала. Особливу увагу тут автор зосереджує на зв'язках чеського дослідника із західноукраїнським середовищем. Ф. Заплетал належав до тих представників чеської інтелігенції, які захоплювалися своєрідною романтикою західноукраїнських сіл та їхнім населенням. Він із щирою прихильністю ставився до українців і публікованим комплектом фотографій зробив їм неоцініму прислугу. У зв'язку з цим тут слід позитивно оцінити організаторську працю П. Р. Маґочі, без якої ця книжка не могла б появитися.

Однаке, автор передмови населення сіл згаданих українських етнічних областей не називає українцями. П. Р. Маґочі їх послідовно означає карпато-русинами, а в тексті наводить, що вони відомі також як карпато-росіяни, карпато-рутени або карпато-українці. Це видання претендує на науковий рівень. Намагання представляти населення українських етнічних областей Закарпаття і Пряшівщини не українцями є сьогодні вже незаперечним анахронізмом. І якщо з історичного погляду ще можна зрозуміти згадування віджилих означень цього населення карпато-русинами, карпато-рутенами чи карпато-українцями, то вже ніяк не можна толерувати означення цих людей карпато-росіянами, тому що ніяка безпосередня етнічна спорідненість з російським народом тут не існувала і не існує. Цей анахронізм дещо знижує вартість інакше цінної публікації.

П. Р. Маґочі в передмові також згадує, що фотографії Ф. Заплетала він отримав від чехословацького етнографа Миколи Мушинки. У зв'язку з цим цікава та обставина, що передмова в багатьох місцях нагадує стиль і численні положення, які властиві публікаціям і різним виступам саме М. Мушинки (напр., все, що стосується Ф. Заплетала, а зокрема частини передмови про його біографію, зв'язки з українцями і етнографічна аналіза публікованого фотоматеріялу). Ця спорідненість настільки виразна, що вона по мітна навіть з англійського і німецького текстів.

Стаття Заплетала „Дерев'яні церкви південнокарпатських русинів” (вийшла 1923 року в Празі чеською мовою у публікації: Josef Chmelař, *Podkarpatská Rus*) належить до тих особливо цінних матеріалів, які докumentують ставлення представників інших народів до культурних надбань українського населення. Автор тут наводить, що в першій половині 20-их років збереглося на Пряшівщині і на Закарпатті близько 150 оригінальних дерев'яних церков. Найстарші з них були побудовані у 17 столітті. Він розподіляє церкви з цієї території на три основні групи і подає їхню характер-

ристику. Він каже, що ці церкви могли б бути гордістю, славою і радістю будь-якого народу, але що світ про них не знає. Ф. Заплетал тут також скаржиться на те, що місцеве населення до цих дерев'яних церков ставилося у 20-х роках з недостатньою повагою і на багатьох місцях їх замінювало банальними кам'яними будовами.

В англійському і німецькому перекладах статті Заплетала знаходяться деякі неточності. Наприклад, на самому початку статті Заплетал говорить про територію на якій знаходяться ним фотографовані церкви і каже що ширина цієї території є всього 20-25 км, але довжина понад 300 км. Перекладач на англійську мову Майкл Бурк ці дані переклав так: ширина 15-40 миль, а довжина 300 миль; перекладач на німецьку мову Гелга Гайнес ці дані перекладає так: ширина 24-64 км, а довжина 480 км. З цього видно, що німецький переклад зроблено не з чеського оригіналу, як це наведено в книжці, але з англійського перекладу.

Про дерев'яні церкви та інші споруди на етнічній території, заселеній ще тепер або в минулому західними українцями, існує сьогодні вже немало публікованих праць. Шкода, що в цій публікації не наведено бібліографію хоча би найважливіших із них. (В передмові згадано лише працю Січинського з 1940 р.).

Музей української культури у Свиднику видав у 1971 р. монографію „Дерев'яні церкви східного обряду на Словаччині” (автори Б. Ковачевичова-Пушкарьова та І. Пушкар, „Науковий збірник Музею української культури у Свиднику”, т. 5, 528 стор.). Це дуже ретельно опрацьована монографія зі значним документаційним матеріалом про дерев'яні церкви в українських селах Пряшівщини. Автори і працівники музею, однаке, не мали доступ до фотоматеріалу Ф. Заплетала. Тому деякі церкви, які сьогодні вже не існують, в цій монографії не задокументовані, а на фотографіях Ф. Заплетала їх можна ще бачити.

В порівнянні з цією монографією має рецензована публікація переважно популяризуюче значення для читачів західних держав (тим більше, що текст подано двома західними мовами). Дальша різниця полягає також в тому, що Ф. Заплетал у своєму кількісно великому комплекті фотографій все-таки не задокументував всі церкви в українських селах Пряшівщини і Закарпаття. До того ж свидницька монографія зовсім не стосується Закарпаття, але лише Пряшівщини.

Слід також зауважити, що назва рецензованої публікації не цілком відповідає її змісту — на фотографіях Ф. Заплетала є не лише дерев'яні, але також муровані церкви та інші будови.

Однаке треба зауважити, що пізнавально-історична цінність цієї книжки заслуговує на те, щоб її видати також українською мовою.

Павло Мурашко
Прага

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A TABLE OF TRANSLITERATION

(Modified Library of Congress)

а	—	a	ї	—	i	ф	—	f
б	—	b	҃	—	i	х	—	kh
в	—	v	к	—	k	ц	—	ts
г	—	h	л	—	l	ч	—	ch
ѓ	—	g	м	—	m	ш	—	sh
đ	—	d	н	—	n	шћ	—	shch
е	—	e	о	—	o	ю	—	iu
е	—	ie	п	—	p	я	—	ia
ж	—	zh	р	—	r	ь	—	-
з	—	z	с	—	s	-ий	—	y in endings
и	—	y	т	—	t			of personal
и	—	i	у	—	u			names only

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